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After requesting and receiving a consumer credit disclosure from defendant Experian, plaintiff Edward Dixon noticed that Experian was not reporting his payment history concerning his mortgage account held by Green Tree Servicing, LLC. While Dixon admits that his mortgage account was previously held by GMAC Mortgage until the account was discharged in bankruptcy, he argued that his payment history with Green Tree should nevertheless have been reported by Experian because he continued to make mortgage payments to Green Tree post-bankruptcy. After filing suit against Experian alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Dixon served seventy Requests for Production and 40 topics for Experian’s Rule 30(b)(6) corporate witness. While Experian asserts it has already produced 966 pages of discovery, Dixon asked the court to compel Experian to provide supplemental responses, specifically, in their native format as originally requested. After discussing Rule 34 and Rule 26 in explaining the dynamics of ESI-related discovery, the court noted that Dixon explicitly requested that Experian produce electronically stored information in the electronic form in which it is normally kept. Dixon's request further defined the applicable terms of “electronically stored information” and “native format” so there would no confusion as to the nature of his discovery request. In response, Experian produced the information in unsearchable PDF format but did not address ESI or object to Dixon’s ESI specifications. Thus, the court ruled, “Experian waived any objection to the ESI format requested by Dixon pursuant to Rule 34(b)(1)(C).” This waiver by failure to object was perhaps Experian’s greatest oversight. Not only did the court subsequently grant Dixon’s motion to compel as to his requests for discovery in native format, but the court made clear that “[i]t is not Dixon’s burden to now explain why the native format…would be more useful to him than the .pdfs.” Even though Experian was not ordered to export the documents into a readable format such as Microsoft Word or Excel, Experian was still ordered to produce the documents in their requested native format. In addition to compelling documents in their native format, Dixon also asked the court to compel internal and external communications and written policies pertaining to how mortgage accounts of bankrupt consumers are and should be reported. Experian argued that it has already produced a complete, text-searchable version of the 2012 Credit Reporting Resource Guide and argues that no further information need be produced. Agreeing with Dixon, the court found that internal and external communications, “including those pertaining to how mortgage accounts of bankrupt consumers are and should be reported” are relevant to the policies included in the Guide and help established whether Experian’s procedures were reasonable. Further, the court ordered Experian to, at least, conduct a search as to whether any communications or emails with Green Tree regarding Dixon’s dispute exist because such communications are relevant to Dixon’s claims. In the event Experian found no communications exist, the court advised Experian to “state so in its amended responses.” The court then examined several of Dixon’s specific discovery requests. Dixon requested that Experian produce “any and all name scans, snap shots, or other periodic backups of Plaintiff’s file,” presumably in an attempt to demonstrate the content of his credit file at various points in time. Dixon argued such request went to the reasonableness of Experian’s policy that post-bankruptcy payments not be reported. Experian countered, stating that such request is unduly burdensome, overly broad, neither relevant to the litigation, nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and vague and ambiguous as to the meaning of its terms. The court ultimately agreed with Experian and held that “even if the discovery were relevant . . . the burden on Experian in compiling such ‘periodic backups’ that do not already exist outweigh Dixon’s need for the information” especially since the court ordered Experian to provide Dixon with documentation in native format. The motion to compel this periodic backup information was denied. In ruling on Dixon’s motion to compel documents Dixon believes Experian is withholding, the court found little support that Experian was actually withholding documents and ruled that “Dixon’s suspicion that additional documents may exist is an insufficient basis on which to compel discovery.” The court additionally declined to award any expenses to Dixon related to this motion. The court then concluded by reviewing Experian’s motion for a protective order based on Experian’s assertion that Dixon’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice exceeds the scope of discovery permitted by Rule 26(b). Experian requested protection from six of the thirty-one topics identified by Dixon that Experian believes are not relevant to this case. The court granted protection for five of these six topics: protection from depositions on Experian’s periodic backups; protection from depositions on the exportation of consumer credit files into a readable format; protection from depositions regarding e-mail records; protection from depositions regarding a confidential, one-page document that produced in another lawsuit, and; protection from depositions concerning the identities of Experian representatives most knowledgeable regarding searching and positing queries to an internal database. Many of these protections were granted on the basis that the court had already compelled Experian to produce documents in their native format, thus eliminating the need for excessive depositions aimed at acquiring the same or similar information. The court, however, denied the motion for protective order as to communications between Experian and Consumer Data Industry Association, the organization responsible for producing the 2012 Guide relied on by Experian for guidelines on credit reporting. The court held that should Experian produce responsive communications, then “Dixon is entitled to pursue this topic in Rule 30(b)(6) deposition.” Based on the foregoing, the court granted in part and denied in part Dixon’s motion to compel. Similarly, the court granted in part and denied in part Experian’s motion for a protective order and ordered Experian to make a Rule 30(b)(6) witness available to Dixon for deposition on the single topic if circumstances so demand. The court concluded by extending the discovery deadline to allow the parties to comply with the court order. Nicole was a 2010 magna cum laude graduate of Northeastern University located in Boston, Massachusetts where she earned her B.A. in English and Political Science. She will receive her J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. After graduation, Nicole will serve as a clerk to a trial judge of the Superior Court of New Jersey in the Morris-Sussex Vicinage. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
The attorney-client privilege is not as inclusive as some may think. The privilege protects confidential communications between attorney and client in order to “encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients.” The attorney-client privilege only applies if the following conditions are met. The asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; The person to whom the communication was made is an attorney; The communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed; (a) By the client, (b) Without the presence of strangers, (c) For the purpose of securing an opinion of law or legal services; and The privilege has been claimed and not subsequently waived. Commonly, disclosure of confidential information functions as an abdication of attorney-client privilege. Unintentional disclosure, however, does not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege if: (1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error. Courts also look to factors such as the quantity of the disclosure and the overriding interests of justice when determining whether the attorney-client privilege was inadvertently waived. In this case, a discovery dispute arose because the defendant unintentionally disclosed two privileged documents to the plaintiff. The first document was a letter from the defendant to an attorney for the purpose of soliciting legal advice. The second document was a response letter from the attorney providing counsel to the defendant. The court here found that these two documents are clearly covered by attorney-client privilege. So, the issue then became whether or not the defense waived attorney-client privilege when the party unintentionally disclosed the privileged documents. The court first considered the precautions taken by the defense to prevent accidental disclosures and discovered that there were none. For one, the defendant did not maintain a privilege log. Additionally, the defense did not even mark or designate the letters as confidential. For purposes of maintaining privilege, this factor weighed heavily against the defendant. The next factor the court looked to was the number of inadvertently disclosed documents. These documents were a mere three pages among a total of 3,500 pages of discovery documents. This factor weighed in favor of maintaining privilege. The third factor considered was the extent of privileged information disclosed. This factor weighed in favor of waiver because the information contained on the letters was clearly privileged. The court reasoned that the extent of the defendant’s carelessness weighed against maintenance of attorney-client privilege. The fourth factor considered was the extent of any delay in correcting the inadvertent disclosure. Since the defense took more than three months to attempt to rectify their mistake, this factor was found to be in favor of waiver. As to the last factor, the court stated that the defense did not offer any explanation as to why, in the overriding interest of justice, the letters should still be privileged. Since the majority of factors were found to be in favor of the waiver of attorney-client privilege, the court held that the defense has waived attorney-client privilege with respect to the letters. It is imperative to keep in mind that the attorney-client privilege can be waived unintentionally. One of the most effective ways to prevent an inadvertent disclosure is to maintain a preventative mechanism. Mark all privileged documents as privileged, keep a detailed privilege log, and constantly double check all disclosed documents so any mistake can be corrected quickly. If these steps are followed, a party will likely be able to maintain privilege even if the party inadvertently discloses privileged documents. Daniel received a B.A. in Criminology and Criminal Justice from The University of Maryland. He will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Presently Daniel is serving as a legal intern in the Juvenile Justice Clinic. After graduation Daniel will clerk for a trial judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here
Please be very careful when turning over discovery to adversaries! Every reasonable precaution should be made to ensure that privileged information is not being turned over. Obviously, accidents do happen and no matter how careful a party may be, sometimes privileged information will slip by and be disclosed to the opposing party. However, in such an instance, do not wait three months to inform the opposing party about the error. Well, only if the disclosing party wants to keep the information privileged, of course! Franklin Square Associates has provided a blueprint for what not to do when privileged information has been inadvertently turned over. Suit has been brought against them by the Gloucester Township Housing Authority in a dispute over the availability of subsidized residential housing. Among the thousands of documents that Franklin Square turned over in discovery were two letters (amounting to three of the thirty-five hundred pages produced) between the Managing Agent of Franklin Square and his attorney. Defendant Shaun Donovan of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) brought a motion asking judge to declare that the letters were not covered by the attorney-client privilege, but that even if they were, the privilege has been waived due to their disclosure in discovery. Without question, the court said, the letters contained privileged information. They were communications between a lawyer and her client, in which legal advice was sought and offered. They represented the quintessential example of what is covered by the attorney-client privilege. So the issue here, then, was whether the privilege had been waived. To make this determination, the court analyzed the facts of the case through five factors the Third Circuit uses to decide whether a party’s disclosure has waived privilege: (1) the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure; (2) the quantity of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of the disclosure; (4) the extent of any delay and the measures taken to rectify the disclosure; and (5) any overriding interests of justice. Regarding the first factor, the court noted that Franklin Square failed to set forth any precautions taken to avoid this inadvertent disclosure! They failed to produce a privilege log and failed to mark any documents as “confidential” or “privileged.” Franklin Square instead said that there were just too many documents to go through. If a party has resorted to using that as an excuse, it is very difficult to feel sympathy for them and the predicament they find themselves in. Parties must be more careful than this! The court found that this factor favored a finding of waiver. Regarding the second factor, the court noted that this current motion to declare the letters unprivileged concerns just three out of thirty-five hundred documents. Therefore, the inadvertent disclosure was de minimis in the grand scheme of things. This was another factor favoring waiver. Regarding the third factor, the court did not feel badly for Franklin Square in this situation because the production of these letters concerned clearly privileged information and yet Franklin Square did nothing to mark the documents as confidential or as communications between an attorney and her client. These letters warranted more scrutiny than that, and so due to the carelessness at play here, the court found this factor to be yet another in favor of a finding of waiver. Regarding the fourth factor, the court found that Franklin Square did not attempt to rectify the situation until more than three months after the inadvertent disclosure! Not only that, these same letters had been produced in a prior state court hearing, meaning these documents had now been disclosed twice! Clearly this favored a finding of waiver. Finally, regarding the fifth factor, the court did not find any overriding interests of justice here to warrant maintaining the privileged status of the documents despite the multiple errors committed by Franklin Square in this case. Therefore, the court held in favor of HUD, and declared that attorney-client privilege had been waived in regards to the letters. The takeaway here? Always, always, always take all reasonable precautions to ensure that privileged information is not being produced in discovery. Even if this information is somehow turned over, notify the opposing party right away to avoid waiving the privileged nature of those documents. Do not wait more than three months to do something about it! Logan Teisch received his B.A. in Government and Politics from the University of Maryland, College Park in 2012. He is now a student at Seton Hall University School of Law (Class of 2015), focusing his studies in the area of Criminal Law. Logan’s prior experiences include interning with the Honorable Verna G. Leath in Essex County Superior Court as well as interning with the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
On March 10, 20108, Marc Liebeskind began working at Rutgers Facilities Business Administration Department. By March 28 of that year, Liebeskind was terminated for lacking the basic skill set needed to perform his job in addition to having a poor attitude while on the job. Liebeskind’s supervisors had suspected he was spending an unreasonable amount of time on non-work related activities on his work computer. Having doubts about Liebeskind’s work performance, his supervisors reviewed the browsing history on Liebeskind’s computer by using an application called IEHistoryView. It is important to note that this search only entailed browsing history, and there is no evidence that Liebeskind’s supervisors were granted any access to his personal or password-protected information and accounts. After his termination, Liebeskind filed suit against Rutgers University and his supervisors, claiming invasion of privacy, among other claims. On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling, which ruling struck down all claims that Liebeskind’s privacy was violated as a result of his supervisors’ investigating the browser history on his computer. The appellate court referenced the New Jersey Supreme Court’s Stengart ruling, which had set the precedent for an employer’s right to monitor employee Internet activity and usage. Closely followed in previous eLessons Learned posts, the 2010 Stengart ruling held that an employee’s email communication with her attorney, using a company-issued computer, but via a personal, password-protected email account was held to be protected by the attorney-client privilege. However, the court’s decision to uphold Stengart’s privacy was not intended to forbid employers from monitoring employees’ actions on company-issued computers or devices in the future. In Stengart, New Jersey’s highest court stated: “Companies can adopt lawful policies relating to computer use to protect the assets, reputation, and productivity of a business and to ensure compliance with legitimate corporate policies.” As noted in Liebeskind, Rutgers’ “Acceptable Use Policy for Computing and Information Technology Resources” was in effect during the time of Liebeskind’s employment. This policy expressly stated that an employee’s privacy “may be superseded by the University’s requirement to protect the integrity of information technology resources, the rights of all users and the property of the University.” Additionally, Rutgers University “[r]eserve[d] the right to examine material stored on or transmitted through its facilities.” Unlike the findings in Stengart, the court established that Liebeskind did not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” In addition, the court agreed that Rutgers had a “legitimate interest in monitoring and regulating plaintiff’s workplace computer.” All companies can learn from this case and the policies in place at Rutgers that protected its right to monitor and search an employee’s computer. One of the most important lessons to be learned here is the need for a written internet usage policy. At the very least, these written policies should mandate that employees are expected to use the Internet and their work issued computers for work related activities only. Additionally, the possible disciplinary actions for any violation of this policy should be made available to employees. As seen in in this case, the existence of an internet usage policy and the reserved right of a company to monitor its employee’s Internet activity is the key to eliminate an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
In McCann v. Kennedy Univ. Hosp., Inc., the plaintiff Robert McCann sued Kennedy University Hospital, asking the court to sanction the hospital for intentionally or inadvertently destroying necessary videotapes. The plaintiff contended that the videotapes contained an account of the defendant’s emergency room lobby on the night the plaintiff claims to have been mistreated by the defendant’s staff. The plaintiff argued that the defendant knew or should have known that the video tapes were discoverable material and that there was actual withholding or suppression of the videotapes, which constituted spoliation. On December 21, 2011, the plaintiff was transported to the hospital after suffering extreme rectal pain and trouble breathing. The Plaintiff claims to have been in excruciating pain while he was waiting to be seen by the hospital staff. He states that he was ignored and neglected for at least seven hours. During the time that he was at the hospital, the plaintiff claimed to have collapsed on the floor and was left lying on the floor for over ten minutes, while staff walked over him without offering assistance. McCann also claimed that when he was eventually seen by the hospital staff, they treated him in ways that made him feel humiliated and uncomfortable. The hospital allegedly refused to treat McCann because he did not have insurance. On December 23, 2011, the plaintiff sent an e-mail to Renae Alesczk, the assistant to the Senior Vice President of the Kennedy Health System, complaining about his experience at the hospital while also threatening to sue. A few hours after the email was received, Aron Berman, formerly employed as the defendant’s Director of Guest Relations and Service Improvement, forwarded the McCann’s e-mail to Kim Hoffman, the Corporate Director of Patient Safety. The defendant claimed to have conducted an internal investigation of the complaints at that time, and notified the plaintiff that his complaints were being addressed. The hospital staff then stated that the investigation showed that the hospital staff acted appropriately and managed the patient’s clinical care in a professional manner. So far, so good. However, the plaintiff’s attorneys requested videotapes of the emergency room lobby, which showed the plaintiff waiting without being treated by staff. The defendants claimed that there was no videotape footage because they did not have enough disc drive space to keep all their video footage and had already erased the footage from the night in question. The plaintiff argued that the defendants knew or should have known that the videotapes would be requested in discovery, and that the defendants should not have destroyed the videotapes. The plaintiff claimed such activity as obstruction of justice and an intentional spoliation of evidence. The defendants argued that the tapes only show the time period during which the patient was in the waiting room, and are irrelevant to the plaintiff’s complaints about the treatment by staff when he was seen in the hospital. The Third Circuit has adopted a four-factor test for evaluating spoliation claims, finding that spoliation occurs where: “(1) the evidence was in the party's control; (2) the evidence is relevant to the claims or defenses in the case; (3) there has been actual suppression or withholding of evidence; and (4) the duty to preserve the evidence was reasonably foreseeable to the party.” Here, there is no argument that the tapes were in the party’s control. The court found that the tapes were not relevant to the plaintiff’s claims and that the defendant did not have a duty to preserve the video tapes at issue. Therefore, there had not been actual suppression or withholding of the evidence. The takeaway from this case is that the court found it was reasonable for the hospital to destroy the videotapes because the plaintiff’s claim was specifically in regard to his being treated while at the facility, NOT his experience while waiting in the lobby. However, to be safe, videotapes of the night in question should be preserved to avoid this kind of confusion. Rebecca Hsu, a Seton Hall University School of Law student (Class of 2015), focuses her studies in the area of patent law, with a concentration in Intellectual Property. She is also certified in Healthcare Compliance, and has worked in Compliance at Otsuka America Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Prior to law school, she graduated, cum laude, from UCLA and completed graduate work in biomedical science. She has co-authored two medical science research articles, as well as completed fellowships through UCLA Medicine and the Medical College of Wisconsin. In addition to awards for her academic achievements, Rebecca has been honored by awards for her community service with disadvantaged communities. In her spare time, Rebecca regularly practices outdoor rock climbing, and can be found camping in the Adirondacks. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here
Dover v. British Airways, PLC, involves a class action lawsuit where the plaintiffs alleged the airliner unlawfully imposed fuel surcharges on its frequent flyer program rewards flights. The plaintiffs supported their claims with a regression analysis. This statistical study, also known as the r-squared analysis, estimates the relationship between two variables and allegedly shows fuel surcharges were mostly unrelated to the changes of fuel prices. British Airways served the plaintiffs with a request for all documents relating to the r-squared analysis. However, that request was denied by Magistrate Judge Go, whose order was affirmed on appeal by District Judge Dearie. While the overarching issue is under what circumstances the details of an expert analysis will not be compelled during discovery, this case brings to light several additional sub-issues. The defendants argued that the information, produced by a non-testifying expert, was not protectable work product and that any protection that may have attached was forfeited through inadvertent disclosure on two occasions. Tackling the latter issue, the plaintiffs’ first inadvertent disclosure occurred during the course of a 137-page document production. More notably, the second inadvertent disclosure occurred during the course of the plaintiffs’ documents submission complying with the defendant’s request for metadata. The plaintiffs inadvertently reproduced the unredacted version of a particular spreadsheet that contained experts’ names and calculations. As this was the second of the two inadvertent disclosures, the court expressly acknowledged that the “plaintiffs should have been on notice with the first inadvertent disclosure that the spreadsheets contained protected information and should have carefully reviewed the spreadsheets before providing them to their vendor and producing them to defendant.” But, under the stipulated protective order signed by both parties, a claw back provision recited that the inadvertent disclosure of any material that qualifies as protected information does not waive the privilege on privileged information. The law with respect to such a protective order invokes the waiver of privilege only if production was completely reckless, and the court did not find completely reckless behavior in this instance. Rather, the court simply found the plaintiffs were careless in twice disclosing a few rows and columns on two pages of a 34-page spreadsheet. Addressing the issue of the fact that the r-squared analysis was performed at the pre-filing stage by a non-testifying expert, both Magistrate Judge Go and District Judge Dearie paid particularly close attention to the underlying fairness at stake and addressed the issue of whether it was fair for plaintiffs to submit an expert analysis in their complaint—that survived a motion to dismiss—and then disclaim the analysis in the future. Because the plaintiffs disclaimed future reliance on the analysis conducted by their consulting expert, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(D) is invoked for its protection of the disclosure of information from non-testifying, consulting experts. Under this rule, discovery is only permitted upon a showing that it is impracticable for the party to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. Since extraordinary circumstances were not found, details relating to the analysis were not compelled. Although it may seem unfair, the r-squared analysis was not the reason the complaint survived the motion to dismiss; the court was required to proceed on the assumption that factual allegations are true even if their truth seems doubtful, and consideration of the attacks on the consulting expert’s analysis would not factor into assessing the complaint’s plausibility. Samuel is in the Seton Hall University School of Law Class of 2015 pursuing the Intellectual Property concentration. He received his master’s from the Rutgers Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences and became a registered patent agent prior to entering law school. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
In the summer of 2013, the Northern District of California conducted a hearing over a motion to compel discovery responses which stemmed from e-discovery disagreements. The plaintiff was a corporate investor in the defendant pharmaceutical company developing bovine-derived oxygen therapeutics. A corporate officer of the pharmaceutical company was also named a defendant. The plaintiff alleged breach of fiduciary duties, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In its reply, the defendants counterclaimed breach of a licensing agreement, theft of intellectual property, and interference with prospective economic advantage. Discovery began when the plaintiff served interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission. The defendant corporation submitted its responses two months past the deadline, failed to completely respond to the interrogatories, and submitted incomplete document production. The plaintiff moved to compel full and complete responses, after which the defendants’ counsel failed to appear at the hearing. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion and awarded the plaintiff $1,400.00 in sanctions. Additionally, the plaintiff complained that the defendant officer’s responses were also incomplete and filed two weeks late. These disputes are governed by the discovery rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rules 33 and 34 establish a 30-day response period for a party to serve its answers and applicable objections. Additionally, Rule 33(b)(2) states that failure to timely respond to discovery requests generally constitutes a waiver of any objections to those requests. Under Rule 37, a party may move to compel discover and if the court grants it the responding party must pay the moving party’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion. At oral argument, the plaintiff asserted the defendants only produced 121 emails, 109 of which were communications with the the Plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged this lack of production raised the possibility of spoliation and boded ill for the document preservation efforts of the defendants. The defendants’ counsel testified he gave instructions to his clients to produce the related documents; however, the court was not convinced. The court cited Rule 26(g) which places an affirmative obligation on an attorney to ensure a client’s search for responsive documents and information is complete. The previous submissions were clearly incomplete and it was the attorney’s responsibility to remedy them. Furthermore, since the responses were late, all of the defendants’ objections were denied even though the court admitted the claims might be vague and overly-broad. The court used its discretion to modify the sanctions placed upon the defendants. It set a new date for all remaining responsive documents to be submitted and if the new deadline was missed the Defendants would be forced to hire an e-discovery vendor. Vendors can be very costly. Furthermore, since the defendants’ failure to timely and fully respond was not justified, the court awarded $5,200.00 in additional attorney’s fees to the plaintiff. While the defendants’ counsel was still held responsible, the court recognized that the defendants were also responsible for the delay and ordered the parties to split the cost of the sanction. This illustrates the point that when discovery efforts are not taken seriously, both the client and the attorney can be on the hook for big expenses. George is a student at Seton Hall University School of Law (Class of 2014). He is pursuing both the Health and Intellectual Property Concentrations and is especially interested in patent law. He received both a B.E. and M.E. at Stevens Institute of Technology in Biomedical and Systems Engineering, respectively. Presently, George works as a law clerk at Stone Law in Colts Neck, NJ, where he assists in the drafting of litigation documents and Office Actions with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
The producing party in a discovery request can be tardy producing documents, while making numerous generalized objections in a response, and still not have waived the party’s right to valid objections under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 or Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.Continue Reading
In Datel Holdings Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., the court was faced with a Motion by the Plaintiff to Compel the production of several document’s inadvertently produced by the Defendant and admitted into evidence at a deposition, that the Defendant now claims are protected by the attorney-client privilege. In this case, the Defendant produced several abbreviated versions of an email chain that did not contain the initial email message from in-house counsel to a non-lawyer program manager, although the following reply emails were entirely among non-lawyers, and discussed the results of computer testing and did not transmit legal advice.Continue Reading
Despite the importance of the general right to public access of court proceedings, a federal judge in Illinois ruled that a media group could not intervene in a lawsuit because, although it had standing, intervention would cause undue prejudice.Continue Reading