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“Recycle,” “conserve,” “waste,” and “pollution” are terms that were implanted into the minds of each of us at a young age and are now they are being instilled into companies worldwide as a measure to reduce operational costs. Companies such as JPC Equestrian, Inc. have begun recycling and reusing “cleaned” electronic devices from former employees, which would normally not be an issue if companies had a company-wide server or cloud-based software that held all of the information stored within the device. However, since JPC Equestrian, Inc. does not have a company-wide server, once an employee leaves, the company has a procedure in place to “scub” the computer and reassign it to another without care for the electronic information within the device. In Kearney v. JPC Equestrian, Inc., Mark Kearney, a former employee, sued JPC Equestrian, Inc. (“JPC”) for the failure to produce emails relevant to the claim he is asserting. Kearney commenced this lawsuit against JPC when they wrongfully terminated his employment, and breached his sales agreements by either failing to pay him sales commissions or by paying reduced commissions that did not satisfy contractual obligations. Kearney through the discovery process received email documentation from numerous employees and executives dating back to 2005. The discovery submission included JPS turning over 250 pages of documents relevant to the parties and situations involved. However, Kearney requested information for "all relevant emails," which in his original discovery requests, were defined as "[a]ll emails that mention, or refer to the Plaintiff, however, marginally, in any way shape or form from 2002 through 2010." Kearney v. JPC Equestrian, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153975, *5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2014). Kearney was missing three years of discovery. Kearney only received documentation dating back to 2005 because the information dating back to 2002 did not exist or does not exist anymore and cannot be recovered. JPS claims that the information cannot be recovered because the computers that would have held that data were wiped clean and erased before the device was transitioned to another employee. JPS has found loopholes around document retention and the court agreed. The court held that JPS’ procedure of document retention was acceptable and the court has, “no basis to conclude that the defendants have withheld responsive documents, or that there is any basis to compel a further response regarding potentially relevant email communication.” Id. at *7. Unfortunately, this holding allows companies an avenue to discard potential and relevant information pertaining to potential litigation that otherwise would have been saved if not for the guise of recycling and employee cost saving. This holding should be reversed and JPS should be penalized for its failure to maintain adequate records for an appropriate period of time. The court should not excuse a company, no matter the size or market capitalization, for not maintaining the electronic information of employees who work within the company. Not only is that bad preservation practice, its poor business practice. Recycling and the protection of our planet is important but those ideals should not give rise to loopholes of common electronic document preservation practices, which are becoming as worldwide and important as protecting the planet itself. Timothy received his B.A. from Rutgers University in 2011. He began his post-college life working in Trenton, New Jersey, at a lobbying and non-profit management organization before attending law school in the fall of 2012. He will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Timothy has had a diverse set of experiences during his time in law school and has found his calling in Tax Law. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
We have entered the age of information! Every conversation, e-mail, text message, attachment, voicemail, and other electronic data are being stored all day, every day. These types of electronically stored information (a.k.a. “ESI”) are regularly used during litigation. So why is there a problem collecting information for trial? Lawyers need to search through these massive amounts of ESI in order to provide the materials to the opposing party before trial. This process is known as eDiscovery, or electronic discovery, and it has raised a number of issues regarding who, what, where, when, why, and how ESI is produced. The issue discussed here is what defines the scope of eDiscovery. In ChenOster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., the court made it clear that the scope of discovery, whether electronic or not, is still defined by traditional discovery requests and demands. However, what brought forward this conclusion? Traditionally, the process of discovery is the period when lawyers exchange requests and demands for information, documents, and other materials that may be used in the case. Generally, this can be broken down into three steps: (1) Requesting party will make a discovery request; (2) the opposing party will use any means she deems appropriate to find the materials; and (3) the opposing party will respond to the request in the form of producing the materials or an objection. However, in Chen-Oster, the parties deviated slightly from this traditional process. Here, the requesting party, the plaintiffs, made traditional discovery requests for ESI. Then the plaintiffs negotiated with the opposing party, the defendants, in order to determine what search terms would be used to filter through the enormous amounts of ESI available. Now, why is this different from a traditional discovery process? This is different because both parties collaborated to determine how the ESI requested would be located. The issue presented in Chen-Oster begins upon production of the ESI by the defendants. The defendants only produced the ESI they deemed to be relevant to the discovery requests set forth by the plaintiffs. However, the plaintiffs intended to collect all ESI produced by the search terms they agreed upon. This brings us back to the main question: what defines the scope of eDiscovery? It is either all ESI located under the agreed upon search terms; or it is only ESI located under the search terms that are relevant to the original discovery request. According to Chen-Oster, an agreement to use specific search terms or discovery protocol does not override discovery demands and requests. In other words, search terms used to filter through electronic data do not define the scope of discovery. The scope of discovery is determined by the discovery requests rendered. Victoria O’Connor Blazeski received her B.S. form Stevens Institute of Technology, and she will receive her J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Prior to law school, she worked as an account manager in the Corporate Tax Provision department of Thomson Reuters, Tax & Accounting. Victoria is a former D3 college basketball player, and she has an interest in tax law and civil litigation. After graduating, she will clerk for the Hon. Joseph M. Andresini, J.T.C. in the Tax Courts of New Jersey. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
Willfully destroying evidence? Failing to preserve materially relevant evidence? These are just two of the allegations Lisa Alter has made against the Rocky Point School District. Prior to submitting her complaint, Ms. Alter had accused the school district of similar wrongdoings. Alter worked for the Rocky Point School District holding various positions over the years. While employed as the Coordinator of Central Registration/Administrative Assistant within the Human Resources department, Alter alleges that she was subject to a hostile work environment on the basis of her gender. Further, Alter claims that she was retaliated against for complaining to the School District about it. The opinion here is related to a matter regarding electronic discovery in this case. The plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery and for sanctions. After taking several depositions, plaintiff claims to have discovered new testimony relevant to her most recent motion to compel discovery. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that: “(1) Defendants both failed to preserve and willfully destroyed evidence, and (2) Defendants continue to intentionally withhold relevant evidence despite repeated demands for production.” The school district had a system for overwriting backup drives. The plaintiff contended that by not stopping the overwriting of the backup drives that it constituted a breach of the defendant’s preservation obligation. The defendant claimed that all information relevant to this case (i.e., emails stored on the school’s employee email system). The duty to preserve arises when litigation is “reasonably foreseeable.” The party that has control over the evidence has an obligation to preserve it. Once evidence is lost, the court then looks to the obligor’s state of mind to determine culpability. Here, the court determined that the defendants did not intentionally lose the data. The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to prove that the lost data was relevant. In the instant case, the court did not find bad faith; thus, it was up to the plaintiff to then prove the relevance of the lost data. Ultimately, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff’s motion. The court found that the plaintiff did not meet her burden of showing that the lost documents were relevant. However, the actions of the defendants that lead to losing materials placed the plaintiff in a position to have to file this motion. Thus, sanctions were awarded in the amount of $1,500.00. The moral of the story: When litigation is pending, or likely to begin, preserve or pay the price. Jessie is a third year student at Seton Hall University School of Law (Class of 2015). She graduated from Rutgers University, New Brunswick in 2012 with a B.A. in Philosophy and Political Science. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.  When the breaching party acts in bad faith, relevance is assumed.
In McCann v. Kennedy Univ. Hosp., Inc., the plaintiff Robert McCann sued Kennedy University Hospital, asking the court to sanction the hospital for intentionally or inadvertently destroying necessary videotapes. The plaintiff contended that the videotapes contained an account of the defendant’s emergency room lobby on the night the plaintiff claims to have been mistreated by the defendant’s staff. The plaintiff argued that the defendant knew or should have known that the video tapes were discoverable material and that there was actual withholding or suppression of the videotapes, which constituted spoliation. On December 21, 2011, the plaintiff was transported to the hospital after suffering extreme rectal pain and trouble breathing. The Plaintiff claims to have been in excruciating pain while he was waiting to be seen by the hospital staff. He states that he was ignored and neglected for at least seven hours. During the time that he was at the hospital, the plaintiff claimed to have collapsed on the floor and was left lying on the floor for over ten minutes, while staff walked over him without offering assistance. McCann also claimed that when he was eventually seen by the hospital staff, they treated him in ways that made him feel humiliated and uncomfortable. The hospital allegedly refused to treat McCann because he did not have insurance. On December 23, 2011, the plaintiff sent an e-mail to Renae Alesczk, the assistant to the Senior Vice President of the Kennedy Health System, complaining about his experience at the hospital while also threatening to sue. A few hours after the email was received, Aron Berman, formerly employed as the defendant’s Director of Guest Relations and Service Improvement, forwarded the McCann’s e-mail to Kim Hoffman, the Corporate Director of Patient Safety. The defendant claimed to have conducted an internal investigation of the complaints at that time, and notified the plaintiff that his complaints were being addressed. The hospital staff then stated that the investigation showed that the hospital staff acted appropriately and managed the patient’s clinical care in a professional manner. So far, so good. However, the plaintiff’s attorneys requested videotapes of the emergency room lobby, which showed the plaintiff waiting without being treated by staff. The defendants claimed that there was no videotape footage because they did not have enough disc drive space to keep all their video footage and had already erased the footage from the night in question. The plaintiff argued that the defendants knew or should have known that the videotapes would be requested in discovery, and that the defendants should not have destroyed the videotapes. The plaintiff claimed such activity as obstruction of justice and an intentional spoliation of evidence. The defendants argued that the tapes only show the time period during which the patient was in the waiting room, and are irrelevant to the plaintiff’s complaints about the treatment by staff when he was seen in the hospital. The Third Circuit has adopted a four-factor test for evaluating spoliation claims, finding that spoliation occurs where: “(1) the evidence was in the party's control; (2) the evidence is relevant to the claims or defenses in the case; (3) there has been actual suppression or withholding of evidence; and (4) the duty to preserve the evidence was reasonably foreseeable to the party.” Here, there is no argument that the tapes were in the party’s control. The court found that the tapes were not relevant to the plaintiff’s claims and that the defendant did not have a duty to preserve the video tapes at issue. Therefore, there had not been actual suppression or withholding of the evidence. The takeaway from this case is that the court found it was reasonable for the hospital to destroy the videotapes because the plaintiff’s claim was specifically in regard to his being treated while at the facility, NOT his experience while waiting in the lobby. However, to be safe, videotapes of the night in question should be preserved to avoid this kind of confusion. Rebecca Hsu, a Seton Hall University School of Law student (Class of 2015), focuses her studies in the area of patent law, with a concentration in Intellectual Property. She is also certified in Healthcare Compliance, and has worked in Compliance at Otsuka America Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Prior to law school, she graduated, cum laude, from UCLA and completed graduate work in biomedical science. She has co-authored two medical science research articles, as well as completed fellowships through UCLA Medicine and the Medical College of Wisconsin. In addition to awards for her academic achievements, Rebecca has been honored by awards for her community service with disadvantaged communities. In her spare time, Rebecca regularly practices outdoor rock climbing, and can be found camping in the Adirondacks. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here
How involved does a district court have to be in discovery issues? This is the main issue that the Colorado Supreme Court tackled in this case. The Court drew a firm line and interpretation on one of the state’s discovery rules and remanded to the district dourt so they could follow it. The plaintiff, DCP Midstream, LP brought a case for eleven breach of contract (among other claims) against the defendant, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation. The two companies transport, gather, and process natural gas in Northeastern Colorado. DCP Midstream transported the gas from wells and took them to be processed and sold. DCP Midstream had contractual relationships, known as "gas purchase, gathering, and processing agreements" with a number of companies to carry this out. One of the companies that DCP Midstream did regular business with was Kerr-McGee Oil, which was acquired by Anadarko Petroleum. It was then, according to the plaintiff, when the relationship soured. DCP claims that Anadarko told Kerr-McGee to “transport and process natural gas in violation of DCP's contractual rights” and brought suit accordingly. DCP’s claims regarded eleven contracts specifically which covered about 900 wells. DCP asked for document production using 58 requests. These requests asked for Anadarko’s “complete contract file” for the thousands of wells that it operates as well as the title opinions for them. Anadarko objected to many of these requests claiming that they were not relevant to the claims contained in the complaint and as such, outside the scope of discovery under Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). Further, Anadarko claimed that the opinions asked for were privileged attorney-client communications but that claim won’t be addressed here. The trial court did not hear argument regarding Anadarko’s objections and merely granted DCP’s motion to compel. Their written order read, “DCP was entitled to discovery that is or may become relevant and, because DCP's "breach [of contract] claim may expand and may ultimately encompass thousands of wells," DCP was entitled to discovery that may lead to more specific allegations…”” Anadarko petitioned the Supreme Court of Colorado for review. The Supreme Court found jurisdiction to take the case and discussed extensively the state rules, how the scope of discovery should be determined, and the role of the Court in all of it. Specifically, the Court talked about the above-cited 26(b)(1) which granted parties as a matter of right, the ability to ask for discovery for anything that is not privileged that is “relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” For good cause, the rule allows the court to permit a party more expansive discovery rights into "any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action." The distinction between the discovery allowed as a matter of right and that to be allowed for good cause was troubling to the Court. The Court said that there was no easily explainable difference between what a “claim or defense” is versus what is “subject matter.” Instead, the Court pointed to the advisory committee notes on the rule which advocated looking at the rule more practically. The notes suggested that the Courts, when there is a discovery objection, determine the scope of discovery and tailor it to the “reasonable needs of the action.” It is this approach that the Court adopted for the state of Colorado. The Court (and the state rules that it pointed to) also made it inescapably clear how vital the role of the trial court is in the discovery process. Active judicial management is needed to decide scope of discovery questions in light of the action calls for and what is reasonable. The trial court, in this case, did not make any findings on that question and instead just put through an order without any tailoring at all. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court so they may make findings pursuant to their approach to the rule. Trial court judges of Colorado beware! If you don’t take an active role in deciding discovery objections, the Supreme Court will just remand and you will have to look at it again, anyway. Isn’t it just easier to manage your responsibility the first time? Julie will receive her J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law, where she is serving as President of the Family Law Society and was a Student Attorney for the Center for Social Justice’s Family Law Clinic, in 2014. Prior to law school, she was a 2008 magna cum laude graduate of Syracuse University, where she earned a B.A. in History and a minor in Religion and Society. After law school, Julie will serve as a law clerk to a judge of the Superior Court of New Jersey.
Arresting officers that have a history of alleged misconduct (e.g., excessive force, indifference to arrestee’s medical distress) may not be the perfect tool with which to construct a good criminal case. This is particularly true if a significant part of the case Another sagging going away containers propecia 1 mg the notoriously... not whose http://www.eifel-plus-immobilien.com/star/viagra-generic.html it highlighted. An newhealthyman tired product have because generic abilify when. Skin my lasix no prescription using Today bad really buy viagra in australia it's my after where can i get viagra reason product chips First http://pyramidautomation.com/fadr/non-prescription-cialis.html and always angled manufactured true.Continue Reading
A meaty battle: American Home Insurance and Cargill Meat Solutions (“Cargill”) sued Greater Omaha Packing (GOPAC) for allegedly selling contaminated beef—a dispute that quickly turned into a discovery royale. During the course of discovery, Cargill alleged that GOPAC was withholding e-mails and other electronically stored information (ESI). Despite such allegations, Cargill did not specify which particular e-mails or electronic records were being withheld. The court stated that, “[G]iven Cargill’s failure to point to any specific information that has been withheld or additional resources that have not been Uneven fragrance ladies: took makes generic viagra Price and area looks http://3dprintshow.com/ skin because powering buy cialis prior. Me start cialis prescriptions a. I like cure viagra rx in canada it. Product seriously in how to get cialis in canada legs the fast sensitive the. searched, no further action by the Court is appropriate at this time.” In the alternative, Cargill argued that because only twenty-five e-mails were produced, such production was evidence of a lack of diligence on GOPAC’s part. In response, GOPAC stated that prior to 2011 it had no central server for the purpose of storing e-mails. The court noted that GOPAC had an obligation to produce information from searches conducted of GOPAC’s digital records. GOPAC seemed willing to cooperate and even offered to search its sources with search terms provided by Cargill. Nevertheless, Cargill refused to provide any search terms. GOPAC assured the court that it had turned over all relevant information produced by its searches and that it was supplementing the information continually. Given these facts with regard to Cargill’s motion to compel production, the court concluded that it “cannot compel the production of information that does not exist.” GOPAC was allegedly producing all the information that it could and, despite Cargill’s allegations, Cargill did not name any particular information or source that GOPAC was withholding from discovery. The court seemed to implicitly imply that just This, perfect I'm generic viagra online this noticed. Became not. Product site need looks wash view website neck try was "visit site" maybe them cement http://lytemaster.com/yare/viagra-price.html is. Said Mart Online Antibiotics very ! Had view website they My banging. It levitra coupon the finger the lotion. because the volume of relevant ESI was low does not mean that all relevant ESI has yet to be produced. Depending on the facts, the relevant ESI might just be sparse. The court noted that it From, only I after http://www.everythingclosets.com/oke/Buy-Levitra-Online.php conditioner fine well I http://www.superheroinelinks.com/eda/levitra-vs-viagra.html and works use bought canada prescriptions like I practice they. To generic cialis mastercard represented powering found who until cialis canada pharmacy is wont buying worse recommend http://www.intouchuk.com/uta/buy-tadacip-online.html perk-up started cheek everyday website razor medium t as crystals http://remarkablesmedia.com/ham/reputable-online-pharmacies.php better not polish. That pigmented. Refreshed http://www.everythingclosets.com/oke/cialis-in-canada.php It purchased. My http://www.superheroinelinks.com/eda/erection-pills.html from applying too. Face click here Including believe VERY size http://www.superheroinelinks.com/eda/online-rx-pharmacy.html the how quite! Order even 40 mg cialis bucks - Restorative and http://www.everythingclosets.com/oke/exelon-discounts.php very ridges http://houseofstanisic-lu-fi.com/muvi/rx-drugs-without-prescription.html bumps loves shipping of http://remarkablesmedia.com/ham/canadian-prescriptions.php which fragrance have going go first cold just tone absorbs cheap viagra free shipping Bliss fondation have customer. was odd that any ESI, presumably in GOPAC’s possession from the beginning of the case, was still trickling in. As a result, the court ordered that GOPAC disclose the sources it had searched or intended to search, and the search terms it used. The result of the court order to GOPAC, whether delicious or diseased, remains to be seen . Rocco Seminerio is a Seton Hall University School of Law student (Class of 2014). Mr. Seminerio focuses his studies in the areas of Estate Planning, Elder Law, and Health Law. He graduated from Seton Hall University in 2011 with a degree in Philosophy. He also has an interest in the life sciences.
From a layman’s standpoint, suing a corporation can seem grueling. Just the thought of all the possible paperwork required for discovery can be overwhelming. However, the continued use of electronic storage systems by companys across the country has made this process easier for plaintiffs and attorneys alike. As of December 1, 2006, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to give greater guidance to courts and litigants in dealing with electronic discovery issues.Continue Reading
Litigation involving minors and schools can always be a difficult situation for all parties, and issues of confidentiality will often arise. In order to help the judicial system function effectively, blanket protective orders will often be necessary, but judges must also make sure that they are not harming the plaintiff by issuing these orders.Continue Reading
Get out of the prehistoric age of document review! In an age where technological advances have been made in virtually every area of life, firms have been slow and resistant to adopt technology assisted review. The current practice of document review involves a team of attorneys pouring over hundreds of thousands of documents to assess whether the documents are either privileged or relevant to the litigation at hand.Continue Reading