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In Freedman v. Weatherford Int’l, Ltd., Weatherford hired law firm Latham & Watkins to review allegations of security fraud made to Weatherford’s whistleblower hotline. Latham found no evidence of fraud. However, a second investigation was conducted by Davis Polk & Wardwell, LLP. Plaintiff’s alleged that Davis’s second investigation reveal that Latham actually discovered evidence of wrongdoing. Plaintiffs sought reports comparing the results of Weatherford’s production with search terms and productions related to the two investigations and search terms proposed by the plaintiff, in order to test the adequacy and reasonableness of Weatherford’s initial production. Weatherford objected, noting that Plaintiff had no legal basis for its request and its requested production was “hugely burdensome.” The District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the plaintiff’s request was “outside the bounds of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . [because they did] . . . not proffer an adequate factual basis for their belief that the production [was] deficient.” Plaintiff’s claim that Weatherford’s production was deficient because 85% of the pages produced related to different case was too conclusory. Furthermore, the Court was not surprised that Weatherford used dramatically different search terms here compared to search terms used in the two investigations and a related action, because of the differing class periods and varying false statements. The court also addresses arguments related to Subject matter waiver and the crime-fraud exception of the attorney-client privilege, but these arguments were not related to e-discovery. Aaron Cohen, a Seton Hall University School of Law student (Class of 2015), focused his studies in the area of Family Law. He participated in the Seton Hall Center for Social Justice’s Family Law Clinic. After graduation, he will clerk for a judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Family Division. Prior to law school, he was a 2011 cum laude graduate of The George Washington University Columbian College of Arts and Sciences, where he earned a B.A. in Psychology. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
This dispute stems from Plaintiff Linda Riley’s slip and fall at a Marriott hotel in Hawaii (her husband, James, is another named plaintiff). As a result of this fall, in simple terms, Riley broke her right leg and sustained permanent nerve damage including sensory motor loss and weakness in her right foot. Riley contends Marriott was negligent for failing to remove accumulated water (it had been raining that day), provide a non-slip surface, or provide warning signs. The entire accident was recorded on Marriott’s security cameras, and according to the loss prevention manager, the footage is maintained for 30 days. However, during discovery, instead of being provided with several hours of footage, Riley was only provided with about 7 minutes; the rest was destroyed. The footage released began about one minute before Riley’s accident, and ended before Riley was even lifted off of the ground! Plaintiff rightfully believed she was prejudiced because: (1) she is unable to determine how much water was removed from the location and how long it took hotel staff to remove it, and (2) that the loss prevention manager’s testimony regarding the footage cannot be meaningfully challenged because the footage was gone. This recording was apparently turned over to the Marriott’s liability insurance carrier, but neither Marriott’s investigation into its destruction (if one occurred) nor the results of any such investigation were ever disclosed. Even maintenance logs—that might have also denoted any water that was removed from the floor or the placement of any signs—were also allegedly destroyed. From this, the court “easily” found Marriott had a duty to preserve both the sweep logs and the video footage from the day of the accident. Further, the court recognized Marriott’s failure to offer any justification for its failure to preserve the evidence. For these actions, the court found “at a minimum, gross negligence.” The question then turned to imposing sanctions. Fortunately for Marriott, their answer was not stricken. Nonetheless, their failure to preserve evidence still resulted in an adverse inference instruction regarding the video footage, or lack thereof. This means the absence of a recording can, at trial, corroborate Plaintiffs’ statements that there were no warning signs at the time of the accident and that water had also accumulated on the floor. Of note here, the jury would not be required to make such an inference. However, Marriott might not be eager to take that chance. Samuel is in the Seton Hall University School of Law Class of 2015 pursuing the Intellectual Property concentration. He received his master’s from the Rutgers Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences and became a registered patent agent prior to entering law school. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
In January 2014, the Hon. Lawrence E. Kahn in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York granted plaintiff Dataflow, Inc.’s motion for sanctions in a case regarding deleted email correspondence. Sanctions took the form of the often-case-ending adverse inference, with the judge reserving on the specific language of the adverse inference jury instruction until trial. Defendant Peerless Insurance Co. might not wait that long, as even the neophyte lawyer can tell when blood is in the water. Dataflow’s claim arose out of a discovery request for production of documents that “targeted, inter alia internal communications and investigations regarding Plaintiffs’ claim.” Dataflow, Inc., v. Peerless Ins. Co., No. 3:11-cv-1127 (LEK/DEP), 2014 WL 148685, *2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2014). When the defendant failed to produce any internal communications responsive to the document request, the plaintiffs tried again. After the plaintiffs submitted an even narrower request for production, the defendants still didn’t produce anything responsive. Perhaps smelling something fishy, Dataflow started taking depositions and asking questions about the internal communications at Peerless. The plaintiffs quickly learned that email was routinely used to communicate about claims. The emails that Dataflow already asked for. The emails that Dataflow was told didn’t exist. The plot thickens. Hon. David E. Peebles, the Magistrate Judge handling discovery in this matter filed a Report and Recommendation urging sanctions be granted and fees shifted. The District Court, reviewing Judge Peebles’s ruling de novo determined that the Magistrate got it right—and that sanctions are appropriate. The court analyzed the facts of the case under the spoliation framework set forth in Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002): On a motion for sanctions due to spoliation, the moving party must show that: (1) the party having control of the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2) that party had a culpable state of mind; and (3) the destroyed evidence was of a nature that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support the moving party’s claim or defense. Dataflow, at *2 (citing Residential Funding Corp, at 107). Here, the duty to preserve for an insurance party was triggered when a claim was submitted. As such, any internal communication regarding that claim is obviously supposed to be preserved. The culpable state of mind can be inferred by the gross negligence displayed by email deletion resulting from a “system change.” A “system change” that also conveniently “changed” the methods of preservation of documents related to paid and unpaid claims. Finally, since the plaintiff was able to prove that the contents of the internal email conversations likely would have supported the plaintiffs’ theory of the case, sanctions in the form of an adverse inference just make sense. Perhaps it’s time for Peerless to have a “system change” with regards to their general counsel. Kevin received a B.S. in Political Science from the University of Scranton (2009), and will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Prior to joining the Seton Hall community, Kevin worked as an eDiscovery professional at two large “white-shoe” law firms in Manhattan. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
“Recycle,” “conserve,” “waste,” and “pollution” are terms that were implanted into the minds of each of us at a young age and are now they are being instilled into companies worldwide as a measure to reduce operational costs. Companies such as JPC Equestrian, Inc. have begun recycling and reusing “cleaned” electronic devices from former employees, which would normally not be an issue if companies had a company-wide server or cloud-based software that held all of the information stored within the device. However, since JPC Equestrian, Inc. does not have a company-wide server, once an employee leaves, the company has a procedure in place to “scub” the computer and reassign it to another without care for the electronic information within the device. In Kearney v. JPC Equestrian, Inc., Mark Kearney, a former employee, sued JPC Equestrian, Inc. (“JPC”) for the failure to produce emails relevant to the claim he is asserting. Kearney commenced this lawsuit against JPC when they wrongfully terminated his employment, and breached his sales agreements by either failing to pay him sales commissions or by paying reduced commissions that did not satisfy contractual obligations. Kearney through the discovery process received email documentation from numerous employees and executives dating back to 2005. The discovery submission included JPS turning over 250 pages of documents relevant to the parties and situations involved. However, Kearney requested information for "all relevant emails," which in his original discovery requests, were defined as "[a]ll emails that mention, or refer to the Plaintiff, however, marginally, in any way shape or form from 2002 through 2010." Kearney v. JPC Equestrian, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153975, *5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2014). Kearney was missing three years of discovery. Kearney only received documentation dating back to 2005 because the information dating back to 2002 did not exist or does not exist anymore and cannot be recovered. JPS claims that the information cannot be recovered because the computers that would have held that data were wiped clean and erased before the device was transitioned to another employee. JPS has found loopholes around document retention and the court agreed. The court held that JPS’ procedure of document retention was acceptable and the court has, “no basis to conclude that the defendants have withheld responsive documents, or that there is any basis to compel a further response regarding potentially relevant email communication.” Id. at *7. Unfortunately, this holding allows companies an avenue to discard potential and relevant information pertaining to potential litigation that otherwise would have been saved if not for the guise of recycling and employee cost saving. This holding should be reversed and JPS should be penalized for its failure to maintain adequate records for an appropriate period of time. The court should not excuse a company, no matter the size or market capitalization, for not maintaining the electronic information of employees who work within the company. Not only is that bad preservation practice, its poor business practice. Recycling and the protection of our planet is important but those ideals should not give rise to loopholes of common electronic document preservation practices, which are becoming as worldwide and important as protecting the planet itself. Timothy received his B.A. from Rutgers University in 2011. He began his post-college life working in Trenton, New Jersey, at a lobbying and non-profit management organization before attending law school in the fall of 2012. He will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Timothy has had a diverse set of experiences during his time in law school and has found his calling in Tax Law. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
A pyrrhic victory is defined by winning an early battle but eventually losing the war because of the costs and expenses of that earlier battle. Everyone has heard the phase, “you may have won this battle but I will win the war.” Victory in life, business, and litigation is achieved by obtaining a favorable outcome in the end, and not defined by winning an early battle over discovery where you exhaust resources by attempting to try to obstruct your opponent. Individuals who fail to comply and purposely try to hide or destroy a document can trigger serious legal consequences and significantly hurt their chances for long term success in the litigation. In Klipsch Group, Inc. v. Big Box Store Ltd., Klipsch Group, Inc. sued Big Box Store (“BBS”) for the spoliation of relevant documents as well as other discovery misdeeds. Klipsch commenced a lawsuit against BBS for infringement of their trademark on a particular headphone in 2012. BBS conceded that they sold some counterfeit headphones but claimed that the sales were innocent and yielded almost no profit. Klipsch’s main claim against BBS is that they failed to hold or preserve relevant documents pertaining to the pending lawsuit when they became aware of the litigation in August 2012 (a requirement by law). Every litigant has an obligation to take reasonable measures to preserve all potentially relevant documents once it has noticed that a lawsuit has been filed. Specifically, that obligation may arise even prior to litigation being formally filed if "the party 'should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation.'" MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2006-OA2 v. UBS Real Estate Secs., Inc., 295 F.R.D. 77, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)). Here, BBS should have known about the possibility of future litigations since they were knowingly infringing onto Klipsch’s patent by selling counterfeit headphones. Klipsch suspected that BBS’ actions warranted, at a minimum, a forensic investigation into their company for documents that could reveal if a larger quantity of counterfeit headphones were sold. Klipsch, correctly believed, that based on the information they received through discovery it seemed that large quantities of documents (emails, transactional documents, sales reports) were missing or altered. This belief was verified during subsequent depositions of BBS employees. The depositions revealed that BBS employees produced contradicting stories than the information revealed in discovery. In deciding Klipsch Group, Inc. v. Big Box Store Ltd., the court refused to levy a severe punishment against BBS although it was discovered that they had broken numerous discovery laws. Instead, the court took a passive approach and applied “the mildest of available remedies” that allowed the parties leave to pursue additional discovery, except this time with an experienced forensic computer expert. However, the court could have imposed stricter penalties onto BBS, such as, termination, preclusion of testimony, or a mandatory adverse-inference charge after it discovered BBS’s possible attempt to destroy evidence. Instead, the court chose a more cautious route and tabled those actions until the forensic discovery was completed. This ponders the question, if the aim of any remedy is to deter the parties from engaging in spoliation and restore the aggrieved party to the same position then why not have automatic forensic discovery? The answer? Costs. Klipsch suggested that the imposition of costs, including fees should be shifted to BBS. The court disagreed and held that the costs would first be borne by Klipsch and could be reallocated or apportioned based on the findings of the expert’s report. The court could better deter abuse of discovery by always imposing costs for forensic experts onto defendants who are found to have wrongfully withheld information requested in discovery. This action and precedent would cause all parties to become forthcoming with unaltered information due to the fear of additional costs levied in litigation. Ultimately, the expert’s report will produce the information needed for Klipsch to move forward in their litigation against BBS, or it will prove unfruitful and Klipsch will drop their litigation. This entire matter could have been avoided if BBS did not attempt to hide information during discovery. BBS could have avoided a pyrrhic problem by not exhausting valuable resources into possibly altering evidence of the sale of counterfeit headphones. However, this case could be used as future precedent to prevent future companies from pursuing this option as a method of strategy if they automatically shift the costs of forensic experts to the litigant in situations where inaccuracies of discovery occur. Timothy received his B.A. from Rutgers University in 2011. He began his post-college life working in Trenton, New Jersey at a lobbying and non-profit management organization before attending law school in the fall of 2012. He will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. Timothy has had a diverse set of experiences during his time in law school and has found his calling in Tax Law. Want to read more articles like this? Sign up for our post notification newsletter, here.
In Freedman v. Weatherford Int'l Ltd., a putative class action alleging securities fraud, the plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the court’s denial of a motion to compel discovery. The plaintiff sought to compare a document that had been produced by defendant Weatherford International during discovery with documents from two internal investigations conducted by defendant, which had not been produced during discovery. Specifically, the plaintiff secured 18 emails from “‘critical custodians at Weatherford’ that were produced (after briefing on the original motion to compel was complete) . . . by third-party KPMG.” KPMG worked with the defendant on its remediation efforts. The defendant never produced these emails during discovery, thereby—according to the plaintiff—demonstrating significant deficiencies in the defendant’s discovery production. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York acknowledged that discovery on discovery is proper “where a party makes some showing that a producing party’s production has been incomplete . . . in order to test the sufficient of that party’s discovery efforts.” However, these meta-discovery requests must be “closely scrutinized” to avoid unnecessarily prolonging the “costly and time-consuming discovery process.” The plaintiff argued that KPMG’s production of the 18 emails proved that the defendant’s production was deficient and that providing the plaintiff with the documents of the two internal investigations would lead to the discovery of “additional relevant documents that had not been produced.” Thus, the district court noted that the plaintiff did seek to test the defendant’s discovery efforts. Rather the plaintiff sought to ‘identify the documents missing from [the defendant’s] production.” The district court held that the documents the plaintiff sought would not lead to additional documents not previously produced. The plaintiff admitted that only three of the 18 emails would have been identified had it been able to compare initially produced documents with documents of the two internal investigation. Additionally, the plaintiff never argued that other documents produced by third parties, but not by the defendant, would have been identified by requested document comparison. Moreover, the court stated “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require perfection.” Further, “it [was] unsurprising that some relevant documents may have fallen through the cracks,” when the defendant “reviewed million of documents and produced hundreds of thousands.” In conclusion, the plaintiff’s requested remedy was not best suited to cure the alleged discovery deficiencies. In order to win a motion to compel discovery on discovery, the plaintiff needed to “proffer an adequate factual basis for their belief that the current production [was] deficient.” Given that a party is not subjected to sanctions for failing to produce minimal amounts of documents during a massive discovery production when its production was otherwise lawful, the plaintiff in this case should never have filed the motion for reconsideration of its previous motion to compel discovery. Furthermore, the plaintiff should have assessed the usefulness of the relief they sought. In this case, the motion to compel discovery was unnecessary because only three of the 18 emails were relevant and the proposed document comparison would not have yielded any other documents not produced by the defendant. Aaron Cohen, a Seton Hall University School of Law student (Class of 2015), focuses his studies in the area of family law. He participated in the Seton Hall Center for Social Justice’s Family Law Clinic. After graduation, he will clerk for a judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Family Division. Prior to law school, Aaron was a 2011 cum laude graduate of The George Washington University Columbian College of Arts and Sciences, where he earned a B.A. in Psychology.
Tech savvy criminals in the United States beware! Your e-mails stored on servers abroad are discoverable by law enforcement agents in the United States. A technologically clever criminal in the United States may have set up his e-mail account with a different country code to hide e-mails abroad from law enforcement agents in the United States during an investigation. The United States District Court of the Southern District of New York did not reward the particularly tech savvy criminals when it decided In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation (“In re Warrant to Search”) on April 25, 2014. In In re Warrant to Search, law enforcement agents in the United States obtained a warrant authorizing the search and seizure of information associated with a specific web-based e-mail account that is stored at the premises of Microsoft Corporation. In response, Microsoft’s Global Criminal Compliance team complied with the warrant to the extent of producing the information stored on servers in the United States. However, the servers in the United States only contained non-content information because the target e-mail account was hosted in Dublin, Ireland, where a server stored all the content information. Thus, Microsoft filed a motion seeking to quash the warrant to the extent that it directs the production of information stored abroad. Microsoft’s obligation to disclose customer information and records to the Government is governed by the Stored Communications Act (the “SCA”). However, Microsoft argued that Federal courts are without authority to issue warrants for the search and seizure of property outside the territorial limits of the United States. The Government contended that the SCA does not implicate principles of extraterritoriality, and as such, Microsoft’s motion must be dismissed. The Court dismissed Microsoft’s motion and required it to produce the digital information from the server in Dublin. The Court found that the SCA was ambiguous regarding principles of extraterritoriality, but the structure of the statute, the legislative history, and the practical consequences undermined Microsoft’s argument. An SCA Warrant allows for law enforcement agents to obtain digital information even when it is stored on servers abroad. Criminal defendants, law enforcement agents, and internet service providers can all learn a lesson from this case. Law enforcement agents in the United States should be aware that digital information stored abroad is not necessarily beyond their grasps. Internet service providers should provide the digital information from all its servers, irrespective of the server’s location, to ensure full compliance with SCA Warrants. And finally, for all the tech savvy criminals out there, your e-mails will be discovered by law enforcement in the United States even if stored on a server in a different country. If you are concerned about hiding your e-mails from law enforcement agents in the United States, I suggest that in addition to storing your e-mails on a server abroad, you should also not use an American internet service provider, such as Microsoft. Gary Discovery received a B.S. in Business Administration, with a concentration in Finance from the Bartley School of Business at Villanova University. He will receive his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2015. After graduation, Gary will clerk for a presiding civil judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey.
In a case dealing with gender discrimination between female employees and a large advertising conglomerate, the plaintiffs filed claims against the defendants under Title VII of the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and similar New York labor laws. After the plaintiffs objectioned to the defendants’ use of computer-assisted review and search method, United States Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck opined that computer-assisted review is an acceptable search method for relevant ESI in appropriate cases. Throughout his opinion, Judge Peck referred to articles and public statements he had made prior to the case on his beliefs of the value of computer-assisted review. Judge Peck explains his interactions with the two parties involved started at the first discovery conference, which took place on December 11, 2011. While, both parties had discussed ESI protocol, the plaintiffs were reluctant to accept the defendant’s utilization of predictive coding to gather the relevant documents among the three million electronic documents from the agreed-upon custodians. In a later discovery conference, the court refuted the defendants’ proposal to cutoff production at the most relevant 40,000 documents due to expense, explaining that proportionality must consider cost and results in gathering the most likely highly responsive documents. The court went on to agree with the defendants on other factors concerning document production and custodians due to the fact that the plaintiffs could not give meaningful reasons for the inclusion of other custodians and emails or assert a likelihood that the information could be found through other reasonable discovery procedures. On February 8, 2012, after going through the main issues that were holding up the discovery process, Judge Peck acknowledged that the defendants agreed to provide the plaintiffs with all seed documents and protocol in determining relevant ESI throughout the computer-assisted review process. With that knowledge, Judge Peck accepted the proposal that defendants submitted to the plaintiffs and the court for producing relevant ESI, and acknowledged that computer-assisted review was an efficient and officially judicially approved method for ESI protocol and production when given the appropriate case. On February 8, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an objection to the court’s ruling.
How many readers are familiar with a class action suit? Do class actions suits seem to be never ending and broad? What is the scope of such suits? In Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of a class action lawsuit in regards to compiling the names and addresses of the members of the class. A class action was brought against Oppenheimer Fund, an open-end diversified investment fund that sells shares to the public at their net asset value plus a sales charge. The respondents bought shares at various times and filed complaints that the shares in the Fund were artificially inflated as they had been overvalued on the Fund’s books. As a result a class action suit was filed. The respondents sought to require the Fund to help compile a list of the names and addresses of the members of the plaintiff class from records kept by using a transfer agent so that individual notices could be sent. The respondents essentially were seeking information about 121,000 people. Of this large number, 103,000 individuals still had shares in the Fund, while 18,000 others had sold their shares. Gathering this information would be time-consuming, as the transfer agent would have to manually sort through paper files. The Second Circuit held that the discovery rules authorized the district court to order the petitioners to assist the respondents in compiling this list of members of the respondent class and to bear the expenses of compilation. The issue was brought before the Supreme Court, which reversed the lower court’s holding, finding that it was an abuse of discretion of the court to require petitioners to bear the expenses of compilation. Here, the respondents could easily hire the transfer agent as a third party to compile the list by paying the agent the same amount that petitioners would have to pay. The Court reasoned that this information must be obtained to comply with the obligation of the respondents’ to prove notice to their class. Additionally, no special circumstances were presented to warrant requiring petitioners to bear the expense. The Court noted that a mere allegation of wrongdoing is an insufficient reason to require the Fund to undertake the financial burdens and risks in compiling the list. Overall, the lesson to be learned here is that in class action lawsuits, where the information sought can be obtained at the same cost to either party, it is the respondents who will bear these expenses to identify members of their own class. Jennifer Whritenour received her B.S. in Political Science and History in 2011 from the University of Scranton. In 2014, Ms. Whritenour graduated from Seton Hall University School of Law.
On July 31, 1996, plaintiff Omega Engineering Corp. ("Omega"), a New Jersey based company, lost its computer programs relating to design and production permanently from its system. Omega manufactured “highly specialized and sophisticated industrial process measurement devices and control equipment” for NASA and the United States Navy. The deletion of these programs debilitated their ability for manufacturing as well as costed the company millions of dollars in contracts and sales. From 1985 to July 10, 1996, defendant Timothy Lloyd worked as the computer system administrator at Omega. He trained with the Novell computer network and installed it to Omega’s computer system. The program worked to ensure that all of Omega’s documents could be kept on a central file server. Lloyd was the only Omega employee to maintain the Novell client and have “top-level security access” to it; however, the defense asserted that others at the company had access. According to a government expert, access "means that ... [an] account has full access to everything on the server." Lloyd was also the only employee in charge of backing up the information to the server. In 1994 or 1995, Lloyd became difficult. The company moved him laterally in hopes of improving his behavior. A government witness testified that even though it was a lateral move, it was in fact, considered a demotion by the company. Lloyd’s new supervisor asked him about the back-up system and wanted him to loop a couple more people in but he never did. Moreover, he instituted a company-wide policy that employees were no longer allowed to make personal backups of their files. On top of the above issues, there was also a “substandard performance review and raise.” The combination of the two factors, according to the government, showed Lloyd that his employment with the company would soon be terminated. This established Lloyd’s motive to sabotage the Omega computer system. On July 10, 1006, Lloyd was terminated. On July 31, 1996, Omega’s file server would not start up. On July 31, “Lloyd told a third party, that "everybody's job at Omega is in jeopardy.” days later it was realized that all of the information contained on it were permanently lost. More than 1,200 of Omega’s programs were deleted and, as per Lloyd’s policy, none of the employees had their own personal backups. There was no way for any of these programs to be recovered. A search warrant conducted on Lloyd’s house turned up some backup tapes and a file server master hard drive. Experts hired by Omega found that the deletion of information was “intentional and only someone with supervisory-level access to the network could have accomplished such a feat.” The commands necessary to pull off such a purge were characterized as a “time bomb” set to go off on July 31st when an employee logged into the system. There was evidence found by these experts of Lloyd testing these specific commands three different times. This string of commands was further found on the hard drive that was in Lloyd’s home. Lloyd was convicted of a federal count of computer sabotage. It was remanded due to a jury member’s claimed use of outside knowledge during deliberations. Julie received her J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2014. Prior to law school, she was a 2008 magna cum laude graduate of Syracuse University, where she earned a B.A. in History and a minor in Religion and Society. After law school, Julie will serve as a law clerk to a judge of the Superior Court of New Jersey.