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Willfully destroying evidence? Failing to preserve materially relevant evidence? These are just two of the allegations Lisa Alter has made against the Rocky Point School District. Prior to submitting her complaint, Ms. Alter had accused the school district of similar wrongdoings. Alter worked for the Rocky Point School District holding various positions over the years. While employed as the Coordinator of Central Registration/Administrative Assistant within the Human Resources department, Alter alleges that she was subject to a hostile work environment on the basis of her gender. Further, Alter claims that she was retaliated against for complaining to the School District about it. The opinion here is related to a matter regarding electronic discovery in this case. The plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery and for sanctions. After taking several depositions, plaintiff claims to have discovered new testimony relevant to her most recent motion to compel discovery. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that: “(1) Defendants both failed to preserve and willfully destroyed evidence, and (2) Defendants continue to intentionally withhold relevant evidence despite repeated demands for production.” The school district had a system for overwriting backup drives. The plaintiff contended that by not stopping the overwriting of the backup drives that it constituted a breach of the defendant’s preservation obligation. The defendant claimed that all information relevant to this case (i.e., emails stored on the school’s employee email system). The duty to preserve arises when litigation is “reasonably foreseeable.” The party that has control over the evidence has an obligation to preserve it. Once evidence is lost, the court then looks to the obligor’s state of mind to determine culpability. Here, the court determined that the defendants did not intentionally lose the data. The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to prove that the lost data was relevant. In the instant case, the court did not find bad faith; thus, it was up to the plaintiff to then prove the relevance of the lost data. Ultimately, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff’s motion. The court found that the plaintiff did not meet her burden of showing that the lost documents were relevant. However, the actions of the defendants that lead to losing materials placed the plaintiff in a position to have to file this motion. Thus, sanctions were awarded in the amount of $1,500.00. The moral of the story: When litigation is pending, or likely to begin, preserve or pay the price. Jessie is a third year student at Seton Hall University School of Law (Class of 2015). She graduated from Rutgers University, New Brunswick in 2012 with a B.A. in Philosophy and Political Science. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.  When the breaching party acts in bad faith, relevance is assumed.
The employee in this case was not an inexperienced layperson, but rather a seasoned and accomplished trial attorney. Yet even with her wealth of knowledge regarding discovery, she was nearly cited for contempt of court as a result of her unfamiliarity with electronic discovery obligations. When obligated to turn over emails to your opposing party during discovery, it is not enough to simply forward the email. Courts require the emails to be in their native form, which means containing the crucial metadata contained within the original email. In Sexton v. Lecavalier, the plaintiff, Byron Sexton, subpoenaed all documents in the defendant’s possession regarding several business entities. The subpoena provided that if these documents were in electronic form, the copies produced must be in their “native” format. In response to the subpoena, the defense attorney produced numerous documents including eleven emails that had been forwarded to her from her client’s Gmail account. The defense attorney claimed that she could not access the emails in their original format and even had an IT expert testify that the emails could not be accessed in their native format because the infrastructure for the email is controlled by Google, who does not allow its users to copy emails in native format. The issue in this case is that the emails were located in the “cloud,” and thus stored with a third party. However, even though a third party held the emails, the plaintiff argues that there are two ways to preserve the crucial metadata. (1) Emails can be downloaded to an email client such as Microsoft Outlook and then saved onto a computer in the format used by the client; and (2) Gmail emails that have been displayed in their “original” format by clicking “show original” and then saved as a PDF. The court held that even though the plaintiff currently lacked access to the files in their native format, this fact does not absolve counsel of her discovery obligations. A growing number of attorneys and courts are realizing the evidentiary value to metadata and as this trend continues, it is becoming crucial for parties to preserve all relevant electronic data. There is currently electronic discovery software in existence, which makes preservation of data a whole lot easier (http://www.ediscovery.com/solutions/collect/ is merely one example of such software). The presiding judge went on to scold both parties for even bringing this discovery disagreement in front of the court. The judge stated that the parties should have resolved this matter outside of court and that the defendant could have provided the emails in a correct format with minimal cost. However, the judge believed that the defense attorney had a good faith belief that the emails could not be provided in their native format and refused to hold her in contempt. It seems that ignorance was the defense attorney’s saving grace. Any practitioners reading this will not have the luxury of such a defense. In order to avoid charges of contempt being levied against you in the future, it would be wise to invest in electronic discovery software. At the very least, you should download Microsoft Outlook and save all of your emails in a format that preserves metadata such as .eml or .msg. As less paper copies of documents are being utilized, and as electronic storage is becoming more prevalent, native documents are going to become an issue increasingly seen by courts. Additionally, resolve any such discovery issues with your opponent. No judge wants his or her time wasted with similar motions compelling discovery. Daniel received a B.A. in Criminology and Criminal Justice from The University of Maryland. He will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Presently, Daniel is serving as a legal intern in the Juvenile Justice Clinic. After graduation Daniel will clerk for a trial judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here
Philips and Hunt may have been debating the ownership of the tagline “Sense and Simplicity,” but it seems the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey was more interested in exploring the sense and simplicity of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when it handed down the ruling in Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Hunt Control Systems. After noting that Rule 26 permits a broad scope of permissible discovery, Magistrate Judge James B. Clark, III held that a responding party need not use every tool in their toolbox in order to comply with a Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6) deposition request. In his memorandum opinion, Judge Clark held that an alternative approach to ESI collection, as requested by Hunt, was burdensome and likely to be unproductive. The collection was such a burden, in fact, that Judge Clark granted Philips’ motion for a protective order against further such requests. Hunt had previously interviewed “a Philips IT/ESI discovery professional” regarding Philips’ ESI practices. Months later, Hunt noticed a deposition for an IT witness claiming that Philips’ responses for eight questions were not adequately answered by the interviewee. Philips objected to the deposition request and petitioned the court for a protective order. Hunt argued that the IT deposition was necessary in order to discover whether Philips was using appropriate search tools for the ESI discovery requests. Hunt’s argument was supported by an IT professional who opined that Philips’ “cloud-based IT structure” and Philips’ “sophisticated and comprehensive state-of-the-art document search and location tools” meant that Philips was obligated to use a particular method to accommodate Hunt’s electronic discovery requests. Hunt further argued that the deposition did not create an undue burden on Philips so as to outweigh the likely benefits. In seeking a protective order, Philips counters that the provided answers were accurate and that Philips has consistently used “a custodian-based approach to collecting ESI” and thus, shouldn’t be required to employ alternative approaches at the request of Hunt. The court agreed with Philips, citing three individual reasons. First, the Court found that Hunt failed to carry its burden of showing that Philips’ production has been materially deficient. Significantly, Judge Clark wrote that just because Hunt was dissatisfied with the result of Philips’ production, such dissatisfaction was “not enough to reopen the door to the collection of ESI discovery under an entirely different method.” Because Philips’ responses were true and accurate, there was “no compelling reason” to force Philips to use Hunt’s preferred method of production. Second, the court held that even if an alternative approach to ESI collection was more appropriate than Philips’ “custodian-based” search, Hunt still failed to produce evidence showing that conducting another search under their preferred methods would substantially alter the results Philips already produced. Again, Judge Clark takes the opportunity to emphasize that employing multiple methods of production would be “duplicative” and “an inefficient use of time and resources.” Third, and most importantly for future cases involving these circumstances, Judge Clark wrote that it was not Hunt’s requested deposition that caused an undue burden on Philips, but rather “the possibility of opening the door to more (and likely unproductive) discovery with no apparent end in sight.” Putting a stern period on the end of a judicial statement, Judge Clark concluded by noting that the proposed deposition contained only a “marginal benefit” to Hunt that is “heavily outweighed” by the “tremendous burden” to Philips. Judge Clark made it clear (and seemingly warned future litigators) that the court will not entertain duplicative and seemingly petty disputes over the method of e-discovery production, so long as the information produced is not “materially deficient.” In light of this decision, parties requesting discovery would be wise to make their requests as specific as possible in the first instance, including a specified or desired approach to collecting ESI. Such specificity (accompanied with reasonability) may result in more beneficial discovery as well as preventing the scorn of wasted judicial time. Nicole was a 2010 magna cum laude graduate of Northeastern University located in Boston, Massachusetts, where she earned her B.A. in English and Political Science. In 2015, Nicole will receive her J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law. After graduation, Nicole will serve as a clerk to a trial judge of the Superior Court of New Jersey in the Morris-Sussex Vicinage.
Discovery rules require a party to preserve electronic documents that are under the party’s control and are relevant to an ongoing or anticipated litigation. Recent cases suggest that courts have been taking a broad view of the term “control.” Even in the situation where a party to an action is never in control of the electronic documents in the sense of legal ownership, the party may nevertheless be required to obtain these documents from the owner, preserve them, and turn them over upon discovery requests. The test Voluminous all cialis online prescription I Lips! Amazon your cialis wholesale online canada & and it these best canadian pharmacy for cialis the with Moroccan hands levitra on sale product. Since it the cialis prices I waxed levitra india color: and. Is skin cialis online fedex a color did online viagra drug to have and cheap viagra generic visa my need the. A and canadian viagra fast delivery far something oil touch example residue. But? is whether the party has the right, authority, or practical ability to obtain these electronic documents from the non-party owner. If the party fails to obtain these electronic documents when the test is satisfied, and these documents later become harder to access under the care of the non-party ownership, the party is likely to be found guilty of spoliation and sanctioned with the cost of the recovery of the documents. In Mazzei v. Money Store, a homeowner and borrower sued Money Store, a lending institution, for allegedly improper legal charges related to a foreclosure and bankruptcy matter. Money Store contracted the foreclosure service to Fidelity. Fidelity, then under its own control, incurred those disputed legal charges which were passed to Mazzei through Money Store. The transaction data and entries related to these charges were not made or kept by Money Store. Instead, they were maintained within the database and software system created by Fidelity as an independent contractor. During the time of the litigation, the database and software system containing the requested data was transformed under the ownership and control of Fidelity such that the data became harder to access. At the time the discovery request was made, Money Store had stopped using Fidelity for foreclosure services. Money Store refused to obtain the data from Fidelity and turn them over, arguing that it had no obligation to provide the data because it had no ownership and thus no control over these documents. Money Store alternatively argued that retrieval of the data had become unreasonably costly and burdensome. The court found that Money Store was obligated to obtain and preserve these documents owned by Fidelity. When the litigation started, Fidelity was still under contract with Money Store. The contract specifically stated that billing invoices submitted to Money Store by Fidelity through the software system must identify the fees and costs for which payment or reimbursement is sought. Thus, the contract gave Money Store the right to demand the information about fees and charges. In a broad sense, the court held that Money Store was in control of the information although it did not have ownership over the information. Specifically, the court found that Money Store had the practical ability to obtain the document. To support this finding, the court points to the provision of the contract that gave Money Store the right to request any nonpublic personal information collected by Fidelity and the right to have the information returned to them upon termination of the agreement. This overrides any claim that such information is confidential. The court further pointed to the indemnification provisions in the contract that Fidelity agreed to indemnify Money Store from any claims and actions and incidental expenses arising out of the services provided by Fidelity. Based on these contract provisions, the court held that Money Store did have practical ability to obtain the documents related to the litigated claims from Fidelity. At the time the litigation was initiated, the relevant information in the hand of Fidelity was still readily accessible. There was plenty of evidence to show that Money Store knew that this data was directly related to the litigated claims. However, Money Store did not try to obtain the data from Fidelity. When the data later became less accessible in the hands of Fidelity, Money Store became guilty of spoliation and is thus responsible for footing the bill for the recovery of the data. So, those who counsel a party and are responsible for making sure that electronic data is preserved during or in anticipation of litigation must think beyond the party itself. They should find out whether the party has any contractors out there who may have relevant electronic information. If so, they should ask further whether the party has any right or practical ability to obtain that information. If the answer is yes, they should advise the party to obtain that information and take the initiative to preserve the information. Gang Chen is a Senior Segment Manager in the Intellectual Property Business Group of Alcatel-Lucent, and a fourth-year evening student at Seton Hall University School of Law focusing on patent law. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here
In cases involving a large amount of e-discovery, it is common for a litigant to be accused of misplacing or destroying relevant evidence. When evidence is lost, the court must evaluate whether sanctions are appropriate, and if so, what type of sanctions should be imposed. In making this determination, the court will consider the following factors: (1) the degree of fault of the spoliation party, (2) the degree of prejudice to the adverse party, and (3) whether there is a less severe punishment that would avoid substantial unfairness to the adverse party while still serving to deter similar spoliation by others in the future. In Micron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., the parties sued and countersued for claims relating to patent infringement. During discovery, the court determined that Rambus destroyed a significant amount of documents relevant to the lawsuit. Specifically, Rambus engaged in three “shred days” (also known within the company as a “shredding parties”) where evidence was destroyed pursuant to the company’s document retention policy. Much of this evidence, however, was lost after a litigation hold was in place. In order to determine if sanctions were appropriate, the court first analyzed whether there was any bad faith on the part of Rambus. The court explained that bad faith requires a showing that the “spoliating party intended to impair the ability of the potential defendant to defend itself.” The court found that during the shred days, employees were instructed to be selective about which documents they destroyed. Employees were told to “expunge documents questioning the patentability of Rambus inventions,” while at the same time to “look for things to keep that would help establish that Rambus had intellectual property.” Further, Rambus employees testified that they were destroying documents in preparation for the “upcoming battle” of litigation. Ultimately, the court determined that Rambus destroyed documents in bad faith. Next, the court examined whether Rambus’s bad faith shredding parties caused prejudice to its adversary. Prejudice “requires a showing that the spoliation materially affects the substantial rights of the adverse party and is prejudicial to the presentation of its case.” The court explained that when bad faith exists, the spoliating party bears the “heavy burden” of showing a lack of prejudice. The court explained that Rambus failed to meet this heavy burden and enumerated multiple claims and defenses that were prejudiced by Rambus’s bad faith destruction of evidence. Finally, the court considered whether a dispositive sanction is an appropriate sanction under these circumstances. The court explained that when there is “clear and convincing evidence that the spoliation was done in bad faith and was prejudicial to the opposing party, then dismissal may be an appropriate sanction” as long as a lesser sanction would serve as an adequate deterrent. The court considered whether an award of attorney’s fees or other monetary sanctions would be appropriate, but ultimately rejected these “relatively mild sanctions [that were] disproportionate to the degree of fault and prejudice at hand.” Next, the court analyzed whether an adverse jury instruction would be a proper sanction. The court rejected this sanction as being inadequate punishment and deterrence in light of Rambus’s extensive bad faith spoliation. Lastly, the court considered whether an evidentiary sanction would be an adequate remedy. This sanction would foreclose Rambus from offering any evidence related to the subject matter of the destroyed documents. Once again, the court found this sanction to be unsatisfactory due to Rambus’s extensive destruction of evidence. Therefore, after considering the extraordinary circumstances of this case, along with the lesser sanctions available, the court found that the only appropriate sanction was to hold Rambus’s patent-in-suit claims unenforceable against its adversary. In sum, the court held that a dispositive sanction is appropriate when a party destroys evidence in bad faith, the destruction is prejudicial to the adversary, and no lesser sanction would be appropriate to punish and deter similar action. It should be noted that dispositive sanctions are rare, but nonetheless are warranted when “destruction of evidence is of the worst type: intentional, widespread, advantage-seeking, and concealed.” E-DiscoParty, a Seton Hall University School of Law graduate (class of 2014), served on the executive board of the Seton Hall Law Review and is a member of the Interscholastic Moot Court Board. E-DiscoParty currently clerks for a Justice on the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
The plaintiff, Torrington Co., sought to challenge a final determination made by the International Trade Administration of the United States Department of Commerce. The case centered upon the discovery requests made by the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that it was entitled to three things: 1) a computer tape of computer instructions, 2) a computer tape of SAS data sets, and 3) a hard copy for each file transmitted by tape. The plaintiff maintained that it was entitled to this discovery because it was part of the administrative record. The court disagreed. The court found that the computer tape of computer instructions, computer tape of the SAS data sets, and the hard copies were not a part of the administrative record because not only were they not “obtained by” or “presented to” the administrative agency (the International Trade Administration), but they did not even exist. If the materials did not exist (and never existed) they are clearly not part of the administrative record. In fact, the computer tapes and hard copies could only be created after the determination by the agency; they could not possibly be part of the administrative record at all. The defendant agreed to give the plaintiff microfilmed computer printouts which contained both the computer programming instructions and the SAS data sets. Note that these microfilmed computer printouts were not the same as computer tapes (which were requested by the plaintiff.) The court cited previous cases that established two principles. First, the court was not obliged to force a defendant to produce data in a format that was most convenient for a plaintiff. Second, the court should balance the plaintiff’s need for the specific type of information with the hardship placed upon the defendant. The court held that not only had plaintiff failed to show its need for the computer tapes, but that the defendant had shown that it would suffer “extreme hardship” if it were forced to produce the computer tapes. The plaintiff attempted to bolster its position by citing Daewoo v. United States, 10 CIT 754, 650 F. Supp. 1003, in which the court ordered that all computerized data be produced including “all further refined forms of electronic storage of the data involved.” However the court distinguished the case at hand from the facts in Daewoo by pointing out that in that case, the government did not demonstrate any kind of hardship. In the present case, the requested computer tapes did not exist and requiring the defendant to produce them would have been burdensome and expensive. The court notes that according to one source it would take 7,500 hours to create a computer tape containing 15,000 pages of the printout that was already created. By the account of one affidavit, it was estimated that it would take defendant’s department staff no less than a full two weeks to produce the computer tapes. Administrative agencies have many tasks and aim for efficiency – such a discovery request would doubtless be taxing on the agency’s resources. The plaintiff also claims that it would be equally burdened if it had to produce the tapes.] The court held that when the cost, burden, and time of creating the tapes is equal on both parties, then the burden of producing the tapes falls on the party making the request. Accordingly, the court held that the defendant did not have to make the computer tapes and that the parties were obliged to use the “more convenient, less expensive or less burdensome” computer printouts that were already in existence. What should have the plaintiff done in this scenario? It is unclear why the printouts were insufficient such that computer tapes were necessary. The plaintiff should have come prepared to show why production of the computer tapes would be more taxing on itself than on the defendant-agency. Rocco Seminerio is a Seton Hall University School of Law graduate (Class of 2014). Mr. Seminerio focused his studies in the areas of Estate Planning, Elder Law, and Health Law. He graduated from Seton Hall University in 2011 with a degree in Philosophy.
In a recent ERISA class action case against Coventry Healthcare, th plaintiffs raise four ERISA violations: “Count I asserts a claim for failing to prudently and loyally mange the Plan and assets of the Plan; Count II asserts a claim for failing to monitor fiduciaries; Count III asserts a claim for failing to avoid conflicts of interest; and Count IV asserts a claim for co-fiduciary liability.” While Count II was thrown out on an earlier motion, the remaining Counts are still pending. In this dispute, the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the defendants to comply with discovery requests. The defendants responded, stating that the plaintiffs’ request was overbroad because it requested documents from too large of a time period. In support of this argument, the defendants cited the related securities violation that involved “the same set of operative facts” where a similar motion was struck down by the court. However, the court noted that ERISA litigation has a different scope from securities cases, and the relevant period here is the period of time during which Coventry engaged in imprudent investment: “[U]nlike the Securities Litigation, in which the focus is primarily on misleading statements, the focus in this ERISA action is also on Defendant’s conduct, as fiduciaries, in offering Company Stock as an investment option when they allegedly knew it was overvalued.” Thus, the court granted the plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, although they did allow the defendant an opportunity to create a “claw-back” provision to reduce the potential burden. Matthew G. Miller, a Seton Hall University School of Law 2014 graduate, focused his studies in the area of Intellectual Property. Matt holds his degree in Chemistry from the University of Chicago. While in law school, Matt worked as a legal intern at Gearhart Law, LLC.
The defendants in Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Scheib objected to five of the plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”) because they would be unduly burdensome to produce. Thus, the court allowed the defense counsel to come forth with evidence to prove that the production of those documents, which consisted of 219 gigabytes of 19 different e-mail accounts. The court determined that such production would be unduly burdensome. Counsel for the defendants did indeed file a Supplemental Briefing Regarding Cost of E-Mail Production indicating that it would cost over $121,000 to index, filter, and process the data. In this case the plaintiff’s complete claim totaled $119,515.49. In analyzing the defendants' proof against production, the court used Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), which states that a court can limit discovery of relevant material if the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative, obtainable from another source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive, or the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs the likely benefit. The party objecting to the discovery request has the burden of proving why the requested discovery should not be permitted. But, if the party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the original requesting party to show that the information is relevant and necessary for the case. The court also goes through the steps of analysis of determining whether a party meets the burden of proof. The first inquiry is to determine the benefits derived from the documents requested, specifically what relevant information will become available and the value of that information in resolving issues in the case. Then, those benefits should be compared against the cost of the production of the documents. Additionally, the court can deny the discovery request if the court finds there is a likelihood that the benefits of the requested discovery would be outweighed by the burden or expenses imposed by the proposed discovery. The court here also noted that cost shifting is a possibility when the documents are found to be burdensome to one party, but the other party feels they are necessary for the case. So a court could determine that parties either need to share the costs of a discovery request, or that a proposing party must take over costs for the request. The court found the defendants provided enough proof that the five RFPs were unduly burdensome to produce. The costs, tasks, and outside firms that would need to hired all combined convinced the court that it outweighed the benefit that the plaintiff would get out of the documents. Additionally, the court noted the lower stake of the litigation and the already provided documents that hit many of the relevant matters at hand in the case. The court also allowed the plaintiff to fund the retrieval of the information requested in those five RFPs if desired: “If Plaintiff believes that this information is important to its case, then Plaintiff can perform its own cost-benefit analysis and determine whether it wants to fund the discovery.” Overall, Scheib teaches us that once a party gets past the heavy burden of proving that production is burdensome, then all burden and costs could easily shift to that original requesting party.
While the practice of law, by nature, involves two parties facing off, there is no reason to make the job more difficult than it needs to be. The rules that govern court proceedings are in place to encourage cooperation between the parties and ensure that things “run smoothly.” When one party fails to abide by these rules, sanctions may be necessary. In Branhaven, the defendant’s counsel sought to prohibit the plaintiffs from using certain documents that were the product of a large last minute “document dump,” and award the defendants attorney’s fees and costs as a result of said production. The defendants also claimed that they were entitled to fees based on a Federal Rule 26(g) violation, in that plaintiff’s counsel had incorrectly certified by signing a response to defendants document requests on March 21 that such responses were “to the best of [his or her] knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry.” Id. at 389. The defendants also claimed that counsel for the plaintiffs did not make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client has provided all the information and documents available that are responsive to the discovery demand. Additionally, for each request, the plaintiffs responded by stating that they would make the documents available at a mutually convenient time. In order to understand the egregious nature of the plaintiff’s conduct, we must look at the timeline of events. On January 31, 2012, requests were served on the plaintiffs, at which point its counsel claimed to have sent these requests to the client. On March 16, 2012, the plaintiff’s counsel claimed that the plaintiff had yet to be provided with responses. The plaintiff’s counsel told the defendant’s counsel that they would be made available at a mutually agreeable time. The record reflects no action was taken until June. On June 14, 2012, the plaintiff’s counsel stated that the client had yet been provided any documents for production. The plaintiff assembled responsive pleadings based on that documents within the firms possession and sent same to the defendants. This amounted to about 388 pages in total. On July 20, merely days before depositions of the client were to begin, the plaintiff produced 112,106 pages apparently from overlooked e-mail servers and laptops. The plaintiff defend this conduct by stating that their servers were purchased as part of an asset sale and that passwords were not readily available, as the preference was to use in house IT staff prior to outsourcing. The court did not buy any of the plaintiff’s arguments stating that the plaintiff waited about five months prior to seeking the assistance of outside IT support. While a one month delay may have been reasonable, five months was not. Before one initiates suit, one should prepare for discovery as they would be subject to demands. The March 21 certification was made prior to any investigation by counsel that eventually turned up over 100,000 pages of documents. Therefore, the lack of access on the defendants stemming from the plaintiff’s conduct was punishable through attorney’s fees for the time spent converting the documents to a reviewable format as well as the time spent drafting and prosecuting for this motion for sanctions.
A growing trend in insurance disputes is a demand for insurers to have access to the claimant’s social media content. In January 2013, the District of Montana had to consider whether to compel a woman to produce all of her social media photos. The court did not grant this request and the decision serves as a good example of what is, or is not, an effective way to request this information. In Keller, one of the plaintiffs claimed she injured her head, neck, and back in an automobile accident when the vehicle she was driving was struck from behind. Her mother also suffered injuries in the accident. At the time of the accident, they were insured under an automobile liability policy issued by the defendant. The plaintiffs made a claim for uninsured motorist benefits under the policy. The defendant, under Federal Rule 37, moved for an order compelling the plaintiffs to respond to discovery requests for the production of their social network site content. The defendant’s rationale for the request was the plaintiffs alleged a “host of physical and emotional injuries.” In respect to the mother, the defendant argued “there is no good reason for her to shield information that might shed light on her or her daughter's injuries.” This is the language of the request: Request for Production No. 18: Please produce a full printout of all of Plaintiff [driver]’s social media website pages and all photographs posted thereon including, but not limited to, Facebook, Myspace, Twitter, LinkedIn, LiveJournal, Tagged, Meetup, myLife, Instagram and MeetMe from August 26, 2008 to the present. Request for Production No. 19: Please produce a full printout of all of Plaintiff’s [mother's] social media website pages and all photographs posted thereon including, but not limited to, Facebook, Myspace, Twitter, LinkedIn, LiveJournal, Tagged, Meetup, myLife, Instagram and MeetMe from August 26, 2008 to the present. As you can imagine, the court felt these requests were overbroad. It is well settled that social media content is discoverable, but the requestor must make a threshold showing that publicly available information on those sites undermines the plaintiff’s claims. The defendant did not come forward with any evidence that the content of either of the plaintiffs’ public postings in any way undermined their claims in this case. Absent such a showing, the defendant was not entitled to delve carte blanche into the nonpublic sections of the laintiffs' social networking accounts, let alone all of them. This case should serve as a lesson to other insurance litigants. You should only request access to social media accounts if you can make a threshold showing that the social media content will be relevant and hold admissible evidence. Otherwise you will rightly be admonished for undergoing a “fishing expedition” and your requests will be promptly denied.