Welcome to the new eLessons Learned

eDiscovery Written by Law Students

eDiscovery Written by Law Students

eLessons Learned features insightful content authored primarily by law students from throughout the country. The posts are written to appeal to a broad spectrum of readers, including those with little eDiscovery knowledge.

Law + Technology + Human Error

Law + Technology + Human Error

Each blog post: (a) identifies cases that address technology mishaps; (b) exposes the specific conduct that caused a problem; (c) explains how and why the conduct was improper; and (d) offers suggestions on how to learn from these mistakes and prevent similar ones from reoccurring.

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New to the eDiscovery world?

Visit our signature feature, e-Discovery Origins: Zubulake, designed to give readers a primer on the e-discovery movement through blog posts about the Zubulake series of court opinions which helped form the foundation for e-discovery. Go There

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Cell-Site Location Information: How “Good Faith” Reliance Circumvented Fourth Amendment Protections

Author: JATCase Citation: U.S. v. Pleasant, Criminal Action No. 17-62 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2018)Employee/Personnel/Employer Implicated: Police, MiscellaneouseLesson Learned: Despite the recent Supreme Court decision in Carpenter, the warrantless seizure of cell-site location information (CSLI) was found to be permissible where law enforcement acts on a good faith basis pursuant to the Stored Communications Act, and the information is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.Tweet This: Bank robbers thwarted! Reasonable expectation of privacy provides no defense when law enforcement acted upon good faith in accessing cell-site location information. In this digital age, one’s expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment is subject to immense scrutiny. Cell-site location information (CSLI), for instance, gives off the user’s location without their consent, tracking their every movement throughout the day. This level of intrusiveness raises “Big Brother-esque” concerns and potential abuses by law enforcement. However, there are situations where accessing CSLI is reasonable, and even permissible, in order to prevent criminal activity. Consider the following case as an example of how electronically stored information, in the form of CSLI, operates in the context of balancing Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless searches and seizures, against the need to give law enforcement proper recourse to prevent criminal activity. In United States v. Pleasant, No. 17-62 (E.D. Pa. 2018), the court allowed the introduction of CSLI as evidence, even though the information was acquired without a warrant. The defendant Pleasant had committed multiple bank robberies, but unbeknownst to him, his cell phone was conveying information to nearby cell towers. Information from the several towers can be used to triangulate the owner’s position. Law enforcement officers accessed Pleasant’s CSLI without procuring an official warrant. Instead, the officers acted under § 2703(c) of the Stored Communications Act to get the information from the cell provider based on showing that the records were “relevant and material” to an ongoing criminal investigation. At trial, Pleasant moved to suppress the CSLI associated with his cellular phone. His argument: that the recent Supreme Court decision in Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. (2018) violated [his Fourth Amendment freedom from such a seizure of his information without a warrant. The Supreme Court in Carpenter held that accessing CSLI from wireless carriers violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in their physical movements and that such information must be obtained by a warrant based upon probable cause. But why, then, did this ruling from the highest court in the land, not hold in Pleasant? Ordinarily, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not allowed to be introduced at trial. This notion is known as the exclusionary rule. But as is the case with many “rules” of law; there is an exception. For, you see, the exclusionary rule was meant as a deterrence, or a kind of judicially imposed sanction, applied when necessary to enforce the Fourth Amendment so as to deter abuses by law enforcement officers. Thus, the court in Pleasant posits an overriding question: Is there some deterrent purpose being served by excluding the evidence of CSLI in this case? The answer, NO. Here the court found that the law enforcement officers were acting in “good-faith” such that their warrantless access of the CSLI was legally permissible. The law enforcement officers justified their actions by reliance on the Stored Communications Act, which was essentially good law before the Supreme Court ruling in Carpenter. Somewhat ironically, law enforcement officers probably had no idea that legal issues concerning CSLI raised in Carpenter, was to be heard by the Supreme Court during the course of their investigation. Maybe it was by dumb luck, or perhaps it was by clever arguments from counsel, that the court in Pleasant held that an officer’s good-faith reliance on a federal statute that operated as controlling precedent at the time, sufficed to permit the CSLI as evidence. It must be understood that the relevant provision of the Stored Communications Act that the law enforcement officers relied upon in Pleasant is no longer operative in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter. That is, accessing CSLI must be done with an official warrant. Merely claiming that CSLI information is “relevant” to an ongoing criminal investigation is unlikely to be sufficient justification for a warrantless seizure of that information from cell providers. What happened in Pleasant might be an oddity and such circumstances are unlikely to repeat again.[ JAT is a second-year law school student at Seton Hall University School of Law pursuing an Intellectual Property Concentration along the Technology and Business Law track. Want to read more articles like this?  Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.

What are the Consequences of Willful Manipulation of Evidence in Discovery?

Author: Dana KutzlebCase Citation: Lawrence v. City of New York, 1:15-cv-8947 (S.D. N.Y. July 27, 2018)Employee/Personnel/Employer Implicated: Client/Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s AttorneyeLesson Learned: Willful Manipulation of Evidence in Discovery Can Lead to DismissalTweet This: That’s So Meta(data): Staged Photos Grounds for Dismissal in Civil Rights Case A picture is worth 1,000 words. In the context of a lawsuit, the right picture could be worth much more, millions in fact, because seeing is believing, and there is nothing that convinces a jury like a snapshot of a scene exactly as a party describes. That is exactly what Angela Lawrence was thinking when she gave photos to her attorney to verify her claim that police entered her home without a warrant, threw her to the ground, and violated her civil rights: her allegations of misconduct corroborated by photos showing the state of her apartment when police finally left. A big problem for her, however, is that metadata records when a photo is taken, and these particular photos showing damage allegedly done by officers were taken two years after they left. In Lawrence v. City of New York, Angela Lawrence brought suit against New York City arising from an incident where police officers allegedly entered her home without a warrant, threw her to the ground, and damaged her property. Her attorney was Jason L. Leventhal, who received what his client said were photographic evidence of damage and converted them into PDFs and produced them to the other side as part of discovery. These photos were staged, however, and Lawrence took the photos two days before she relinquished them to her attorney, about one year after the commencement of her lawsuit and two years after the damage was supposed to have been done. In her depositions, Ms. Lawrence’s testimony relating to the pictures became contradictory: first, she asserted that a son and a friend took the photos, then that it was only her son, and finally that she had taken some of the photographs herself. Attorneys for the City quickly sought to have the photos produced in their native form. Upon inspection of the metadata, which tracks the time at which a photo is captured, revealed that 67 of the 70 photos were taken nearly two years after the incident was said to have occurred. The Defendant quickly moved for dismissal, and for Ms. Lawrence and her attorney to be sanctioned, her for the willful manipulation of evidence, and him for failing to verify the story the client told. The District Court was troubled by the attorney’s uncorroborated faith in his client but ultimately ruled that Leventhal, while “careless,” was not sanctionable. Ms. Lawrence did not fare so well, however. The Court was too concerned with the fraud upon the court to allow the case to continue and, pursuant to its powers, dismissed the case in its entirety. The Court denied the Defendant’s request for attorney’s fees and costs, in part because it would be a “hollow victory” because Ms. Lawrence, a single mother who rents an apartment, was of limited means. Ultimately, a few lessons can be gleaned from this case. First, do not manipulate evidence to be produced in discovery. It undermines the very institution of the courts, and the tracking on technology makes it near-impossible to hide. Second, in this new technology-driven world, attorneys are expected to verify client’s claims when it comes to e-discovery and not blindly accept the representations of their clients. Third, if you sense something, say something. Attorneys for the Defendant trusted their gut when presented with the inconsistent testimony of Ms. Lawrence and sought the reproduction of the photos in question in their native form. Without this instinct, it is possible this fraud never would have been revealed, and a jury could have awarded damages based on manipulated photos. Dana Kutzleb, a third-year law student at Seton Hall University School of Law, focuses her studies in criminal law. Prior to law school, she graduated from Seton Hall University with B.A. degrees in political science and classical studies. In law school, Dana participated in the Seton Hall Center for Social Justice’s Criminal Defense Clinic and will clerk for a presiding criminal judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey upon graduation. Want to read more articles like this?  Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.

What Is One Issue Defendant Airline Companies Can’t Fly Away From? A Defective TAR process.

Author: Maria A. GrajalesCase Citation: In Re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litigation, No. 15-1404, 2018 WL 4441507 (D. D.C. Sept. 13, 2018).Employee/Personnel/Employer Implicated: Outside Counsel, Information Technology Professional eLesson Learned: Although TAR is a useful document review tool, attorneys cannot blindly rely on the accuracy of this process. Attorney and discovery specialist must be careful and ensure that this process is functioning properly and is based on accurate metrics or risk delays in the litigation process.Tweet This: Airlines cannot fly away from an ineffective TAR process but must deal with the consequences of a discovery extension. Practitioners are increasingly becoming “tech savvy” and are taking advantage of technology to facilitate the practice of law, specifically in the area of discovery. TAR, which stands for technology-assisted review, is one such tool that has cut the time and costs associated with discovery. TAR combines technology and analytical processes in order to help practitioners sort and review voluminous discovery requests. Its successes, however, are not without issues, and it is incumbent on practitioners to ensure the accuracy of the TAR process relied on. In Re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litigation highlights the importance of ensuring that the TAR process relied on functions properly and that the parties are complying with TAR protocols. In this case, the court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for an extension of time to complete discovery after plaintiffs discovered an issue with Defendants’ document production. Bad metrics leads to more work. Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants relied on a deficient TAR process that produced “more than 3.5 million [core] documents to the Plaintiffs, but . . . only approximately 17% or 600,000, of the documents produced are responsive to Plaintiffs’ requests,” thereby rendering Defendants’ TAR process unreliable. Plaintiffs, thus contended, and the court agreed, that this deficiency in Defendant’s TAR process merits an extension to the discovery deadlines. To ensure that the TAR process was effective, the parties entered into a validation protocol whereby Defendant was required to validate the accuracy of its TAR process by “reviewing a statistically representative sample of documents.” Upon reviewing the TAR validation metrics relied on by Defendants, Plaintiffs found that the TAR process was alarmingly deficient. In fact, the metrics revealed a mere precision rate of 16.7%. After further investigation, Defendants revealed that “it had incorrectly reported the control set metrics . . . .” This revelation led Plaintiffs to conclude that the TAR process previously relied on was grossly inaccurate and that they would need to review all 3.5 million documents themselves. The importance of accurate metrics. An effective TAR process depends on accurate metrics. This means that practitioners cannot rely on a particular TAR process if the metrics upon which the process depends on are skewed or inaccurate. Defendants here acted improperly when they shared with Plaintiffs a TAR process that was based on inaccurate metrics. This caused Plaintiffs to rely on those results. Based on those results Plaintiffs agreed to a set of discovery deadlines. Plaintiffs arguably would not have agreed to that particular discovery schedule had they known that they would be responsible for analyzing 3.5 million documents as opposed to 600,000 documents. If the TAR process was correct from the beginning, Plaintiffs would have likely asked for a longer discovery period and would have eliminated the need for litigating a discovery extension. From this grave mistake, practitioners are reminded of the importance of ensuring that TAR processes and the metrics upon which these process’ rely are accurate. Practitioners should check with the IT, discovery, and/or metrics specialist that are responsible for calculating and putting these together that all calculations and standards are followed accurately. The best practice would be to double check the metrics and TAR process before they are shared with the opposing party. Maria is a third-year law student at Seton Hall University School of Law and is expected to graduate in January 2020. She earned a B.A. in Political Science from Montclair State University in 2015. Maria is interested in the area of complex litigation. Want to read more articles like this?  Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.

What Should a Party Do When Filing a Renewed Motion to Compel? The Secret to Getting Your Motion Granted

Author: Kiersten A. Fowler Case citation: Firefighters' Ret. Sys. v. Citco Grp. Ltd., Civ. Action No. 13-373-SDD-EWD (M.D. La. Jan. 3, 2018) Employee/Personnel/Employer Implicated: Firefighters’ Retirement System eLesson Learned: When you’re requesting that more documents be produced, be specific in demanding what you want and why you want. Tweet This: Going back to square one: the key to getting a judge to grant your Renewed Motion to Compel. Any lawyer will tell you that as a basic rule of any aspect of litigation, “you can’t always get what you want.” This is especially true in discovery, and it is a frustrating situation when you feel as if the other party is holding out on you once you receive the results of their document production. However, you’ll carry a heavy burden if you assert a Renewed Motion to Compel, so make sure you are ready and have the full strength necessary to overcome carrying that burden to a panel of judges. Firefighters’ Retirement System v. Citco Group Limited is a cautionary tale of how seriously courts take the Federal Rule of Procedure 26(b) when a party files a Renewed Motion to Compel. Document production can be a tedious task, so being asked to perform the same production twice is a dreadful fate. Luckily courts agree with that and thus will refuse to bestow that horrid fate on anyone… unless the other party has a good reason for it. So, if you’re that other party, learn what is and what isn’t a good reason enough to be granted a Renewed Motion to Compel. The contentions made by Firefighters’ Retirement System (FTS) is a good example of an arbitrary reason: statements given by a single employee during one deposition. FTS was concerned with how Citco gathered the information to respond to interrogatories and requests for productions, and rightfully so requested and was granted a deposition pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b). One Citco employee’s deposition, Mr. Diver’s, wound up serving as the sole basis for FTS’s Renewed Motion to Compel, as FTS believed Diver’s responses showed a clear flaw in both the list of custodians and electronic search for documents. The court was not nearly as convinced. In denying the Renewed Motion to Compel, the court strictly adhered to the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Specifically, the Court focused on two key elements: (1) FTS’s reason for the motion, and (2) weighing that reason against the fate of performing document production TWICE. Regarding the first element, the Court noted that FTS’s reasons were far too broad. In its analysis, the Court referenced the importance of “meet and confers” where parties should be explicit in addressing any foreseeable issues about disclosure, discovery, and the preservation of ESI pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3)(C). This conference was held, the parties came to an agreement, and yet FTS was still unsatisfied with the documents that came as a result of Citco’s document production. Without a specific reason as to what FTS would have done differently in this meeting, (e.g., asserting that there should have been specific custodians or search terms added in the second production to make up for the allegedly “flawed” first production), FTS’s request simply wasn’t going to be granted. In regard to the second element, the court moved their scrutiny to what FTS was actually requesting. Without reason, FTS demanded more be done. These requests included a mass email questionnaire to all Citco employees questioning their personal knowledge of the issues of the lawsuit, accurate responses from all employees, and individual searches of the personal computers of certain employees. Considering what was at stake, the court found this completely unreasonable, and rightfully so. Thus, if you ever find yourself propounding a Renewed Motion to Compel, give more reasons than FTS and fewer demands. The test under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(b) is a balancing test, so the reasons should always outweigh the demand and burden on the other side. Lastly, it is equally as important to address what Citco did correctly: they gathered their documents from the three general sources that should be collected from. Take note: (1) hard copy files of each Citco Defendant entity, (2) the shared hard drive files of each Citco Defendant entity, and (3) email files of the 21 agreed-upon custodians using 56 agreed-upon search terms. Courts don’t want to force lawyers to “go back to square one” in document production efforts because we live in an era where vast amounts of electronic information are available for review. It is because we live in this era that courts have not and will not expect a party to meet a standard of perfection in document production. The lesson is simple: when you’re producing documents, do your due diligence, and when you’re requesting that more documents be produced, be specific in demanding what you want and why you want. Kiersten Fowler earned a B.S. in Biochemistry and a B.A. in Classical Studies from Seton Hall University in the highly regarded Honors Program. She is currently pursuing her J.D. at Seton Hall University School of Law (Class of 2019). After law school, Kiersten will be working for Haug Partners, LLP, a mid-sized Intellectual Property firm in Manhattan. She is hoping to specialize in both patent litigation and patent procurement, but is open to exploring other areas of IP Law during her career. Want to read more articles like this?  Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.

Can deleting information be considered spoliation? Not easily.

Author: Matthew T.Case Citation: Steves and Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-545 (E.D. Va. May 1, 2018)Employee/Personnel/Employer Implicated: Consultant, Developers of Manufacturing PlanteLesson Learned: Spoliation can only be shown if the documents should have been preserved, the documents are “lost” because of the implicated party not taking steps to preserve, and if there is no way to restore or replace what the documents would have said or shown.Tweet This: It’s not spoliation just because you pressed delete – accusing parties must do their due diligence. When does document deleting turn into spoliation? The defendants in the Steves and Sons case learned that just because you deleted something, even if you knew it may help the other side in a lawsuit, does not mean the court should use your deletion against you. In this case, a consultant hired by developers of a manufacturing plant deleted documents that may have incriminated them on a trade secret misappropriation claim. In the end, even though the court noted that the consultant either knew or should have known that he was under an obligation to preserve these documents, the court found that there was no spoliation. Although the actions taken by the consultant and developers were not ideal, they still were not illegal. The consultant, in this case, e-mailed the developers and explicitly stated that he recommended they delete certain documents that his ex-employer could use to “make trouble for [the consultant and the developers].” The consultant even went so far as to say that he knew of situations like this in which his ex-employer filed lawsuits claiming misappropriation of trade secrets, and that “some of the financial information that I’ve passed to you might cause us trouble.” Thus, he decided to delete an extensive amount of various documents so that they would not “be forced to send them anything that would give them even a remote basis to continue with proceedings.” When the consultant’s ex-employer did eventually sue, they asked for these documents that were deleted. Because they were not provided, the ex-employer sought a spoliation sanction – essentially, that a jury could infer that the documents deleted were incriminating and that he deleted them because they were incriminating. Obviously, at face value, this exchange of e-mails does not look good for anyone involved. One would assume that the Court found that spoliation had occurred. This assumption, however, would be wrong. When examining claims of spoliation, courts need to find four things: (1) the documents should have been preserved; (2) the documents were lost; (3) the loss was due to the person’s failure to take reasonable steps to preserve the documents; AND (4) the documents cannot be restored or replaced by other forms of evidence. In this case, the Court found the first three to be true but did not find the fourth. Thus, simply deleting documents because you think they can hurt you does not by itself lead to a spoliation claim. This is not to say that you should delete potentially incriminating documents – in fact, I would highly advise against it. However, if you have deleted information, the other party must do its due diligence to show that either the information cannot be restored through forensic examination of hard drives or replaced by other documents that show similar information that the deleted documents would have shown. If the other party does not do their due diligence, there cannot be a successful claim of spoliation, and your deletions cannot be used against you. Even with all of this in mind, the best way to avoid a possible spoliation claim is to be responsible. If you have a deletion policy, then continue it until you believe that the documents will be sought through impending litigation. If you have no reason to believe a lawsuit is about to be filed, continue your deletion policy without being worried. Want to read more articles like this?  Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here. Misc.:Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)

What happens when you don’t follow the courts orders concerning discovery and document production?

Author: Elliot M. HirschCase Citation: Davis v. Electronic Arts Inc., 2018 WL 1609289 (N.D. Cal. 2018) eLesson Learned: If you don’t follow the specific instructions a court order delineates you will not be able to find a loophole and avoid culpability. They can and will sanction you for not following their orders.Tweet This: NFL players file a lawsuit against EA’s Madden NFL game and wish they were as good on the field as they are in the courtroom Anytime you deal with an NFL player you know they aren’t going to be a pushover. These guys live on the gridiron and are an inspiration to people worldwide. If you try to take advantage of them, they will let you know that they aren’t having it. EA Sports created a famous NFL game called Madden. What EA tries to do best is create NFL figures that look exactly like the real-life players. The NFL players sued EA on the basis that they were misappropriating their rights by infringing on their likeness without proper authorization. What occurred after the lawsuit is that EA requested certain documents in discovery and certain communications between the players and others. They did this because they stated that these communications and documents would provide EA the information to protect itself from this lawsuit. The court on September 15, 2017, made an order granting EA’s request for certain discovery and amending responses pertaining to interrogatories and production of documents. There were multiple levels of requests that EA was demanding. The court found their arguments warranted pursuit and therefore granted their motion. Thereafter, the NFL player Plaintiffs failed to follow the court order and EA made a motion for sanctions and other relief. The court went through a detailed account of all the things that the plaintiffs neglected to do pertaining to its order. The court went through each demand and in some cases stated that the Plaintiffs were not liable but in most of them, the court stated that the Plaintiffs failed to properly follow the court order. For example, the court stated that because the Plaintiffs' didn’t comply with the court's order regarding Interrogatory Nos. 13 and 14, they sanctioned them in the sense that they only allowed the Plaintiffs to assert any action concerning the economic value in Plaintiffs' names, images, identities, and/or likenesses. This was done in order to punish the plaintiffs and now they were limited in their capability to sue EA. In another way, the court relied upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) by prohibiting the Plaintiffs from introducing or relying upon, in a motion, at a hearing, or at trial, any documents that they have not previously produced in discovery, absent substantial justification. EA requested $40,000 in monetary sanction. The court concluded that $25,000 was warranted in conjunction with the evidentiary consequences. This was because EA was not able to furnish proper billing records concerning the attorney fees. In conclusion, it is apparent that by not following the court's order the court imposed some severe sanctions that hampered the NFL players ability to sue EA for what they were seeking. It is crucial to ensure that one fully follows a court order in order to retain its capability to legally pursue one’s rights. Elliot M. Hirsch is a third-year law student at Seton Hall Law school. Before attending law school, Mr. Hirsch was a semi-professional tennis player training with some of the best tennis players in the world. Additionally, Mr. Hirsch was a Math teacher and tutor for students in middle school and high school. Mr. Hirsch has taught over 3500 students ranging from Honors programs to students with severe learning disabilities. Want to read more articles like this?  Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.

When is it permissible to gain access to government officials emails in a case relating to violations of constitutional rights?

Author: Elliot M. HirschCase Citation: Mann v. City of ChicagoEmployee/Personnel/Employer Implicated: Certain Custodians from the Mayor's OfficeeLesson Learned: If there are emails or records that can be used to support a claim by a party, then those emails/records will be subject to discovery and can be compelled to be pursued.Tweet This: Motions to Compel discovery email search on people who work in an office that has a connection to the case isn’t that difficult, just ask the City of Chicago. The City of Chicago’s police force has allegedly engaged in some shady practices at non-public locations in Chicago that have come to the forefront in many cases appearing in United States District Court. There is a place called Hopman square in Chicago. The police officers of the city of Chicago have allegedly taken many people there and subjected them to unconstitutional searches and arrests. These are extremely serious allegations. The issue in front of the court here was not about damages that Chicago should pay these citizens. The issue here was regarding emails that would show that the police force had policies that were not in accordance with the law and prove that they engaged in these illegal practices. The main case that the complainants relied upon in their argument was Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The city of Chicago had about 9 custodians from the Mayor’s office that the complainants were seeking to compel to release emails from their servers to reveal the illegal practices that were prevalent amongst the police force in the City of Chicago. The defendants agreed to release 2 custodians’ emails to the court but did not want to release the others. They cited undue burden and high costs as their main argument in order to prevail. But the court was not impressed and didn’t agree to their arguments. The rule at play here was the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 which discusses discovery and has a specific mention about electronically stored information. But before discovery can be commenced the law is that the information being sought must be considered “relevant”. Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 721 (N.D. Ill. 2014). The court concluded here that the emails of the custodians could certainly contain information that would buttress the complainant’s allegations and were not persuaded by the argument of the City of Chicago. It is an important ruling pertaining to eDiscovery that the court was very generous in allowing the search of more person’s email servers. But the court did set out a sort of warning or rule that should pertain to future cases in similar situations. The court did not allow every single custodian email server to be searched. They set out a precondition of the sort that said that those custodians that are of the short tenure of the staff person or the time during which the person holding the position would not be searchable. This was a kind of solution to the argument made by the City that stated claims such as high cost and undue burden of discovery procedures. It should be noted that the court mentioned that because the City did not provide a number or even an estimate of the amount of money that the burden would cost, their argument was shut down. If they did provide such data, then it appears the court might have made a different decision. Elliot M. Hirsch is a third-year law student at Seton Hall Law school. Before attending law school, Mr. Hirsch was a semi-professional tennis player training with some of the best tennis players in the world. Additionally, Mr. Hirsch was a Math teacher and tutor for students in middle school and high school. Mr. Hirsch has taught over 3500 students ranging from Honors programs to students with severe learning disabilities. Want to read more articles like this?  Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.

Discretion May Be Good for Judges, But It’s Not For The Defendants With Data.

Author: Ashley E. MorganCase Citation: Nunes v. Rushton, No. 2:14-cv-00627-JNP-DBP (D. Utah May 14, 2018).Employee/Personnel/Employer Implicated: The defendant in a defamation caseeLesson Learned: The producing party must preserve all relevant information existing at the time the duty to preserve attaches and any information that is created after the duty attaches, even if the information is on a backup system.Tweet This: Deleting the problem will not make it go away. Instead, it will make the problem even bigger and more expensive. Most lawyers know that mundane actions taken by clients can become serious headaches when done in the litigation context. That is exactly what happened in the case of Nunes v. Rushton, where the plaintiff made a motion to sanction the defendant for spoliation of evidence following the defendant’s deletion of a Google account. Specifically, the plaintiff had brought suit on August 28, 2014, alleging defamation stemming from the defendant’s use of a number of “sock puppet” accounts to post positive reviews of her own books and negative reviews of the plaintiff’s books. During the ensuing litigation, the plaintiff made a discovery request for documents stored on the defendant’s various Google accounts. On August 12, 2015, while this discovery request was pending, the defendant deleted one of her Google sock puppet accounts. The defendant then deleted all of the remaining accounts on March 21, 2016. There exists a duty to preserve whereby the producing party must preserve all relevant information existing at the time the duty to preserve attaches and any information that is created after the duty attaches, even if the information is on a backup system. The Court reasoned, then, that spoliation sanctions are proper only if a party has a duty to preserve evidence because it knew, or should have known, that litigation was imminent, and the adverse party was prejudiced by the destruction of the evidence. Sanctions that ask for an adverse inference, whereby the jury would be instructed that the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable, must meet the additional requirement that such actions were done in bad faith. Mere negligence in losing or destroying records is not enough because it does not support an inference of consciousness of a weak case. Here, spoliation sanctions were not appropriate for the accounts deleted on March 21, 2016, as the plaintiff had not shown that she suffered any prejudice as no attempt was made to demonstrate that the posts and comments on these accounts were irretrievably lost. On the other hand, the defendant’s deletion of her Google accounts on August 12, 2015, was both done after the filing of the plaintiff’s lawsuit and prejudiced The plaintiff because all the information stored on this account was irretrievably lost. The only question that remains, then, is whether the defendant deleted the account in bad faith. The defendant offered no explanation for the August 12, 2015 deletion of the Google account. Given that litigation had been pending for almost a year, that the defendant was represented by counsel, and that the plaintiff had requested the production of documents associated with this Google account, the court could only infer that the deletion was done in bad faith. As a result of the defendant’s actions, the jury was instructed to presume that the documents and emails stored on the defendant’s deleted Google account would have been unfavorable to her. It’s safe to say that all of this could have been avoided if the defendant had just used their accounts in the same way they would have if there wasn’t pending litigation. Clients can become unnerved by being thrown into the litigation arena and will sometimes take actions they wouldn’t otherwise as a means of self-preservation. In those instances, the best thing to do is maintain the status quo. Sometimes, inaction is the best advice a lawyer can give to their client. Ashley was a 2016 magna cum laude graduate of Seton Hall University located in South Orange, New Jersey where she earned her B.A. in Political Science, History, and Philosophy. She will receive her J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2019. After graduation, Ashley will serve as a clerk to a trial judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey in the Bergen vicinage. Want to read more articles like this?  Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.

How Much Redaction is Too Much Redaction? Blanket Redactions Without Legitimate Justification.

Author: Maria A. GrajalesCase Citation: IDC Fin. Pub., Inc. v. Bonddesk Grp., LLC, 2017 WL 4863202 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 2017)Employee/Personnel/Employer Implicated: Counsel (unclear as to whether it is In-House Counsel and/or Outside Counsel) eLesson Learned: When a party seeks to redact portions of discoverable documents, he or she must demonstrate that the subject documents are privileged and or that these documents are protected by the work-product doctrine.Tweet This: No, no, says the court to bogus practice of redactions. A tool once meant to protect the privacy and sensitive information of parties has now been abused to impede the disclosure of discoverable information. The practice of redacting serves a critical role in the discovery stage of litigation, but its potential for abuse is one we cannot lose sight of. Attorneys must be careful to redact only information that is privileged or subject to work-product protections. In IDC Fin. Pub., Inc. v. Bonddesk Grp., plaintiffs brought a motion to compel against defendants after defendants redacted 600 of over 6,000 documents produced in discovery. Plaintiffs sought production of the unredacted version of these documents. Defendants argued that the information redacted is not relevant and was therefore permissibly redacted. Defendant further claimed that plaintiff is not entitled to peruse through any and all documents dealing with the contract at issue. While it is certainly true that parties to a litigation do not have free reign to obtain and review any and all documents, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make clear that parties may obtain documents that are both nonprivileged and relevant to a party’s claim. This means that even information that is not admissible as evidence in court falls within the scope of discovery. However, this does not mean that a party cannot object to a document request or that a party is suddenly barred from redacting pertinent information. A party seeking to redact certain information simply needs to assert that the information redacted is privileged or is protected by the work-product doctrine. The issue in IDC Fin. Pub., Inc. v. Bonddesk Grp. is that defendants went “beyond the sort-of ‘line item’ redactions of personal information or account numbers sanctioned by [the federal rules]. Instead, they have blocked out large chunks of information on documents . . . they admit are discoverable.” In support of these blanket redactions, defendants merely asserted that the information redacted was not relevant. This unsupported assertion provides courts with little to judge. By virtue of these redactions and lackluster explanations, judges are themselves incapable of determining whether the information has been properly redacted. In fact, redactions based on irrelevance is not supported by the federal rules of evidence. These broad blanket redactions permit parties to unilaterally determine what is discoverable and what is not, with little to no oversight from the courts or any other party. This essentially deprives a party’s adversary from the opportunity to review discoverable information. Allowing unfettered redactions would threaten the legitimacy of our justice system by incentivizing parties to redact as much as they can and hide the truth. Going forward attorneys should be cautious in what they redact. Attorneys should be careful to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and only redact information that is either privileged or subject to the work-product doctrine. Alternatively, the party seeking to redact an extensive portion of discoverable information must show other compelling reasons for doing so. Adopting such a practice will ensure a more efficient and productive resolution of the case at stake. Maria is a third-year law student at Seton Hall University School of Law and is expected to graduate in January 2020. She earned a B.A. in Political Science from Montclair State University in 2015. Maria is interested in the area of complex litigation. Want to read more articles like this?  Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.

What are the Limits on Discovery Sanctions for Willful Spoliation? Sanctions Without Borders: The Consequences of Willful Spoliation

Author: Dana KutzlebCase Citation: Klipsch Group, Inc. v. ePRO E-Commerce Ltd., 16-3637-cv (2d Cir. Jan 25, 2018).Employee/Personnel/Employer Implicated: CEO, CFO, various employees in unspecified positions deemed “custodians of responsive information”eLesson Learned: Willful spoliation of discovery can result in exorbitant sanctions and cost restitution to adversaries, regardless of the ultimate award of damages.Tweet This: The Price of Willful Spoliation is an Adversary’s Costs of Investigation The process of discovery tends to be the costliest phase of litigation, save a trial itself. Generally, the costs associated with discovery come from the gathering, organizing, copying, and producing the demanded documents: a process that can take months and drain tremendous resources. While the information learned in the discovery phase is typically invaluable to the case and often bases for case resolution, the bank-breaking prices can have parties wishing they could simply pretend the information doesn’t exist. The Second Circuit recently disincentivized the cost-saving yet rule-breaking practice of spoliation, however, when it awarded a plaintiff more than 100 times the value of the litigation damages as sanctions for discovery violations. (“Continue Reading…”) In Klipsch Group, Inc. v. ePRO E-Commerce Ltd., the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s imposition of sanctions for continuous, willful spoliation by the defendant. Plaintiff Klipsch Group, a maker of electronic sound equipment, sued Defendant ePRO alleging ePRO’s sale of counterfeit headphones that unlawfully mimicked Plaintiff’s product. That ePRO’s subsidiaries engaged in infringing sales is undisputed; the controversy arises in the number of sales of the infringing products. The Plaintiff claimed sales of approximately $5M; ePRO asserted the profit was closer to $8,000. Over the course of the litigation, as the parties entered the discovery phase, the Defendant failed to produce the documents demanded by Plaintiff through lawful means: as of the time when Plaintiff was to depose its employees, ePRO produced less than 500 pages of documents in discovery. ePRO ultimately admitted some failures and agreed to retain an e-discovery vendor, who was able to extricate an additional 40,000 documents relevant to the litigation. The documents contradicted the testimony given by the CEO in depositions, and the vendor revealed that ePRO both limited the vendor’s investigation and failed to enact a “litigation hold,” or policy of preservation, as instructed by the court. Plaintiff moved for sanctions at this time, but the court instead allowed Plaintiff to conduct its own investigation at its own cost, with the option of seeking reimbursement depending on the results. The e-investigator uncovered evidence of document deletion and manipulation, data-wiping software, and a failure to preserve the information on backup drives. Court rules impose on parties the obligation to honestly and fairly disclose all reasonably sought evidence in the course of litigation. There are lawful remedies for challenges to document demands, which include negotiating with the adversary and relief from the court, but which DO NOT include the willful destruction of information relevant to the legal case. Moreover, the Rules incorporate certain limitations on demands to rein in over-eager discovery-seekers, which includes that discovery is “proportional to the needs of the case.” This means that a case with a court-estimated valuation of $25,000 should not cost one party $2.7 MILLION DOLLARS in discovery costs. But, given ePRO’s conduct, that is exactly what happened in this case: discovery cost ePRO 108 times what paying actual damages would have. There are a few important lessons to be learned from this case: first and foremost, willful spoliation will cost you, even if the case has relatively little otherwise at stake. At numerous points, ePRO could have made better decisions: it could have been more responsive in the first instance, cooperated with its own e-discovery vendor, imposed a litigation hold at any point, and not actively manipulated and deleted relevant information. If that were the case, maybe ePRO would have had to pay $25,000 in damages, but the Defendant would not have had $2.7M in assets seized by the court before the trial even began. Also of note: the model behavior of the Plaintiff, which would continuously inform the court of the Defendant’s perceived failures and seek permission before taking corrective action. The takeaway: adhere to the rules of discovery and cooperate with the court’s directives, or the party-protecting proportionality requirement relating to discovery will not be able to shield you! Dana Kutzleb, a third-year law student at Seton Hall University School of Law, focuses her studies in criminal law. Prior to law school, she graduated from Seton Hall University with B.A. degrees in political science and classical studies. In law school, Dana participated in the Seton Hall Center for Social Justice’s Criminal Defense Clinic and will clerk for a presiding criminal judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey upon graduation. Want to read more articles like this?  Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.

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