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This case involves an employment discrimination claim that the plaintiff, Anthony Smith, levied against his former employer, Hillshire Brands, under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The plaintiff was an employee of Hillshire Brands and in a letter dated August of 2013, he was given time off of work under the FMLA until February of 2014, but Smith’s employment was terminated in September of 2013. During the course of this suit, both parties became engaged in various discovery disputes, one of which is the subject of this order dated June 20, 2014. The defendant served the plaintiff with documents requests, which would show the plaintiff’s activity on social media websites. The defendant’s request was, Request No. 15: All documents constituting or relating in any way to any posting, blog, or other statement you made on or through any social networking website, including but not limited to Facebook.com, MySpace.com, Twitter.com, Orkut.com, that references or mentions in any way Hillshire and/or the matters referenced in your Complaint. Request No. 18: Electronic copies of your complete profile on Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter (including all updates, changes, or modifications to your profile) and all status updates, messages, wall comments, causes joined, groups joined, activity streams, blog entries, details, blurbs, and comments for the period from January 1, 2013, to present. To the extent electronic copies are not available, please provide these documents in hard copy form. In response to these document requests, the plaintiff refused to provide his complete profile on social media websites because most of the information had no relevance to the defendant’s claims or defenses in this case. So, the defense filed a motion to compel and stated the social media profile could offer a diary of the plaintiff’s activities, thoughts, mental condition, and actions, which relate to the plaintiff’s claims for emotional distress. Also, the defendant claims the information stored in the plaintiff’s profile may provide insight as to whether the plaintiff abused his FMLA leave, which was cited as the reason for his termination. The legal standard for discovery requires that any information sought to be relevant. This seems ambiguous, but luckily, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide further details regarding what is relevant. Rule 26 requires any document requests to be tailored so that it appears to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court here states that allowing the defendant unfettered access to the social media profiles of the plaintiff would allow the defense to case “too wide a net for relevant information.” The court here cites another case, Ogden v. All-Star Career School, 2014 WL 1646934, at *4 (D. Kan. 2014), which stated, Ordering plaintiff to permit access to or produce complete copies of his social networking accounts would permit defendant to cast too wide a net and sanction an inquiry into scores of quasi-personal information that would be irrelevant and non-discoverable. Defendant is no more entitled to such unfettered access to plaintiff’s personal email and social networking communications than it is to rummage through the desk drawers and closets in plaintiff's home. In addition to the problem of casting “too wide a net,” the court also stated that social network activity might not be as relevant to an emotional distress claim as one might think. The reason is that a severely depressed person may have a good day or several good days and choose to post about those days and avoid posting about moods more reflective of his or her actual emotional state. As a result of this analysis the court granted the defendant’s document request as it relates to only information that references the plaintiff’s emotional state and potential reasons for that emotional state. Daniel received a B.A. in Criminology and Criminal Justice from The University of Maryland. He will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Presently Daniel is serving as counsel in the Juvenile Justice Clinic. After graduation Daniel will clerk for a trial judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here
In April 2014, the Honorable Dominic J. Squatrito from the District Court for the District of Connecticut handed down a decision that dismissed all but one of plaintiff Ray Tedeschi’s claims against defendant Kason Credit Corporation (“KCC”), a collections agency that wrongfully targeted Tedeschi based on a telephone mix-up. On Both parties moved for summary judgment on claims of invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Tedeschi’s claims were largely unsupportable – not the least of which being his assertion that Kason Credit Corporation should face an evidentiary adverse inference instruction based on spoliation of electronic evidence. In sum and substance, Tedeschi claimed that KCC was harassing Tedeschi with nearly twenty phone calls over the course of a yearlong period, seeking to collect a debt from a consumer who listed Tedeschi’s new home phone number as a means of contact. Tedeschi continually informed KCC that he was not the debtor, and asked that KCC stop calling. Tedeschi v. Kason Credit Corp., No. 3:10CV00612 DJS, 2014 WL 1491173 *2-3 (D. Conn. Apr. 15, 2014). KCC, on the other hand, denied the volume of calls asserted by the plaintiff, and instead asserted that only two phone calls took place over that same period of time. Id. KCC further alleged that the behavior met the standards of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15. U.S.C. § 1692, and was not actionable. Recognizing a dispute of fact, the Court left this claim intact. However, it’s unlikely that Tedeschi’s claim will pass muster with any jury. Here’s why: When deposing the CEO of KCC, Karl Dudek, plaintiff learned that a “fact sheet” was generated for Tedeschi’s matter that tracked calls from KCC employees to Tedeschi’s phone number. In response to an inquiry, Dudek indicated that the fact sheet “has probably been printed out 20 times.” Id. at *16. Tedeschi argued that the print-out produced at the time of the deposition did not satisfy discovery requirements, since the print-out was dated December 2010, and that the original print-out must have been destroyed. KCC was able to demonstrate that the print-out was unchanged in substance or form from the first request date in June 2010 to the produced copy in December 2010. Relying on Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002), the court outlined the criteria for an adverse inference: the moving party must demonstrate that the party having control over the evidence had a duty to preserve it at the time of destruction, that the evidence was destroyed with a culpable state of mind, and that the destroyed evidence would support the moving party’s claim or defense. Judge Squatrito found that KCC did not have a duty to preserve print-outs, since the print-outs “merely duplicate ‘original evidence.’” Id. at *17. Since Tedeschi was unable to support a claim that the electronic data was destroyed with any culpable state of mind, the claim necessarily fails. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“A party . . . must retain all relevant documents[,] but not multiple identical copies[,] in existence at the time the duty to preserve attaches, and any relevant documents created thereafter.”). Plaintiff’s claims against KCC were doomed from the start, and Tedeschi would have been smart to see the writing on the wall – if not the words on the print-outs. Kevin received a B.S. in Political Science from the University of Scranton (2009), and will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Prior to joining the Seton Hall community, Kevin worked as an eDiscovery professional at two large “white-shoe” law firms in Manhattan. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
In the Sixth Circuit, a party seeking sanctions for the destruction of evidence must show three things: (1) the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2) the evidence was destroyed with a "culpable state of mind"; and (3) the destroyed evidence was relevant to the party's claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense. You can find countless articles that outline when the obligation to preserve documents occurs. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state, that whenever it can be “reasonably anticipated” that an action will be filed, all parties have a duty to preserve potentially relevant evidence. You can also find numerous articles about the third fact, an individual’s claim that the requested destroyed electronic discovery is relevant to their cause of action or defense. However, this article is about the second factor, the evidence was destroyed with a "culpable state of mind.” The Model Penal Code 2.02(2) establishes that there a four culpable states of mind: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. At common law there are more than just the four Model Penal Code culpable states (wickedly, purposely, intentionally, willfully, knowingly, recklessly, maliciously, negligently, scienter). A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. A person acts knowingly if he is aware that his conduct; and he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. A person acts recklessly when they have a conscious disregard of unjustifiable and substantial risk. Finally, a person acts negligently when a person should have known better then to take that substantial risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The disregard of the risk must be a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have followed. The court in Siggers recognized that "failures to produce relevant evidence fall 'along a continuum of fault—ranging from innocence through the degrees of negligence to intentionality . . . .'" And, "'[o]nce the duty to preserve attaches, any destruction of [evidence] is, at a minimum, negligent.'” This case is an example of one area of the law crossing over into another. The Sixth Circuit incorporated aspects of criminal law into the determination of sanctions. However, the transition is appropriate. A person must purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently destroy electronic documents and evidence to be guilty and worthy of sanctions. Here, the court held that sanctions were not appropriate in this situation because “Siggers failed to demonstrate Campbell’s ‘culpable state of mind’ in destroying the evidence and show that responsive documents existed and were among the destroyed. The court reasoned that although Campbell's discovery failures reflect negatively on her in regards to Siggers' motion, they do not, when weighed against the above considerations, merit the imposition of sanctions. Instead of sanctions, the court offered Siggers the opportunity for redress by questioning Campbell at trial about her failure to timely impose a litigation hold and about the other matters related to his assertion that she must have had relevant e-mail communications that no longer exist. If courts are following such a policy it is important that individuals understand the possible (criminal law based) consequences of their actions. This case illustrates that the importance of proper electronic data management and hold policies in order to avoid potential penalties and sanctions. Timothy received his B.A. from Rutgers University in 2011. He began his post-college life working in Trenton, New Jersey at a lobbying and non-profit management organization before attending law school in the fall of 2012. He will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Timothy has had a diverse set of experiences during his time in law school and has found his calling in Tax Law. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
The sanction of an adverse inference is appropriate, but not mandatory, in cases involving the negligent destruction of evidence. The court will determine on a case-by-case basis whether sanctions are appropriate where a party negligently destroyed evidence. However, the court is more likely to impose sanctions when a discovery obligation is breached through bad faith or gross negligence rather than ordinary negligence. In Schulman v. Saloon Beverage, Inc., Schulman (the “Plaintiff”) sued Saloon Beverage, Inc. (the “Defendant”) under Vermont’s Dram Shop Act for allegedly serving Mark Clarke, a drunken patron, four Sierra Nevada draft beers approximately ten minutes before he collided head on with the Plaintiff’s car. The Defendant contended that Clarke was not at its saloon on the night of the accident. The only documentary evidence available to prove Clarke was at the saloon were the records of checks because Clarke allegedly paid in cash. The Plaintiff filed a Rule 37 motion seeking sanctions for failing to preserve or permitting the destruction of the checks. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant failed to produce all of the check receipts for the night in question. After the Defendant produced printed copies of all the check receipts, the Plaintiff then alleged that the Defendant destroyed or altered the evidence because the check receipts contradicted other evidence which showed that Clarke was at the saloon. The Plaintiff wanted to prove that the Defendant altered the receipts by analyzing the electronically stored information (“ESI”) in original format; however, the computers were not preserved when the saloon went out of business. The issue in this case concerned whether the Plaintiff established its spoliation claim against the Defendant for destroying the ESI. A prerequisite to a spoliation claim is that the sought-after evidence actually existed and was destroyed. In order to obtain an adverse inference instruction regarding the loss or destruction of evidence, a party must establish: (1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were destroyed with a culpable state of mind; and (3) that the destroyed evidence was relevant to the party's claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense. In Schuman, the Plaintiff established that the Defendant negligently destroyed the ESI. There was no dispute that the check receipts were relevant because they involved the disputed issue of whether Clarke was at the saloon. The court found that the Defendant either knew or should have known that the ESI would be relevant to litigation because the Defendant was on notice when the Plaintiff made a claim in the Defendant’s bankruptcy proceedings. Furthermore, the court concluded that the ESI was destroyed through ordinary negligence, a culpable state of mind. Although the Plaintiff established that the Defendant negligently destroyed the ESI, the court still held that an adverse inference instruction was not appropriate because the Plaintiff’s suggestion of prejudice was based on conjecture. Instead of imposing the sanction, the court merely held that evidence of the destruction of the ESI may be admissible at trial. The sanction of an adverse inference is not mandatory in cases involving the negligent destruction of evidence. The court has the discretion to determine whether the sanction is appropriate where a party negligently destroys evidence on a case-by-case approach. A party seeking an adverse inference instruction should attempt to bolster its claim by establishing that the other party breached a discovery obligation through bad faith or gross negligence. Gary Discovery received a B.S. in Business Administration, with a concentration in Finance from the Bartley School of Business at Villanova University. He will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. After graduation, Gary will clerk for a presiding civil judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey.
eDiscovery experts gathered at the 12th Annual Advanced eDiscovery Institute in Washington, D.C. to discuss the hottest topics in eDiscovery. The two-day event, hosted by Georgetown Law, took place on November 19th and 20th, just 10 days before the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will go into effect. The event launched with a keynote speech from Christopher Surdak, the renowned author of Data Crush which won GetAbstract's International Book of the Year Award in 2014. Mr. Surdak also served as a panelist in several programs following his keynote address, in which the hottest topic appeared to be the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their possible implications in the world of eDiscovery. While some seemed to be worried about the effects of the new rules, most were hopeful that they will increase efficiency and cooperation among parties throughout the discovery process, especially during meet and confer efforts. The Honorable Judge Mark Coulson of Maryland expressed that he hoped to see the new rules be “used as tools and not weapons,” and the Honorable J. Michelle Childs noted that the new rules will not have a drastic effect in areas where parties are already open to cooperating and communicating honestly with one another. Another hot topic was Native Production. At a program that got heated quickly, panelists passionately debated the pros and cons of providing documents in native form. Attorney, Craig D. Ball, argued that the eDiscovery process is backwards and that all documents should be provided in native form to increase cost efficiency and minimize room for error. Attorney, David J. Kessler rebutted, emphasizing that opposing counsel cannot be trusted to provide adequate security for the native documents once they are turned over. The Honorable Paul S. Grewel, who seemed highly amused by the debate, joked that he “can’t wait to write an opinion on this.” Overall, the presentations were well thought out, intriguing and enlightening. We thank Tiffany Joly, her fine staff, and Georgetown Law for inviting eLessons Learned (eLLblog.com) to cover the program. It will be interesting to see how the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shape the eDiscovery process and we look forward to hearing further discussion of their effects, and other burgeoning eDiscovery issues, at next year’s Annual Advanced eDiscovery Institute.
When you think about making a copy, you may think of copying and pasting a document into a thumb drive or a folder in your documents. You might also think about scanning a document and saving that copy as a PDF. However, the question in many cases has become what is the price of that copy, and is it a cost that can be recovered. In the case of In Re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, the court addressed this very vague and unsettled question. The court did so by accepting the rule previously set forth in Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., which basely states the following: The cost of making an electronic copy may be recovered, but costs that are unnecessary to making the actual copy will not be recovered. In other words, you may not recover for any extra enhancements made to ESI; however, you may recover any costs associated with the basic copy of the information. Why is this frustrating? Because technology presents numerous standard features which streamline and lower the cost of discovery that are deemed unnecessary enhancements under this rule. This case presents a perfect example of an enhancement that is deemed unnecessary in regards to making copies of electronic data. The technology is called optical character recognition (OCR), which allows a computer to recognize text so that it may be copied, pasted, and searched. The defendants assert that OCR is a necessary part of copying ESI in order to perform basic interactions with an electronic document (i.e., copying and pasting from the ESI copies). Most individuals assume that the ability to copy and paste data from an electronic document is standard; and as such, it logically follows that this would be a necessary part of making an electronic copy. However, here, the court deemed that OCR is not a necessary part of making copies. Under this framework, even the commonplace technological advancements such as providing the ability to copy and paste from a copied electronic document are not seen as a necessary cost. Therefore, the decision to utilize such technology is done on producing party’s own dime. In this case, the court cites Race Tires again stating, “gathering, preserving, processing, searching, culling, and extracting ESI simply do not amount to `making copies.'" They further explained that only scanning and file format conversion could be considered under the small umbrella of “making copies.” Further, anything that can be deemed “processing" is also not seen as part of “making copies”. The court even expands on this to say that even if the processing was “essential” to making an electronic copy “comprehensive and intelligible” the services of processing the data are not included in making copies, and therefore, will not be recoverable. The Court in this case does not specifically determine the award of costs, but rather directs the parties to resubmit a budget in compliance with these rules. However, in the often cited Race Tires case, the court basically limited the awardable costs to only the scanning of hard copies, the conversion of files to appropriate formats, and the transfer of VHS tapes to DVDs. Victoria O’Connor Blazeski (formerly Victoria L. O’Connor) received her B.S. form Stevens Institute of Technology, and she will receive her J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Prior to law school, she worked as an account manager in the Corporate Tax Provision department of Thomson Reuters, Tax & Accounting. Victoria is a former D3 college basketball player, and she has an interest in Tax Law and Civil Litigation. After graduating, she will clerk for the Hon. Joseph M. Andresini, J.T.C. in the Tax Courts of New Jersey. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.  674 F3d 158 (3d Cir. 2012).
Arthur Lawrence’s attorneys must have thought that he had struck gold because among the 15,000 documents turned over as discovery from Dependable Medical Transportation Services, LLC, there were a number of e-mails between the Dependable Medical and their attorney. Lawrence immediately jumped at the opportunity to use these e-mails to his advantage. The e-mails were the Holy Grail, the promised land; they would surely bolster his case against the defendant and they might even give him the leverage to win a motion for partial summary judgment. Without a moment’s hesitation, Lawrence filed that motion for partial summary judgment; however, he was in for a rude awakening. The surprising part of this story is the fact that Lawrence was represented by counsel. He had retained the Phillips Deyes Law Group to represent him in this matter. Therefore, the ignorance of the court rules when dealing with such a matter is inexcusable; these attorneys should have known that not following the proper procedure in such a matter would result in an impending detriment to their client. When the defendant learned that the plaintiff had these e-mails in their possession they requested that they be returned in accordance with Arizona Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4 which provides that "[a] lawyer who receives a document and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender and preserve the status quo for a reasonable period of time in order to permit the sender to take protective measures." Further the comment on this rule state, [i]f a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a document was sent inadvertently, then this Rule requires the lawyer to stop reading the document, to make no use of the document, and to promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to take protective measures." Nevertheless, the plaintiff ignored this rule and the defendant’s requests, did not return the documents, and utilized the e-mails in their motion for partial summary judgment. This was a mistake, which would ultimately cost them any chance to use the e-mails at all. In their ruling denying the motion for partial summary judgment, the court referenced a rule that the plaintiff’s should have already known Rule 26(b)(5)(B). The court stated, "The requirements in Rule 26(b)(5)(B) are straight forward. Once a party is notified that a claim of privilege is being made, the party must either return or destroy the document or the party may turn the document over to the court for determination of the claim." Piasa Commercial Interiors, Inc. v. J.P. Murray Co., 2010 WL 1241563 *2 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2010). Therefore, since the plaintiffs had not followed the rule they not only lost their motion, but also lost any chance to argue tor their right to use the e-mails in any capacity. A.S. Mitchell received his B.A. in Political Science from the University of Central Florida (2008). He will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
Larry Klayman sued six separate journalist defendants for defamation. This case is about Klayman wanting more discovery from the defendants. Specifically, Klayman’s motion is to compel the production of documents and to hire a computer expert. In this case, Klayman has conceded the fact that he is a public figure. So, in order to win in a defamation suit, he must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the journalists published the statements about him with actual malice. Thus, Klayman made this discovery motion to try to obtain “any and all documents, discussions and/or publications that refer or relate in any way to Plaintiff Larry Klayman within the past five years,” as well as several other document requests. Klayman contends this information is relevant to state of mind of the journalists. However, the defendants represent that they have already provided Klayman with all relevant information. Based on this representation, the court denied Klayman’s request to compel document production. Klayman also petitioned for a computer retrieval expert to be hired to go through each defendant’s computer files. Klayman claimed that the defendants had improperly withheld documents. However, the court ruled that the plaintiff must show good cause in order to compel a forensic expert, and here he has failed to do so. The court further stated that his assertions were “conclusory and unpersuasive.” Jessie is a third year student at Seton Hall University School of Law (Class of 2015). She graduated from Rutgers University, New Brunswick in 2012 with a B.A. in philosophy and political science. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
A party has been burdened with manually reviewing 565,000 potentially relevant documents for search term hits. This manual method of review was agreed on by both parties and memorialized in a court order at the start. Shortly into the review process, the plaintiff realized this method would be costly and time consuming, and took it upon themselves to apply a predictive coding method using the agreed upon search terms. They then moved before the court to be able to use these predictive coding techniques, and not human manual review, to review the documents. The plaintiff argued that the modification to predictive coding should be utilized because it would achieve a more accurate measure of relevant documents, in addition to saving time and money. The defendant argued the opposite, believing that the predictive coding protocol was complicated and had various other issues involved. They argued that other courts, which have allowed predictive coding, have stressed the need for transparent and cooperative behavior by all parties, a manner of which plaintiff in this case has not acted. They even went as far as to say that the predictive coding protocol utilized by the plaintiffs did not comply with the “best practices” for the chosen software. The court, although in support of predictive coding, ordered the plaintiff to produce all documents in the agreed upon manner (Human review wins!). “If the parties had worked with their E-discovery consultants and agreed at the onset of this case to a predictive coding based ESI protocol, the court would not hesitate to approve a transparent mutually agreed upon ESI protocol.” But here, their hands were tied by the earlier court order. The court also stated that, and agreeing with the defendant’s argument, predictive coding requires a heightened degree of transparent cooperation among parties. “In the few cases that have approved technology assisted review of ESI, courts have consistently required the producing parties to provide the requesting parties with full disclosures about the technology being used, processes, methodology and documents used to “train” computers.” Here, the court found that the Plaintiff has been unwilling to engage in the level of transparency necessary, which they believed would “only result in more disputes and delays.” TAKEAWAY: The parties, especially the moving party, should have prepared a electronic discovery strategy from the beginning, as the main problem here was that the plaintiff sought to modify an already agreed upon order and the court thought it was too late in the game. Additionally, the parties must be open and transparent about the methodology being used with the technology if predictive coding is the agreed upon ESI method. Amanda is a third-year student at Seton Hall University School of Law, where she is pursuing a J.D. with a certificate in Health Law. Prior to law school, she was a 2011 magna cum laude graduate of Seton Hall University, where she earned Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and a minor in Philosophy. Presently, she is a law clerk at a small firm handling real estate and bankruptcy matters. After graduation this native New Yorker hopes to work at a mid-sized firm in the Big Apple. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
This case involves ACT, a career guidance service firm that assists job seekers throughout their job search, suing Daniel Drasin, the administrator of a blog known as Random Convergence. According to ACT, Drasin exercises editorial control over the blog. ACT complains that the blog disparage ACT's services and damages ACT's business and reputation. On March 11, 2013, Magistrate Judge Kristin Mix granted ACT's motion to serve third party subpoenas on Drasin, demanding that he produce the name and contact information for each of the people who posted disparaging remarks on Drasin’s blog. On April 18, 2013, Drasin, then self-represented, filed a third-party motion to quash the subpoenas, stating that they violated the bloggers’ rights to First Amendment right to anonymous speech. He also argued that most individuals who posted comments on the Blog did so anonymously, and he explained that he had no records of those who chose to remain anonymous. The court sided with Drasin and quashed the subpoena. The court found that the Subpoena imposes two types of burden on Drasin. First, in order to comply with the subpoena, Drasin must surrender his personal hard drives to ACT for up to thirty days. Personal computers generally cannot function without their hard drives, so this requirement would force Drasin to spend up to thirty days without the use of his personal computer. Second, forcing Drasin to surrender his hard drives to ACT would give ACT access to Drasin's personal files. Moreover, ACT has alternative means to obtain the information it seeks, such as serving a subpoena on Google. The court also found persuasive that the benefits of the Subpoena appear to be minimal, as there is no indication in the record that Drasin possesses any information that would be relevant in the Colorado Action beyond that which he has already provided. The takeaway message is that subpoenas can be quashed if discovery imposes an undue burden, if the information is irrelevant to the action, and if there are other avenues from which the information can be obtained. Rebecca Hsu, a Seton Hall University School of Law student (Class of 2015), focuses her studies in the area of Patent Law, with a concentration in Intellectual Property. She is also certified in Healthcare Compliance, and has worked in Compliance at Otsuka America Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Prior to law school, she graduated cum laude from UCLA and completed graduate work in Biomedical Science. She has co-authored two medical science research articles, as well as completed fellowships through UCLA Medicine and the Medical College of Wisconsin. In addition to awards for her academic achievements, Rebecca has been honored by awards for her community service with disadvantaged communities. In her spare time, Rebecca regularly practices outdoor rock climbing, and can be found camping in the Adirondacks. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here