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This case involves ACT, a career guidance service firm that assists job seekers throughout their job search, suing Daniel Drasin, the administrator of a blog known as Random Convergence. According to ACT, Drasin exercises editorial control over the blog. ACT complains that the blog disparage ACT's services and damages ACT's business and reputation. On March 11, 2013, Magistrate Judge Kristin Mix granted ACT's motion to serve third party subpoenas on Drasin, demanding that he produce the name and contact information for each of the people who posted disparaging remarks on Drasin’s blog. On April 18, 2013, Drasin, then self-represented, filed a third-party motion to quash the subpoenas, stating that they violated the bloggers’ rights to First Amendment right to anonymous speech. He also argued that most individuals who posted comments on the Blog did so anonymously, and he explained that he had no records of those who chose to remain anonymous. The court sided with Drasin and quashed the subpoena. The court found that the Subpoena imposes two types of burden on Drasin. First, in order to comply with the subpoena, Drasin must surrender his personal hard drives to ACT for up to thirty days. Personal computers generally cannot function without their hard drives, so this requirement would force Drasin to spend up to thirty days without the use of his personal computer. Second, forcing Drasin to surrender his hard drives to ACT would give ACT access to Drasin's personal files. Moreover, ACT has alternative means to obtain the information it seeks, such as serving a subpoena on Google. The court also found persuasive that the benefits of the Subpoena appear to be minimal, as there is no indication in the record that Drasin possesses any information that would be relevant in the Colorado Action beyond that which he has already provided. The takeaway message is that subpoenas can be quashed if discovery imposes an undue burden, if the information is irrelevant to the action, and if there are other avenues from which the information can be obtained. Rebecca Hsu, a Seton Hall University School of Law student (Class of 2015), focuses her studies in the area of Patent Law, with a concentration in Intellectual Property. She is also certified in Healthcare Compliance, and has worked in Compliance at Otsuka America Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Prior to law school, she graduated cum laude from UCLA and completed graduate work in Biomedical Science. She has co-authored two medical science research articles, as well as completed fellowships through UCLA Medicine and the Medical College of Wisconsin. In addition to awards for her academic achievements, Rebecca has been honored by awards for her community service with disadvantaged communities. In her spare time, Rebecca regularly practices outdoor rock climbing, and can be found camping in the Adirondacks. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here
The court first directed the defendant to produce the file of the plaintiff’s insurance claim in 2007, and needless to say, even in 2014 the defendant still had not produced everything. Over one year later, the court granted the plaintiff’s first motion to compel. When a flood of documents appeared at a deposition in 2011, discovery was reopened and the defendant was sanctioned. Another motion to compel was granted in 2012, and this time it was for the deposition of a representative of the defendant who could testify about the efforts the defendant had taken to respond to discovery requests. Yet another flood of documents appeared, and the representative deposed was unable to describe any of the defendant’s discovery efforts. The plaintiff moved again for sanctions, which were granted in 2013. At that time, the court also granted the plaintiff the costs and legal fees due to the late production of documents. As relevant here, before the court in this motion was the assessment of legal fees and another production request. The defendant did not want to produce more documents because by this time the defendant said the emails were on backup tapes that were purportedly not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. Can you guess what the court thought of that argument? We’ll get to that in a moment. Without delving into specifics, the court painstakingly analyzed the plaintiff’s legal bill for the various motions, filings, etc. and awarded $81,997.60 in attorney’s fees. Some of these costs were attributable to an IT specialist hired by the plaintiff that was to help the attorneys ask proper questions at the defendant’s representative’s deposition so they could ensure protocols were followed during discovery and that sufficient documentation was recovered (and if discovery was delayed because of an honest mistake, the explanation for that could be ascertained). Even though the individual deposed actually had no knowledge of the defendant’s discovery practices, the defendants couldn’t escape paying for the IT specialist’s and attorney preparation time. On top of the nearly $82,000 awarded in legal fees, the defendant said it would cost $200,000 to recover the backup tapes containing emails. While the actual cost is unclear, the defendant was ordered to turn over eight weeks of tapes, at its expense, of the thirteen individuals the plaintiff identified. The judge even left the door open for the the plaintiff to get additional discovery if further exploration is necessary. However, this isn’t the end. Sometimes, a single well-placed footnote can be unbelievably powerful. This case illustrates just that, as the judge cleverly observed the defendant’s conduct as such: [c]onsistent with Hartford’s approach to discovery in this case, it has spent more time and resources challenging two entries totaling 1 hour than the amount requested by the plaintiff for those entries. The court trusts that Hartford’s attorneys will notify their client how much they incurred in attorneys fees on these two entries. So please, take discovery seriously. Samuel is in the Seton Hall University School of Law Class of 2015 pursuing the Intellectual Property concentration. He received his master’s from the Rutgers Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences and became a registered patent agent prior to entering law school. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 401 defines something as relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26(b)(1)-Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. In addition, the plaintiff bears the burden of convincing the court that search terms for electronically stored information (ESI) is relevant. In a motion to compel, a court will weigh the relevancy of a plaintiff’s request and justification versus a defendant’s previously produced documents. This is the underlying law that is challenged in McNabb v. City of Overland Park. In McNabb v. City of Overland Park, a police officer alleges claims of sexual harassment and inappropriate workplace behavior and requests electronic mail from a group of individuals from within the police department. The plaintiff during the discovery period submitted a list of 35 search terms to the defendant for document request to support his claim. In response, the defendant, upon discussion with the plaintiff’s counsel, produced over 36,000 documents which were broken up into five categories of search. The defendant produced the following document categories: (1) all emails sent or received by plaintiff; (2) all emails sent or received by Officer Bever, (3) all emails mentioning plaintiff, (4) all emails mentioning Officer Bever, and (5) any emails containing both “McNabb” and “Bever.” In filing the motion to compel discovery, the plaintiff seeks to require the defendant to search the electronic files of 14 custodians for their 35 specific search words. However, the judge held that the plaintiff must present something more than speculation that a search of those 14 custodians’ emails with proposed words would be likely to reveal additional information not included in the initial discovery documents. Specifically, the court noted, the search as required by the plaintiffs was overly broad and it was unlikely that it “could conceivably encompass some information that may arguably be relevant to this litigation…” The court also took note to a significant number of the search terms that were not sexually charged although the plaintiff’s claim in the litigation was sexual harassment. In addition, the court found that the plaintiff included a numerous amount of duplicative and unnecessary search terms (“bullied” and “bully;” “defamation” and “defame;” “discriminate” and “discrimination;” “harass” and “harassment;” “kissed,” “kisses,” and “kissing;” “retaliate” and “retaliation;” and “sex” and “sexual”). In response, the defendant claimed that this measure was to ensure that the discovery search was thorough, but the court held that this measure was a prime example of the overbroad and excessive nature of the search. Therefore, in order for discovery searches to be deemed proper they must be arguably relevant for what they request. Anything that is overbroad will be deemed excessive if the defendant was willing to participate and contribute something toward your discovery goal. The holding in this case attempts to scale back the overbroad reach of FRCP 26(b) and begins to narrow the focus of ESI discovery requests. This is a matter that must be carefully watched because courts could be leaning towards no longer allowing fishing expeditions into Metadata for ESI. Timothy received his B.A. from Rutgers University in 2011. He began his post-college life working in Trenton, New Jersey, at a lobbying and non-profit management organization before attending law school in the fall of 2012. He will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Timothy has had a diverse set of experiences during his time in law school and has found his calling in Tax Law. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
In January 2014, the Hon. Lawrence E. Kahn in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York granted plaintiff Dataflow, Inc.’s motion for sanctions in a case regarding deleted email correspondence. Sanctions took the form of the often-case-ending adverse inference, with the judge reserving on the specific language of the adverse inference jury instruction until trial. Defendant Peerless Insurance Co. might not wait that long, as even the neophyte lawyer can tell when blood is in the water. Dataflow’s claim arose out of a discovery request for production of documents that “targeted, inter alia internal communications and investigations regarding Plaintiffs’ claim.” Dataflow, Inc., v. Peerless Ins. Co., No. 3:11-cv-1127 (LEK/DEP), 2014 WL 148685, *2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2014). When the defendant failed to produce any internal communications responsive to the document request, the plaintiffs tried again. After the plaintiffs submitted an even narrower request for production, the defendants still didn’t produce anything responsive. Perhaps smelling something fishy, Dataflow started taking depositions and asking questions about the internal communications at Peerless. The plaintiffs quickly learned that email was routinely used to communicate about claims. The emails that Dataflow already asked for. The emails that Dataflow was told didn’t exist. The plot thickens. Hon. David E. Peebles, the Magistrate Judge handling discovery in this matter filed a Report and Recommendation urging sanctions be granted and fees shifted. The District Court, reviewing Judge Peebles’s ruling de novo determined that the Magistrate got it right—and that sanctions are appropriate. The court analyzed the facts of the case under the spoliation framework set forth in Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002): On a motion for sanctions due to spoliation, the moving party must show that: (1) the party having control of the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2) that party had a culpable state of mind; and (3) the destroyed evidence was of a nature that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support the moving party’s claim or defense. Dataflow, at *2 (citing Residential Funding Corp, at 107). Here, the duty to preserve for an insurance party was triggered when a claim was submitted. As such, any internal communication regarding that claim is obviously supposed to be preserved. The culpable state of mind can be inferred by the gross negligence displayed by email deletion resulting from a “system change.” A “system change” that also conveniently “changed” the methods of preservation of documents related to paid and unpaid claims. Finally, since the plaintiff was able to prove that the contents of the internal email conversations likely would have supported the plaintiffs’ theory of the case, sanctions in the form of an adverse inference just make sense. Perhaps it’s time for Peerless to have a “system change” with regards to their general counsel. Kevin received a B.S. in Political Science from the University of Scranton (2009), and will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Prior to joining the Seton Hall community, Kevin worked as an eDiscovery professional at two large “white-shoe” law firms in Manhattan. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
“Recycle,” “conserve,” “waste,” and “pollution” are terms that were implanted into the minds of each of us at a young age and are now they are being instilled into companies worldwide as a measure to reduce operational costs. Companies such as JPC Equestrian, Inc. have begun recycling and reusing “cleaned” electronic devices from former employees, which would normally not be an issue if companies had a company-wide server or cloud-based software that held all of the information stored within the device. However, since JPC Equestrian, Inc. does not have a company-wide server, once an employee leaves, the company has a procedure in place to “scub” the computer and reassign it to another without care for the electronic information within the device. In Kearney v. JPC Equestrian, Inc., Mark Kearney, a former employee, sued JPC Equestrian, Inc. (“JPC”) for the failure to produce emails relevant to the claim he is asserting. Kearney commenced this lawsuit against JPC when they wrongfully terminated his employment, and breached his sales agreements by either failing to pay him sales commissions or by paying reduced commissions that did not satisfy contractual obligations. Kearney through the discovery process received email documentation from numerous employees and executives dating back to 2005. The discovery submission included JPS turning over 250 pages of documents relevant to the parties and situations involved. However, Kearney requested information for "all relevant emails," which in his original discovery requests, were defined as "[a]ll emails that mention, or refer to the Plaintiff, however, marginally, in any way shape or form from 2002 through 2010." Kearney v. JPC Equestrian, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153975, *5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2014). Kearney was missing three years of discovery. Kearney only received documentation dating back to 2005 because the information dating back to 2002 did not exist or does not exist anymore and cannot be recovered. JPS claims that the information cannot be recovered because the computers that would have held that data were wiped clean and erased before the device was transitioned to another employee. JPS has found loopholes around document retention and the court agreed. The court held that JPS’ procedure of document retention was acceptable and the court has, “no basis to conclude that the defendants have withheld responsive documents, or that there is any basis to compel a further response regarding potentially relevant email communication.” Id. at *7. Unfortunately, this holding allows companies an avenue to discard potential and relevant information pertaining to potential litigation that otherwise would have been saved if not for the guise of recycling and employee cost saving. This holding should be reversed and JPS should be penalized for its failure to maintain adequate records for an appropriate period of time. The court should not excuse a company, no matter the size or market capitalization, for not maintaining the electronic information of employees who work within the company. Not only is that bad preservation practice, its poor business practice. Recycling and the protection of our planet is important but those ideals should not give rise to loopholes of common electronic document preservation practices, which are becoming as worldwide and important as protecting the planet itself. Timothy received his B.A. from Rutgers University in 2011. He began his post-college life working in Trenton, New Jersey, at a lobbying and non-profit management organization before attending law school in the fall of 2012. He will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Timothy has had a diverse set of experiences during his time in law school and has found his calling in Tax Law. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
On March 10, 20108, Marc Liebeskind began working at Rutgers Facilities Business Administration Department. By March 28 of that year, Liebeskind was terminated for lacking the basic skill set needed to perform his job in addition to having a poor attitude while on the job. Liebeskind’s supervisors had suspected he was spending an unreasonable amount of time on non-work related activities on his work computer. Having doubts about Liebeskind’s work performance, his supervisors reviewed the browsing history on Liebeskind’s computer by using an application called IEHistoryView. It is important to note that this search only entailed browsing history, and there is no evidence that Liebeskind’s supervisors were granted any access to his personal or password-protected information and accounts. After his termination, Liebeskind filed suit against Rutgers University and his supervisors, claiming invasion of privacy, among other claims. On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling, which ruling struck down all claims that Liebeskind’s privacy was violated as a result of his supervisors’ investigating the browser history on his computer. The appellate court referenced the New Jersey Supreme Court’s Stengart ruling, which had set the precedent for an employer’s right to monitor employee Internet activity and usage. Closely followed in previous eLessons Learned posts, the 2010 Stengart ruling held that an employee’s email communication with her attorney, using a company-issued computer, but via a personal, password-protected email account was held to be protected by the attorney-client privilege. However, the court’s decision to uphold Stengart’s privacy was not intended to forbid employers from monitoring employees’ actions on company-issued computers or devices in the future. In Stengart, New Jersey’s highest court stated: “Companies can adopt lawful policies relating to computer use to protect the assets, reputation, and productivity of a business and to ensure compliance with legitimate corporate policies.” As noted in Liebeskind, Rutgers’ “Acceptable Use Policy for Computing and Information Technology Resources” was in effect during the time of Liebeskind’s employment. This policy expressly stated that an employee’s privacy “may be superseded by the University’s requirement to protect the integrity of information technology resources, the rights of all users and the property of the University.” Additionally, Rutgers University “[r]eserve[d] the right to examine material stored on or transmitted through its facilities.” Unlike the findings in Stengart, the court established that Liebeskind did not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” In addition, the court agreed that Rutgers had a “legitimate interest in monitoring and regulating plaintiff’s workplace computer.” All companies can learn from this case and the policies in place at Rutgers that protected its right to monitor and search an employee’s computer. One of the most important lessons to be learned here is the need for a written internet usage policy. At the very least, these written policies should mandate that employees are expected to use the Internet and their work issued computers for work related activities only. Additionally, the possible disciplinary actions for any violation of this policy should be made available to employees. As seen in in this case, the existence of an internet usage policy and the reserved right of a company to monitor its employee’s Internet activity is the key to eliminate an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
We all have personal social media pages. No matter who you are, you likely have an online presence in the form of a profile on one of the many sites available on the Internet. One who simply forgets about a newly created social profile can be the subject of worldwide scrutiny—the page is available for all to see. Who cares, right? Most likely, you will not have anything important on there. However, what happens when you are facing a criminal charge and the prosecution uses your social media profile in order to prove your guilt? Meet Aliaksandr Zhyltsou, a Ukrainian native living his life in Brooklyn, New York. All was well until Zhyltsou allegedly furnished Vladyslav Timku with a forged birth certificate, which claimed that Timku was the father of a baby daughter. Timku, as a cooperating witness for the government, admitted that he had sought the forged birth certificate in order to skirt his responsibility to military service in his native Ukraine. During the trail, Timku offered testimony that Zhyltsou had sent him the forged document from the gmail account “firstname.lastname@example.org.” However, the prosecution was unable to offer any other evidence other than Timku’s testimony that tied Zhyltsou to this e-mail address. Therefore, more evidence was necessary in order to corroborate Timku’s claim. Special Agent Cline, from the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service, provided the prosecution with the link between the e-mail address and the VK.com profile (the Russian equivalent of Facebook). Cline asserted that this profile on VK belonged to the defendant and was linked to the very same gmail account used to send the forged document to Timku. To prosecutors, it seemed like a slam-dunk: here was the evidence needed to corroborate Timku’s testimony and sufficiently tie Zhyltsou to the Gmail account in question. Everything seemed in order; the profile contained a picture of the defendant, his work experience, and most importantly the “azmadeuz” Gmail account. Furthermore, the district court agreed that this was the Zhyltsou’s profile page and therefore the prosecution could use it as evidence to establish the link between the defendant and the gmail account. However, one pesky evidence rule could ruin it all in an instant, Federal Rule 901. Simply, Federal Rule 901 requires that in order to “authenticate or identify” a piece of evidence, a proponent asserting any form of evidence “must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the evidence is what the proponent claims it is.” Therefore, in the instant case, the prosecution had the duty to prove that this VK profile page belonged to Zhyltsou alone and was not created by any other person. However, in his haste to provide this vital piece of evidence, the prosecutor failed to adhere to this rule and the case was ultimately overturned on appeal. This case is a prime example of the need for all lawyers to have a firm understanding of electronic discovery. While it may be easy to access social media profiles and the like in order to obtain evidence against an opponent, that is only part of the process. It must be proven that the profile actually belongs to your opponent before you may use it against them as evidence in a court of law. In today’s world, it is not difficult to create fake profiles on such sites and therefore the court was correct in overturning this ruling. However, it is not outside of the realm of possibility that the prosecution could have tied Zhyltsou to this VK profile, it would have simply taken a little more digging and investigative work. A.S. Mitchell received his B.A. in Political Science from the University of Central Florida (2008). He will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Presently, A.S. clerks for the Monmouth County Office of the Public Defender. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
Philips and Hunt may have been debating the ownership of the tagline “Sense and Simplicity,” but it seems the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey was more interested in exploring the sense and simplicity of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when it handed down the ruling in Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Hunt Control Systems. After noting that Rule 26 permits a broad scope of permissible discovery, Magistrate Judge James B. Clark, III held that a responding party need not use every tool in their toolbox in order to comply with a Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6) deposition request. In his memorandum opinion, Judge Clark held that an alternative approach to ESI collection, as requested by Hunt, was burdensome and likely to be unproductive. The collection was such a burden, in fact, that Judge Clark granted Philips’ motion for a protective order against further such requests. Hunt had previously interviewed “a Philips IT/ESI discovery professional” regarding Philips’ ESI practices. Months later, Hunt noticed a deposition for an IT witness claiming that Philips’ responses for eight questions were not adequately answered by the interviewee. Philips objected to the deposition request and petitioned the court for a protective order. Hunt argued that the IT deposition was necessary in order to discover whether Philips was using appropriate search tools for the ESI discovery requests. Hunt’s argument was supported by an IT professional who opined that Philips’ “cloud-based IT structure” and Philips’ “sophisticated and comprehensive state-of-the-art document search and location tools” meant that Philips was obligated to use a particular method to accommodate Hunt’s electronic discovery requests. Hunt further argued that the deposition did not create an undue burden on Philips so as to outweigh the likely benefits. In seeking a protective order, Philips counters that the provided answers were accurate and that Philips has consistently used “a custodian-based approach to collecting ESI” and thus, shouldn’t be required to employ alternative approaches at the request of Hunt. The court agreed with Philips, citing three individual reasons. First, the Court found that Hunt failed to carry its burden of showing that Philips’ production has been materially deficient. Significantly, Judge Clark wrote that just because Hunt was dissatisfied with the result of Philips’ production, such dissatisfaction was “not enough to reopen the door to the collection of ESI discovery under an entirely different method.” Because Philips’ responses were true and accurate, there was “no compelling reason” to force Philips to use Hunt’s preferred method of production. Second, the court held that even if an alternative approach to ESI collection was more appropriate than Philips’ “custodian-based” search, Hunt still failed to produce evidence showing that conducting another search under their preferred methods would substantially alter the results Philips already produced. Again, Judge Clark takes the opportunity to emphasize that employing multiple methods of production would be “duplicative” and “an inefficient use of time and resources.” Third, and most importantly for future cases involving these circumstances, Judge Clark wrote that it was not Hunt’s requested deposition that caused an undue burden on Philips, but rather “the possibility of opening the door to more (and likely unproductive) discovery with no apparent end in sight.” Putting a stern period on the end of a judicial statement, Judge Clark concluded by noting that the proposed deposition contained only a “marginal benefit” to Hunt that is “heavily outweighed” by the “tremendous burden” to Philips. Judge Clark made it clear (and seemingly warned future litigators) that the court will not entertain duplicative and seemingly petty disputes over the method of e-discovery production, so long as the information produced is not “materially deficient.” In light of this decision, parties requesting discovery would be wise to make their requests as specific as possible in the first instance, including a specified or desired approach to collecting ESI. Such specificity (accompanied with reasonability) may result in more beneficial discovery as well as preventing the scorn of wasted judicial time. Nicole was a 2010 magna cum laude graduate of Northeastern University located in Boston, Massachusetts, where she earned her B.A. in English and Political Science. In 2015, Nicole will receive her J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law. After graduation, Nicole will serve as a clerk to a trial judge of the Superior Court of New Jersey in the Morris-Sussex Vicinage.
A pyrrhic victory is defined by winning an early battle but eventually losing the war because of the costs and expenses of that earlier battle. Everyone has heard the phase, “you may have won this battle but I will win the war.” Victory in life, business, and litigation is achieved by obtaining a favorable outcome in the end, and not defined by winning an early battle over discovery where you exhaust resources by attempting to try to obstruct your opponent. Individuals who fail to comply and purposely try to hide or destroy a document can trigger serious legal consequences and significantly hurt their chances for long term success in the litigation. In Klipsch Group, Inc. v. Big Box Store Ltd., Klipsch Group, Inc. sued Big Box Store (“BBS”) for the spoliation of relevant documents as well as other discovery misdeeds. Klipsch commenced a lawsuit against BBS for infringement of their trademark on a particular headphone in 2012. BBS conceded that they sold some counterfeit headphones but claimed that the sales were innocent and yielded almost no profit. Klipsch’s main claim against BBS is that they failed to hold or preserve relevant documents pertaining to the pending lawsuit when they became aware of the litigation in August 2012 (a requirement by law). Every litigant has an obligation to take reasonable measures to preserve all potentially relevant documents once it has noticed that a lawsuit has been filed. Specifically, that obligation may arise even prior to litigation being formally filed if "the party 'should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation.'" MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2006-OA2 v. UBS Real Estate Secs., Inc., 295 F.R.D. 77, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)). Here, BBS should have known about the possibility of future litigations since they were knowingly infringing onto Klipsch’s patent by selling counterfeit headphones. Klipsch suspected that BBS’ actions warranted, at a minimum, a forensic investigation into their company for documents that could reveal if a larger quantity of counterfeit headphones were sold. Klipsch, correctly believed, that based on the information they received through discovery it seemed that large quantities of documents (emails, transactional documents, sales reports) were missing or altered. This belief was verified during subsequent depositions of BBS employees. The depositions revealed that BBS employees produced contradicting stories than the information revealed in discovery. In deciding Klipsch Group, Inc. v. Big Box Store Ltd., the court refused to levy a severe punishment against BBS although it was discovered that they had broken numerous discovery laws. Instead, the court took a passive approach and applied “the mildest of available remedies” that allowed the parties leave to pursue additional discovery, except this time with an experienced forensic computer expert. However, the court could have imposed stricter penalties onto BBS, such as, termination, preclusion of testimony, or a mandatory adverse-inference charge after it discovered BBS’s possible attempt to destroy evidence. Instead, the court chose a more cautious route and tabled those actions until the forensic discovery was completed. This ponders the question, if the aim of any remedy is to deter the parties from engaging in spoliation and restore the aggrieved party to the same position then why not have automatic forensic discovery? The answer? Costs. Klipsch suggested that the imposition of costs, including fees should be shifted to BBS. The court disagreed and held that the costs would first be borne by Klipsch and could be reallocated or apportioned based on the findings of the expert’s report. The court could better deter abuse of discovery by always imposing costs for forensic experts onto defendants who are found to have wrongfully withheld information requested in discovery. This action and precedent would cause all parties to become forthcoming with unaltered information due to the fear of additional costs levied in litigation. Ultimately, the expert’s report will produce the information needed for Klipsch to move forward in their litigation against BBS, or it will prove unfruitful and Klipsch will drop their litigation. This entire matter could have been avoided if BBS did not attempt to hide information during discovery. BBS could have avoided a pyrrhic problem by not exhausting valuable resources into possibly altering evidence of the sale of counterfeit headphones. However, this case could be used as future precedent to prevent future companies from pursuing this option as a method of strategy if they automatically shift the costs of forensic experts to the litigant in situations where inaccuracies of discovery occur. Timothy received his B.A. from Rutgers University in 2011. He began his post-college life working in Trenton, New Jersey at a lobbying and non-profit management organization before attending law school in the fall of 2012. He will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Timothy has had a diverse set of experiences during his time in law school and has found his calling in Tax Law. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
Preserving electronic data can be a challenge for companies with multiple data centers. However, what we have here is a failure to communicate. The case at issue is an ERISA class action against UnumProvident. On November 26, plaintiffs' counsel wrote to request a conference to present their request for a preservation. The court then outlined principles that would serve as the basis for the parties' draft of a proposed order. The court observed, without contradiction from UnumProvident, that UnumProvident already had a duty to preserve any tapes containing emails as of November 4, the date litigation commenced. The order required all back-up tapes or other back-up hard drives, disks or other hardware containing material back-up by the defendants regarding Y2K, regardless of the date or dates of the internal or external e-mails, computer information, or electronic media contained thereon to be preserved. Specifically the plaintiffs requested all internal and external e-mails, generated, created, or dated October 14, 15, and 16 of 2002, and November 18, 19, and 20 of 2002. If the defendants alleged these e-mails were no longer in existence due to routine destruction or otherwise, the defendants had to provide an affidavit explaining circumstances of the unavailability. UnumProvident’s Enterprise Security Architect decided instead of preserved the data to implement a special “snapshot” back-up which would back-up those emails that were on the system as of the day or days the snapshot was taken. UnumProvident could also have directed IBM, their data vendor, to copy email back-up tapes from existing unexpired tapes to other back-up tapes that would contain no expiration date. Similarly, it could have copied the data onto a hard drive or into other computer media. Instead, this snapshot inadvertently caused all of the data on the back-up tapes to be overwritten. The court found that no enterprise officers of UnumProvident had sufficient expertise to discuss the preservation project in a meaningful way. Neither of them took the steps that they needed to take to get sufficiently informed advice on the issues involved. Similarly, there was insufficient supervision of the Enterprise Software Architect's efforts. The officer had also never ordered IBM to preserve emails regarding the six dates. Additionally, the law department of UnumProvident never instructed its officers to confirm that email for the six days had been preserved by IBM. As this issue developed relatively early in discovery, the court found it difficult to determine the extent to which the plaintiffs have suffered any prejudice from the failure to capture all of the UnumProvident emails for the six days. Throughout the whole opinion, the court was very skeptical of the testimony of UnumProvident’s officers. The court determined most of UnumProvident’s actions were inadequate. However, it also determined the accelerated expiration problem that occurred because of the creation of the snapshot was inadvertent and unintended. Therefore, the court did not award any sanctions. It can still be assumed the court would be less trusting of UnumProvident after this debacle and less likely to give them the benefit of the doubt.