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This Article was originally published with Bloomberg Law Reports on November 9, 2011. The Internet has afforded anyone, anywhere, a wealth of information at one's fingertips. Within the current and everexpanding age of technology, Brazilian- and U.S.-based courts continue to draw legal boundaries within a seemingly boundless cyberspace. The boundlessness of the Internet, and its related technologies, transcends geographical limits and poses worldwide issues of regulation. One such technology, which has caught the attention of businesses and resulted in significant legal battles, is "scraping" - a computer software technique that extracts publicly available information from websites. While in and of itself, "scraping" may not be unlawful, courts in Brazil and the U.S. have begun to carve out permissible and impermissible uses of this technology. Brazilian Scraping Lawsuit A recent court opinion of first impression in Sao Paulo, Brazil, gives newfound meaning to ownership rights of information available on the Internet. The Brazilian court's opinion in Curriculum Tecnologia Ltda. v. Catho Online S/C Ltda., et al, examines claims of unfair competition and violation of copyright rules, as applicable to the Internet. The plaintiff, Curriculum Tecnologia Ltda. ("Curriculum"), and defendant, Catho Online S/C Ltda. ("Catho"), are employment recruitment companies, operating solely through the Internet. Thousands of individuals seeking employment use the services of these companies by posting their resumes on the respective websites. In turn, employers seeking to hire review thousands of potential candidates to fill their open positions. In fact, Curriculum is the largest employment website in Brazil, providing a meeting place for over 6 million registered applicants and 100 thousand user companies. These services allow for a faster and easier connection to the open job market. In February 2002, developers at Curriculum noticed an unusual increase in activity on their company's website. While, generally, Curriculum's customers search approximately 500 resumes per day on its website, developers became suspicious when one particular user registered over 63,000 searches in one day. Upon further investigation, Curriculum technicians blocked the particular account and tracked its origin back to a computer at Catho, the defendant competitor. As a result of its investigation and findings, Curriculum filed suit against Catho alleging various business-related claims. As the lawsuit proceeded in the normal course, fact gathering efforts revealed flagrant and deceptive practices by Catho to illegally, in violation of Brazilian law, acquire information from Curriculum's website. In short, Catho developed a program that enabled it to copy ell mass Curriculum's website information database through which it could access resumes from Curriculum's website. Once Catho gained access to the resume information, it used it for its own commercial purposes. The purpose behind Catho's efforts was to increase its own potential employee base in order to offer a wider range to online employment recruiters. Catho acquired hundreds of thousands of resumes from its competitors through the use of these and related methods. Indeed, Curriculum was not the only competitor to bring suit against Catho for these practices, as several other victims of this Internet hacking scheme brought separate actions against Catho. To appreciate the breach of security and the value of the acquired information, one must understand the function of the employment recruitment market in Brazil within which these parties operate. Both parties operate primarily as online employment search engines. Individuals who seek employment and employers who seek skilled individuals, use the services of these recruitment companies by paying fees which permit the posting of resumes and job advertisements, allowing for searches of both to be performed. These web-based services offer various levels of fee-based access to these postings and search capabilities, which in turn generate revenue for these companies. Curriculum's website provides its users with instructions and several menus that allow them to browse its webpage efficiently and effectively. Curriculum does not provide every user with access to its resume bank. Instead, the website uses filters that permit only certain clientele with particular fee-based account settings to access this information. Catho used hacking programs to breach these security devices, allowing unauthorized access to resumes on Curriculum's website, spurring the lawsuit. Specifically, the programs developed by Catho allowed it to take advantage of security flaws in Curriculum's website, and gain access to the entire proprietary database - thereby transferring tens of thousands of resumes in a single clandestine night of debauchery. After plaintiff filed suit, the parties set forth arguments before the Brazilian court in support of their respective positions. Curriculum argued it had a property ownership interest in the data, and therefore Catho engaged in unfair competition and unauthorized copying of Curriculum's information. Catho argued that the information was public, access to the website was open and unrestricted, and therefore the information was not afforded legal protection. In sustaining a lower court's previous finding of damages.judge Luiz Mario Galbetti of 33 Civil Court of Sao Paulo found that Catho engaged in unfair competition by breaching Curriculum's internal computer systems and illegally acquiring thousands of resumes posted therein. The court held that the transmission and expansion of Catho's own database through this illegal acquisition served to increase its market visibility with direct effects on the profits obtained by Catho. Relying on notions of unfair enrichment, abuse of rights, and unpredictability, the court awarded damages in the amount of R$21,828,250.00 (in Brazilian Real). In calculating damages, the court considered the amount charged by Catho per month for posting a resume on its website, R$50.00, multiplied by the 436,595 resumes it illegally acquired. With interest and additional penalties this R$21,828,250.00 resulted in an award of R$63 million in damages, or approximately $42 Million USD. U.S. Scraping Lawsuits Similarly, U.S.-based courts have addressed the legal boundaries of extracting information from public websites. In EF Cultural Travel v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58 (1st Cir.2003), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issued a preliminary injunction pursuant to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. 1030, to prohibit the use of a “scraper” software program that defendants used to collect pricing information from the plaintiff/competitor’s website. Zefer Corp. (“Zefer”) sought review of the injunction, implemented in a prior hearing with co-defendant Explorica, Inc. (“Explorica”). See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001). EF and Explorica are competitors in the student travel business, operating websites that permit their respective visitors to explore various vacation packages. To gain a competitive edge, Explorica hired Zefer to build a program that would allow Explorica to “scrape” the prices from EF’s website and download them into an Excel spreadsheet. After accessing EF’s vacation package pricing, Explorica tailored its own costs, purposefully undercutting EF on an average of 5%. EF stumbled upon the “scraping” scheme as a result of discovery in an unrelated, state court lawsuit involving Explorica. As a result, EF filed suit in federal court, seeking an injunction on the grounds that the “scraping” violated both federal copyright laws and various provisions of the CFAA. The underlying issue in the case was whether the use of the scraper program exceeded “authorized access,” in violation of federal law. The relevant CFAA provision examined by the court provides: Whoever. . . knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the value of such useisnotmorethan$5,000inany1-yearperiod. . .shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section. While the CFAA defines “exceeds authorized access” as “to access a computer without authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesseer is not entitled so to obtain or alter,” the court in EF Cultural Travel provided analysis of the term “authorization.” The trial court held that authorization could be determined both explicitly, for example through a direct statement restricting access, or implicitly. In defining the implicit prong, the trial court relied upon a “reasonable expectations” test. Even though the appeals court agreed that authorization can be both explicit and implicit, it rejected application of the reasonable expectations test used by the trial court. Instead, the appeals court determined that “public website provider[s] can easily spell out explicitly what is forbidden and consonantly, that nothing justifies putting users at the mercy of a highly imprecise, litigation-spawning standard like ‘reasonable expectations.’” As a result, the appeals court determined that a clear manifestation of the company’s intent that no information be collected from its website was necessary in order to show “lack of authorization,” such as an explicit statement on the webpage restricting access. Or, to put it more bluntly, “[i]f EF wants to ban scrapers, let it say so on the webpage or a link clearly marked as containing restrictions.” Nonetheless, this federal appeals court decision did not eliminate the concept of implicit authorization, as it may suffice in other circumstances. However, the decision highlighted that a plaintiff must demonstrate unambiguously that authorization was prohibited. The EF Cultural Travel decision promulgates the theory that the right to control access implicates a right to prevent or obtain legal remedies for any unauthorized access. As demonstrated in EF Cultural Travel, authorization may be established both implicitly and explicitly. Another method of disclosing a lack of authorization may be through the creation of technological barriers, such as encryption of particular information. Under this regime, after the initial encounter, a third party must either obtain permission or take unusual steps to circumvent the technological barrier. Lastly, database owners may also establish use authorization conditions through contractual terms. Whatever the means of establishing authorization, or the lack thereof, it is apparent that a reasonable effort to protect is a precondition to maintaining this legal right. It is recognized, however, that the mere posting of information on a public domain, such as the Internet, does not in and of itself extinguish a protectable right to that information. This presumption is also echoed in case law analyzing the misappropriation of trade secrets. For example, in Barnett, Inc. v. Shidler, 338 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 2003), the court examined whether former employees misappropriated a trade secret by implementing the Infant Swimming Research program (“ISR”), which was designed by plaintiff as a scientific, behavioral approach to pediatric drowning prevention. In finding the ISR program was not a trade secret, the trial court noted “[plaintiff ] allowed its program to become part of the public domain before seeking protection...,” referring to various published books explaining the ISR method. In reversing this finding, the appeals court highlighted the decision in Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 28 F.3d 1042, 1045 (10th Cir.1994) in which the court found that “a trade secret can exist in combination of characteristics, each of which, considered separately, is in the public domain, but, taken together, may yield a competitive advantage that results in a protectable trade secret,” solidifying the argument that information may be a trade secret notwithstanding the fact that some of its components are well known. See also Syncsort v. Innovative Routines, No. 04-CV-03623, 2011 BL 213594 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2011) (federal district court of New Jersey examining the existence of a trade secret in light of its brief publishing on the internet). While case law involving scraping requires some form of notification as to non-authorization, this line of reasoning quashes any argument that information posted on the Internet should not enjoy legal protection simply because of its public nature. A court must determine the underlying intent of the scraper because the legality of extracting data from a website often centers on the underlying intent in copying. The copying of information for any purpose deemed a “fair use” may therefore not be actionable. As evidenced by both EF Cultural Travel and Curriculum, this key element is what often implicates legal remedies. Lessons Learned Easy access to information afforded by the Internet has created a global culture that often accepts the free use (and abuse) of information. This often results in blurred lines between public and private property, especially for those who conduct business through the Internet. Therefore, unless a database is composed of content independently entitled to protection, for example through copyright or trade secret law, database owners must rely upon a patchwork of available legal remedies. Database owners may seek protection under unfair trade statutes or under common law theories such as misappropriation. Contractual restrictions also offer protection, but such a remedy requires privity of contract. Moreover, while a claim for trespass may also be a feasible option, most courts require a showing of actual injury. Lastly, and certainly not exclusively, protection under the CFAA may be warranted. While each option has its own nuances, courts are setting down the foundation of protection in response to the legalities of the Internet age. Therefore, while the potential remedies available to database owners under U.S. law tend to be narrow, it is no doubt only the beginning. Regardless of the underlying legal principal asserted against an illegal scraper, liability attaches on a case by case basis depending upon the type of access obtained by the scraper, the amount of information accessed and copied, the degree to which the access adversely affects the Web site owner’s system and the types and manner of prohibitions on such conduct. The significant monetary award issued by the São Paulo court underscores the value that information has to a company and its survival. The decision also serves as a warning to billions of Internet users globally, as the calculation of damages serves not only to punish the wrongdoer but also to deter the illegal activity in and of itself. These decisions evidence a fairly new attempt by courts to address the legal issues posed by the Internet. While the approach is not yet uniform, there are obvious efforts by courts to protect proprietary information on the Internet from uses that are detrimental to the owners of such sites. Fernando M. Pinguelo, a Partner at Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, P.A. and co-Chair of the Response to Electronic Discovery & Information Group at the firm, is a U.S.-based trial lawyer who devotes his practice to complex business lawsuits with an emphasis on how technology impacts lawsuits. Mr. Pinguelo founded and contributes to the ABA Journal award-winning blog, eLessons Learned – Where Law, Technology, & Human Error Collide (www. eLLblog.com). To learn more about Mr. Pinguelo, visit www. NYLocalLaw.com or email him at info@NYLocalLaw.com. Renato Opice Blum, CEO of Opice Blum Advogados Associados in São Paulo, Brazil, is a Brazil-based attorney and economist, who established one of the first leading technology-based law firms. Mr. Blum is the Coordinator of the MBA course in Information Technology Law at São Paulo State Law School and a distinguished professor at Fundação Getúlio Vargas, among other universities. Mr. Blum is co-author of the book, Internet and Electronic Law. To learn more about Mr. Blum, visit http://www.opiceblum.com.br/ lang-en/01_profissionais_dadosRes.php?ID_CUREQUIPE=138578 or email him at email@example.com. Kristen M. Welsh is a U.S.-based litigation Associate at Schiffman, Abraham, Kaufman & Ritter, P.C. and focuses her practice on business and employment law matters. Ms. Welsh may be reached at KWelsh@sakr-law.com. . This rule of thumb is also applied in cases analyzing the misappropriation of trade secrets. See Barnett, Inc. v. Shidler, 338 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 2003). . Various fair uses have been identified by the court. See Nautical Solutions Mktg., Inc. v. Boats.com, Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶28, 815 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (holding that “momentary copying of open . . . public Web pages in order to extract yacht listings facts unprotected by copyright law constitutes a fair use.”); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 09-CV-07654 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) (“Taking the temporary copy of the electronic information [from the Ticketmaster.com website database] for the limited purpose of extracting unprotected public facts leads to the conclusion that the temporary use of the electronic signals was ‘fair use’ and not actionable.”); see also Assessment Technologies, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003).
In Brown v. Tellermate Holdings Ltd., Tellermate Holdings, the defendant company, terminated two employees for allegedly failing to meet sales targets over several years. The employees, feeling that they were wrongfully terminated due to their age, filed an employment discrimination action against the company as well as other entities and individuals associated with Tellermate. Throughout pre-trial proceedings, the case was plagued with numerous discovery mishaps. The plaintiffs requested from the defendant company data stored and maintained by Salesforce.com, which would, in theory, evidence plaintiffs’ sales records over the last few years in addition to allowing the plaintiffs to compare their sales figures with other (younger) employees. However, even though numerous discovery conferences were held, numerous discovery motions filed with the court, and several discovery orders issued by the court, the defendant corporation failed to produce the requested data and documents. Ultimately, the plaintiffs filed for judgment and sanctions under Federal Rule 37(b)(2); the court held a three-day evidentiary hearing on the matter. The presiding judge, United States Magistrate Judge Terence P. Kemp, identified three areas in which the defendant company or its counsel failed in its obligations to the plaintiffs and the court in relation to production of documents and data: Defendant’s counsel failed to understand how Tellermate’s data stored with Salesforce.com could be obtained and produced to plaintiffs, which resulted in counsel making false statements to the plaintiffs’ counsel and the court; By failing to understand how the defendant’s data was stored and maintained, defendant’s counsel took no steps to preserve the integrity of the information in Tellermate’s database located with Salesforce.com; Defendant’s counsel failed to learn of the existence of documents relating to a prior age discrimination charge until almost a year after plaintiffs requested the documents; Defendant’s counsel produced a “document dump” resulting from counsel’s use of an overly-broad keyword search that yielded around 50,000 irrelevant documents, which plaintiffs’ counsel could not review within the time period ordered by the court. The Salesforce.com Data Judge Kemp found that Tellermate’s failure to preserve and produce the data logged on Salesforce.com’s website irreparably deprived the plaintiffs of reliable information necessary in supporting their claims. Although defendant’s counsel initially stated that Tellermate “does not maintain salesforce.com information in hard copy format,” “cannot print out accurate historical records from salesforce.com,” and that “discovery of salesforce.com information should be directed at salesforce.com, not Tellermate,” the court found such statements to be on their face false. In fact, Tellermate did have access to the information sought by the plaintiffs as one, and sometimes two, of Tellermate's employees enjoyed the highest level of access to the Salesforce.com information. The court determined that the information eventually produced by the defendants could not be trusted as “even a forensic computer expert has no way to detect hat changes, deletions[,] or additions were made to the database on an historical basis.” Because of Tellermate’s failure to preserve the Salesforce.com data, Judge Kamp precluded Tellermate from providing evidence showing that the plaintiff-employees were terminated for their alleged underperformance. Counsel’s Obligations With Respect to ESI The court found that the defense’s counsel fell short of their well-established obligations to critically examine the documents and data Tellermate provided to them. Tellermate made false representations to its counsel about the data’s availability and therefore caused undue delay in document production as well as false and misleading arguments to be made to plaintiffs’ counsel and to the court. Subsequently, the plaintiffs were forced to file discovery motions before the court to address these discovery issues which produced the Salesforce.com data that was never properly preserved albeit its significance to the plaintiffs’ case. Judge Kemp ultimately determined that counsel for the defendant conducted an inadequate investigation of Tellermate’s electronic data while simultaneously failing to understand the most basic concepts of cloud computing and cloud storage, which led to counsel’s failing to preserve key electronic data. Control of Data Stored in the Cloud As mentioned above, Tellermate and its counsel repeatedly represented to the plaintiffs and to the court that it did not possess and could not produce any of the Salesforce.com data requested by plaintiffs. Additionally, the defendants asserted that in light of those facts, the defendants could not preserve the data stored on Salesforce.com’s databases at any point prior to litigation. Judge Kemp dismissed these claims. The court concluded that, without any factual basis whatsoever, no substantive argument could be made that Tellermate was prohibited from accessing the information stored on the Salesforce.com databases or that Salesforce.com was responsible for preserving Tellermate’s information and data as it was the entity that maintained possession and control of the data. In reality, Tellermate was the custodian of the data stored on the Salesforce.com databases. While information can be stored in locations outside the immediate control of the corporate entity by third party providers, it can still be under the legal control of the owner of the data and therefore must be produced by the owner under Federal Rule 34(a)(1)(A). Additionally, had Tellermate’s counsel critically examined the agreement between Tellermate and Salesforce.com, it would have realized that Tellermate was the owner of all data created by its employees and that Tellermate could, at any time, download the data stored on the Salesforce.com databases for preservation and production purposes. Limitations on Document Production to Avoid “Document Dumps” Tellermate produced to the plaintiffs 50,000 pages of irrelevant documents, classified by Judge Kemp as a “document dump.” Tellermate’s counsel refused to disclose which search terms it used in deciding which documents to produce to the plaintiffs, claiming that the search terms were privileged. In actuality, the court discovered, Tellermate’s counsel only used the full names and nicknames of employees as its search terms, which obviously yielded irrelevant documents. Without reviewing the returned documents, and because the court’s deadline for producing relevant documents was rapidly approaching, Tellermate’s counsel produced to the plaintiffs the documents as “Attorney’s Eyes Only.” The court recognized that a protective order was permitted only when counsel held a good faith belief that such information constituted a “trade secret or other confidential research, development, or proprietary business information, and that such material was entitled to a higher level of protection than otherwise provided in the protective order.” Tellermate could not demonstrate entitlement to this level of protection with respect to the search terms used in procuring documentation for discovery: The alleged burden imposed by a high volume production does not provide the producing party or its counsel free reign to choose a given designation and ignore the Court’s order pertaining to that designation. First, the court looked to whether competitive harm would result from the disclosure of the types of documents produced by Tellermate to a competitor; however, Tellermate’s memorandum on the issue did not contain any evidence about the harm which might result if the plaintiffs were permitted to review any particular document that was labeled “Attorney’s Eyes Only.” Second, Tellermate’s argument as to the harm it would experience was entirely conclusory and was not supported by evidence: Apart from the general concept that disclosure of some types of sensitive information to a competitor may result in harm, it contains no particularized argument which is specific to [the plaintiff], the way in which he was competing with Tellermate, and how the disclosure of any one of the 50,000 pages marked as attorneys-eyes-only would harm Tellermate’s interests. The court was astounded that Tellermate continually failed to meet the burden required to designate the documents as “Attorney’s Eyes Only” and, up until the hearing date, made no effort the redesignate a single page of the 50,000 produced in order to permit the plaintiffs from viewing the documents. Sanctions The court had absolutely no qualms with an award of attorneys’ fees for all motion practice connected to the preservation and production of the Salesforce.com data. “Had Tellermate and its counsel simply fulfilled their basic discovery obligations, neither of these matters would have come before the Court, or at least not in the posture they did.” The court took great concern to the extraordinary lengths the plaintiffs had to go to in order to obtain the documents maintained by the defendant and, even after several rounds of motions, were not able to obtain all of them. The “Attorney’s Eyes Only” designation on the 50,000 documents produced was also unfounded, the court held, and unduly precluded plaintiffs from necessary evidence that supported their case, which warranted fees under Federal Rule 37(a)(5)(A). Conclusion Tellermate provides a warning to all attorneys that the realm of technology in which their clients are constantly interact with is always changing. Therefore, so does the practice of electronic discovery. Counsel must always meet its duties with respect to ESI by engaging in discussions with its clients and opposing counsel about ESI; being aware, and perhaps even knowledgeable, of new and emerging technologies; and investigating and assessing with its clients the sources and status of potentially relevant ESI. By forgoing these practices, counsel opens itself and its clients to easily avoided and costly sanctions. Daniel is the Editor-in-Chief of eLessions Learned and a third-year law student at Duquesne University. To read more about him, click here.  Salesforce.com is a cloud-based customer relationship management system with more than 100,000 corporate customers around the world. Tellermate and its employees used Salesforce.com to track their sales and other interaction with customers. The court recognized that each sales person using the Salesforce.com management system could add, remove, or otherwise change data on their sales account.  See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 382 F.Supp.2d 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (counsel had an affirmative duty to monitor preservation an d ensure all sources of discovery information were identified).
An employer doesn’t need an attorney to tell him or her that destroying evidence relevant to litigation may make the court very unhappy. Often times, when a party acts in bad faith by intentionally destroying evidence, the court will impose a sanction such as an “adverse inference” jury instruction. This type of instruction orders the jury to infer that the missing evidence would have been detrimental to the guilty party. But what if a party did not intentionally destroy evidence in bad faith, but rather lost the evidence due to a negligent mistake? Should the same adverse inference instruction be used? In Pillay v. Millard Refrigerated Services, the court held that even if a party is merely negligent in destroying evidence, a jury may presume that the evidence would have been unfavorable to that party. This permissive adverse inference instruction differs from the circumstances where the court determines that the party acted in bad faith because the court gives the jury the option of making an adverse inference. Typically, when bad faith is present, the court will instruct the jury that it should presume the missing evidence is detrimental to the party who destroyed it. This instruction differs from the instruction in Pillay where the court gave the jury the option of making the adverse inference. The Pillay court imposed a permissive adverse inference jury instruction when an employer negligently deleted relevant information. The employer claimed that it terminated an employee because the employee’s production levels were down. The employee claimed that he was terminated for unlawful reasons and that the employer’s labor management system (“LMS”) would show that the employee’s production level exceeded expectations. The employer, however, no longer possessed the LMS data because of routine deletions of the data after one year. The data was deleted despite opposing counsel’s numerous requests to preserve all relevant documents and evidence. The employer argued sanctions were not warranted because the LMS data was not deleted intentionally or in bad faith. The court rejected this argument holding that even without a showing of bad faith, the court has the discretion to impose sanctions when a party’s negligence causes information to be lost. The court sanctioned the employer with the following permissive adverse jury instruction: Pillay contends that Millard at one time possessed data documenting [an employee’s] productivity and performance that was destroyed by Millard. Millard contends that the loss of data was accidental. You may assume that such evidence would have been unfavorable to Millard only if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) Millard intentionally or recklessly caused the evidence to be destroyed; and (2) Millard caused the evidence to be destroyed in bad faith. Moving forward, this case means litigants must be extra careful in preserving evidence that may be relevant to litigation. One negligent misstep, even if done without any showing of bad faith, may be the cause of an adverse jury instruction that can potentially be the deciding factor in a lawsuit. E-DiscoParty, a Seton Hall University School of Law graduate (class of 2014), served on the executive board of the Seton Hall Law Review and is a member of the Interscholastic Moot Court Board. E-DiscoParty now clerks for a Justice on the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
By the time In re Biomet made it in front of a Seventh Circuit Judge for a ruling, 2.5 million documents and attachments were produced to the plaintiffs in this large class action case against Biomet. The plaintiffs wanted the judge to order the discovery of electronically stored information. The plaintiff’s Steering Committee was unhappy with the amount of documents produced and claimed that it should have been almost five times that amount. The plaintiffs challenged the electronic discovery procedure that Biomet had undertaken. Specifically, the plaintiffs wanted the judge to make a ruling that the defendant’s process was “tainted” by their use of keyword culling. The judge disagreed and refused to make such a ruling, which would have thrown Biomet back to almost square one. Biomet went through an extensive process to cultivate documents to produce for the plaintiffs. Biomet first used “electronic search options, then predictive coding, and finally personal review.” The plaintiff’s issue was primarily the first step that defendants irrevocably ruined the rest of their document production from the get-go. To first identify what documents would be relevant the defendant used a “combination of electronic search functions” which included keyword culling. The defendant’s original pool consisted of 19.5 million documents and attachments which the first step narrowed down to 3.9 million (eventually getting to 2.5 million documents). The plaintiffs thought they should have produced 10 million documents and said their keyword searches were the problem. The plaintiffs cited to a New York Law Journal article that said that keyword searches were “only 20 percent” responsive. According to the plaintiffs, Biomet’s approach was flawed because it used the “less accurate” method of keyword search in the beginning instead of predictive coding. They asked for the judge to rule that the defendants had to go back to the first step and use predictive coding with “plaintiffs and defendants jointly entering the ‘find more like this commands’. The judge found that the plaintiff’s journal article and one cited search claiming that Boolean and keyword searches are less effective at producing relevant documents were insufficient in proving that Biomet did not meet its discovery obligations. Instead, the judge found that its procedure did comply with FRCP 26(b) and 34(b)(2). The judge also refused to read into the rules that Biomet had to allow the plaintiffs to sift through possibly privileged documents with them. The judge also found that Biomet fulfilled their federal requirements as proven through their statistical sampling and confidence tests that they ran over their documents. This sampling found that less than 1.34 percent of the documents that weren’t selected would be responsive and that between 1.37 and 2.47 of the original 19.5 were. Biomet’s process singled out 16 percent out of that original. The judge cited heavily to FRCP 26 (b)(2)(C) and said that Plaintiffs’ request did not comport well with proportionality. Biomet had already spent $1.07 million and “will total between 2 million and 3.25 million.” Were Biomet to go back to their original bank of ESI, it would cost them in the low seven-figures. The judge said that it would not make Biomet do that just to test the plaintiffs’ theory that more responsive documents would be found through predictive coding instead of keyword searches.
In this case, the plaintiff, an inmate at Rikers Island, brought a motion for spoliation of evidence and alleged the defendants breached their duty to preserve evidence. The evidence in question is video footage relevant to the litigation regarding the assault on the plaintiff which occurred on May 24, 2011, by other prison inmates in a holding cell at the Bronx Criminal Courthouse. The defendants claim that they do not have a duty to preserve the surveillance footage because by the time they were given notice, the footage had been deleted. The defense states that even if they had a duty to preserve, they met this obligation by saving eight minutes of surveillance that they deemed to be relevant. On the day of the assault, the holding cell in which the plaintiff was placed in with approximately sixteen to seventeen other inmates was under twenty-four hour video surveillance. That same day, Jacqueline Brantley, the former Assistant Deputy Warden Executive Officer at the Bronx Criminal Courthouse, reviewed the video footage to determine the course of events specifically for a period of three hours. Brantley was the only person to view the three hours of footage and therefore she was the only one who could testify in court regarding this evidence. The three hours of video footage is extremely relevant to the case. The footage included evidence of not only the plaintiff’s injuries, but also how the Department of Corrections protected the inmates and how they responded to the incident. The tapes also show the presence and identity of possible witnesses to the assault and help create a visual timeline of events in the holding cell. The Southern District of New York stated that the defendants should have known within a week of the assault that the surveillance footage would be relevant to a future lawsuit. While the Department of Corrections destroyed the footage pursuant to the Department’s automatic video recycling procedures, prior to the filing of the claim by Taylor, the Department did manage to save eight minutes of footage. This begs the following question to be asked: Why did the department not preserve the entire three hours of footage? As a result, the plaintiff in this case sought sanctions for spoliation of evidence with the deletion of the footage. A party seeking sanctions for the spoliation of evidence must establish the following three elements: The party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; The records were destroyed with a culpable state of mind; and The destroyed evidence was relevant to the party’s claim… such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d. Cir. 2002). If the moving party can establish these three elements, then the court has the ability to impose sanctions under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendants here should have anticipated that the plaintiff would file a lawsuit against the Department for its failure for protect the plaintiff in the holding cell. Therefore, the defendants should have reasonably known that any evidence depicting the plaintiff’s treatment in the holding cell would be relevant to the litigation. The obligation to preserve the video footage in this case attached at the time of the assault due to its relevance. The defendants should have known that the entire three hours of footage would be relevant and that two four minute video clips would be insufficient. Since the entire footage has been destroyed, the defendants breached their preservation duty. The destruction of evidence by the defendants was done in a culpable state of mind and destroyed knowingly. Therefore, the defendants were negligent in allowing the footage to be deleted. However, the defendants were not grossly negligent in their failure to preserve, as no relevant evidence here has been claimed to have been destroyed after the plaintiff filed his Notice of Claim, approximately sixty-five days after the assault occurred. Additionally, the destroyed evidence would have been favorable and relevant to the plaintiff’s claims and defenses in this case. This evidence would have shown the three hour period of time the plaintiff was left injured in the holding cell as well as the failure of the Corrections Officers to protect him and remove him from the cell when he was covered in blood after the assault. The Court found that for these reasons the destruction of evidence prejudiced the plaintiff. Therefore, the following sanctions were ordered by the court: 1) the preclusion of Brantley from testifying about what she saw when she reviewed the deleted footage; 2) the use of an adverse inference jury instruction; and 3) the award of attorney’s fees and costs to the plaintiff. To avoid having a similar outcome, potential defendants should immediately preserve any relevant evidence in matters that they know or should reasonably know will give rise to litigation. Jennifer Whritenour received her B.S. in Political Science and History in 2011 from the University of Scranton. She is received her J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law in May 2014.
The plaintiff, Tony B. Clay, brought claims for employment discrimination and retaliation based on race under Title VII against Consol Pennsylvania Coal Company (“Consol”).Continue Reading
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